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Abstract
The three essays of this thesis cover two sets of topics: search in auction platforms in the first
two papers, and political campaigning in the last. In platform settings, search cost reductions are
often regarded as beneficial because they improve match quality. But is this in fact true? And if it
is true in an aggregate sense, what are the consequences to individual platform participants? Do
individual buyers and sellerswin or lose? The first paper develops a novelmodel of search in plat-
forms and applies it to auction platforms to test the popular hypothesis that lower search costs are
always beneficial to sellers. Under certain assumptions, we find that while lower search costs is
welfare improving, its distributional consequences are less predictable. In general, lower search
costs intesify buyer-side competition. On the one hand, this tends to improve seller revenues due
to bettermatches; on the other hand, thismay also thin outmarkets for certain sellers, since lower
search costsmake it easier for buyers to searchout of certainmarkets. Generally, some sellers gain
and some lose; most surprisingly, however, we find that overall seller revenue can decrease with
lower search costs. Our second paper extends the model to endogenize buyer participation— so
some buyers may leave the platform completely— and considers optimal platform search policy
in such settings. Under stricter assumptions, we find that a platform that taxes the seller side
generally benefits from lower search costs; a platform that charges buyers, however, may max-
imize search costs, since the gains from easier search are unevenly distributed among buyers,
and may be inefficiently extracted with a fee. The final essay provides a novel model of politi-
cal campaigning as argumentation, which brings together two different strands of the campaign
spending literature: spending has direct effects on electoral outcomes, but also provide a ``signal''
of candidate quality. The model parsimoniously resolves many pre-existing campaign spending
``paradoxes'' while delivering new results on the effects and desirability of spending caps.
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Introduction
The first two essays presented in this work study search effects in auction platforms. Although
the properties of individual auctions – covering a wide variety of different mechanisms – have
been extensively analyzed, the process by which potential buyers initially find themselves bid-
ding auctions themselves has received relatively little attention. Given the historical context of
early work in auction theory, this makes sense: its main applications have been centered around
engineering sales of relatively unique goods with potentially high, but buyer-specific value. Since
then, however, auctions have proven to be an increasingly popular way to allocate a large vari-
ety of goods, from used cars to search keywords; more recently, three of the largest technology
companies – Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo – have established large display ad exchanges. In con-
trast to the high-profile auctions aroundwhich early auction theory developed, auctions today are
commonplace, most of them completely invisible: almost every time a website is loaded, an auc-
tion is held in the background to allocate a singular, transient advertisement spot. This increase
in quantity has also led to a change in organization: they are organized via centralized exchanges,
or platforms.
When large numbers of simultaneous auctions are organized in platforms, the allocation prob-
lem becomes more complex: the process by which bidders find the auctions they participate in
is just as important as the process by which those individual auctions are conducted. Moreover,
auctions are most useful for goods with specific values and thin markets, characteristics that am-
plify the importance of high quality matches: the better matches a platform can make, the higher
will be prices and surpluses. The first essay presents a first rigorous look at the effects of this
allocation process: it develops a model of auction platforms where buyers find auctions through
sequential search and applies this model to examine the effects of reducing search costs on plat-
form outcomes. One main contribution of this essay is methodological: the search framework
gives awidely applicable tractable treatment of sequential search intomany-to-onematches. This
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significantly expands the applicability of sequential search models, which have previously been
restricted to one-to-one settings. In auction platforms, however, each buyer's utility depends not
only on the seller he is matched to, but also the identities of all other buyers against whom he is
competing. A tractable many-to-one search model may also deliver additional insights into other
phenomena, such as job search, but the present essays focus on auction platforms. The first essay
provide theoretical support for the idea that search generates additional surplus, it turns out that
overall welfare does improve as search costs decrease. At the same time, however, we show that
the distribution of gains is uncertain; most surprisingly, in some cases, overall seller revenue can
actually decline with reductions in search costs.
The second essay is amore applied work: armedwith amodel of agent behavior and outcomes
in auction platforms, we ask what a platform's optimal search policy is. Interest in search effects
has beenmotivated by the intuition that search generates extractable surplus—hence, a platform
operator should stand to benefit from investments that reduce search costs. But as we saw in the
first essay, search has significant distributional consequences, which complicates the question.
Although search may increase total surplus, whether or not a platform operator will desire lower
search costswill depend on its ability to extract that surplus. We establish results on optimal plat-
form policy for two types of platforms, one that taxes sales, or total seller revenues, and one that
charges buyers to participate. The general findings here reinforce the concepts of the first essay:
there are significant gains to be had from producing better matches, but whether or not a plat-
form will want to reduce costs depends on its instrument; in particular, a fee-charging platform
will sometimeswant tomake search costs as high as possible, i.e., tomaximize the search frictions.
The reason for this is that the gains from search are often selectively enjoyed by buyers with ex-
tremal valuations and the sellers they are matched to; whether or not these gains are transferred
to platform operators depends on how responsive the instrument is to those particular matches.
A flat membership fee, in particular, can be levied only at the level of the lowest-utility buyer, and
so a platform that derives its revenue primarily from fees may fail to reap the benefits of reduced
search costs.
The final essay shifts focus from economic to politicalmechanisms and takes a close look at one
particular aspect of political competition: campaigning. The recent 2012 US election cycle, pre-
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ceded by the controversial 2010 Supreme Court decision on Citizens United, has renewed public
debates on the role of money in politics; in spite of spirited voices on bot sides, there is no con-
sensus on how money actually affects political outcomes. Part of the confusion has come from
empirical studies of campaign spending effects, which have consistently found very low effects
of marginal incumbent spending; hence, an argument goes that there is no need to worry about
incumbents being able to steal elections with easier access to contributors. Our essay seeks to
clarify the role of spending in election outcomes by developing an all-pay model of political cam-
paigns. Although all-pay contest are a popular way to model many types of competition, they
have been strangely absent from analyses of political campaigns, in spite of the fact that they
share many structural properties with all-pay contests. Such a framework is also able to bring
together two sides of the political contest literature: spending can have direct effects, while also
serving as a noisy signal of candidate quality. The paper demonstrates how a very basic all-pay
model with asymmetric costs is able to parsimoniously account for several prominent empirical
puzzles. Furthermore, it develops some new insights into how a fund-raising advantage is likely
to bemanifested in the data: in particular, it should show up in the incumbent's fixed effect rather
than his average spending effect, which provides an argument against policies that may increase
an incumbent's cost advantage, even if they are estimated to have near-zero spending effects. Fi-
nally, we show that an adequately chosen spending cap may be effective at improving election
outcomes, both in terms of reducing the incumbent's advantage, and in terms of informational
efficiency; there is, however, a catch: an improperly chosen cap might yield no benefits, but only
degrade election outcomes.
3
1. Search in auction platforms*
1.1. Introduction
New technologies often bring new markets and market structures: just as advances in shipping
technology opened up countries to international trade in goods that were previously too heavy to
ship, advances in communication and computation have created newmarketplaces in goods, me-
dia, and advertising that could not have existed earlier. Many of these newmarkets are organized
aroundplatforms, which bring together large numbers of consumers andproducers, offering each
side easy access to the other. In some ways, these platforms resemble marketplaces that have ex-
isted for centuries: platforms act as intermediaries to facilitate transactions between agents that
would otherwise not occur. In other respects, however, these new platforms are sui generis. The
platforms themselves often represent substantial investments, and they embody many propri-
etary technologies that are just as important as the transactions that they enable. In fact, in many
cases, the platforms themselves are far more visible than the any of the transactions that take
place on them: eBay, iTunes, and Spotify, for instance, have become household names.
Platforms help to overcome several key frictions: (1) they provide market thickness; (2) they
reduce transaction costs; and (3) they reduce search costs (Hagiu 2009). The first two functions
are relatively well-understood, and they represent the two foremost challenges that a platform
must solve in terms of its development strategy. The consequences of search within platforms,
however, are less well understood, in spite of the growing importance that search facilitation
seems to be playing on many platforms. For instance, media platforms, such as Netflix and Ama-
zon, invest heavily in their recommendation systems, which help to direct viewers and readers
to movies and books that they are likely to enjoy; in fact, Netflix, for several years, offered annual
prizes to developers who could improve their user rating prediction algorithms. Some platforms,
* coauthored with Gregory Lewis
4
1. Search in auction platforms
such as dating sites, live or die by the efficacy of their search systems: whatmatters for the paying
members of a dating site is not the number of potentialmatches that might exist on the platform,
but rather the quality of the few matches that actually do take place. The lesson seems to be that
creatingmarket thickness on the other side is not always enough. In situationswherematch qual-
ity is a central part of platform outcomes, a platform also has a role in making desirable matches
easier to achieve.
The implicit intuition behind such efforts to facilitate search within platforms is that lower
search costs represent a ``win-win'' situation for the agents on the platform and lead to Pareto-
improving outcomes. In the case of Amazon, for instance, low search costs make it more likely
that readers find books that they will want – they are better off since they end up getting books
that they like more. Sellers are also better off because the readers most likely to purchase their
books get exposure to them, and so their revenues are likely to increase.
Although the justification for lower search frictions seems straightforward, there has been rel-
atively little theoretical analysis of the within-platform effects of search. The next section gives a
more detailed overview of the existing literature; as far as we know, however, this paper repre-
sents the first rigorous look at the effects of search in a general platformsetting. The twopurposes
of the present paper are (1) to provide the first positive results on the general effects of search
within platforms, and (2) to develop a continuum framework that allows us to reduce the large
platform game to a continuum of Poisson games, which are significantly more tractable than dis-
crete formulations. On the positive side, we find that the ``win-win'' intuition is limited in scope:
in general, it is true that the total surplus generated will be higher, since matches will on average
be of higher quality. It is not generally the case, however, that all sellers benefit from such reduced
frictions – allowing buyers to search into markets that they like means that some sellers may lose
buyers overall, even if they gain desirable ones; a decrease in local market thickness has an ef-
fect counter to that of better matches, and there is no general way to sign the effects. We do find,
nevertheless, that a sufficient condition for lower search costs to raise the revenues of all sellers
on the platform is that the platform be symmetric. In such cases, the measure of buyers faced
by each seller remains constant regardless of search intensity, so that the only channel affecting
seller revenues is the creation of better matches, so revenues will be increasing.
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The primary motivation for the setup presented here is an auction platform such as eBay: buy-
ers have unit demand for some good for which varieties exist, and they have ``tastes'' for different
varieties; buyers acquire the goods by first searching into auctions for specific goods and thenpar-
ticipating in those auctions. While the analysis on the welfare and distributional effects of search
is particular to the allocation mechanism (in this case, single-unit auctions), the overall frame-
work is quite broadly applicable and can be used to model sequential search into many-to-one
matches.
The specific attention to auction platforms also allows us to make several important and per-
haps unexpected connections between search effects and informational effects. Auctions are a
promising setting formore general analyses of search since revenues are directly dependent both
on market thickness as well as composition. Second, the nature of ``interesting'' auctions is also
changing, since they are an increasingly popular way of allocating goods, particularly in the inter-
net economy. While much of modern auction theory has developed around the design of single
auctions, most modern auctions are held on platforms, which bring together large numbers of
buyers and sellers. The new concern here, which supplements channels that have been more ex-
tensively analyzed, is that not only is the auction design itself important, but also the design of the
mechanism by which individual buyers get allocated to individual auctions.
The main positive findings for auction platforms are that matching is welfare-improving, but
that the distribution of surplus may be adversely affected by more efficient matches. For auc-
tion platforms, we are especially interests in matching effects on total seller revenues, since an
ad valorem tax is typically the most popular revenue instrument for platform operators – higher
prices and seller revenues translate directly into higher platform revenues. We show that under
certain conditions, when the markets for the two goods are ex ante identical, matching is benefi-
cial for all sellers; this generalizes both popular intuitions on matching effects as well as recent
experimental evidence that attests to their benefits. When the markets are asymmetrical, how-
ever, for instance, when one type is of unanimously higher ``quality'', or when one good is much
rarer relative to the other, then the reallocation of buyers between different types of goods can
have negative overall revenue effects, and seller revenue can decline. While we do make certain
assumptions on buyer preferences, the main negative result should generalize to most auction
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platforms with unit demand – the assumptions we make represent a ``best-case'' scenario for the
generation of positivematching effects, and since even in the best case, total seller revenue can ac-
tually decline with more intense search, this effect should only be more pronounced under more
general preferences.
To get an intuition for our main finding, we might conceptually decompose search effects into
two parts: (1) a matching effect, which increases the expected total surplus generated by indi-
vidual matches; and (2) a segmentation effect, which causes markets for some goods to become
smaller, since fewer buyers search for those goods. The latter will often affect at least one group
of sellers negatively, and this can outweigh the benefits provided by other sellers, since there are
decreasing returns to market thickness when supply is fixed. Hence, even if individual matches
may be of higher quality and generates high total surplus – hence an increase in total welfare –
the seller's cut of that surplus depends on how many other buyers are also participating in the
same auction. To take a stark example, in an auction with only one buyer we can make the buyer
valuation, and hence total surplus, arbitrarily large, but seller revenue is always zero in a standard
auction without reserves.
Our paper is organized as follows: the next section overviews the existing literature and shows
how ourwork relates to questions that have previously been explored. The third section presents
a simple discrete example to illustrate the effects of search within platforms. The four section es-
tablishes the formalmodel andnotation; the fifth presents the analysis and results. Wealsodevote
a separate subsection to the development of a simpler model to highlight our technical contribu-
tion and its role in solving the model. The final section offers our conclusions and thoughts for
future research directions.
1.2. Literature Review
The three platform functions mentioned in the previous section correspond to three character-
istics of certain markets that make it amenable to platform intermediation: (1) the presence of
network effects; (2) the existence of shared of transaction costs; and (3) the existence of search
costs. This section gives a broad overview of the current literature on platforms, using these three
distinct characteristics as a guide.
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The current literature on platforms has focused almost exclusively on the first of these func-
tions: the realization of network effects (Armstrong 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006; Weyl 2010).
A platform becomes more attractive to potential participants as the number of existing members
on the other side of the market grows. An auction platform such as eBay, for instance, is more at-
tractive to sellers as the number of buyers grows; a software platform such as iOS becomes more
attractive to developers as the ownership of iOSdevices increases. This goes the otherway around
as well: more buyers will join eBay the more sellers there are, since they are more likely to find
goods that they want, and more consumers will purchase iOS devices the richer is its application
ecosystem, i.e., the more software developers are making iOS applications. This implies that the
foremost concern for platforms is to attract a high enough user base, since platform economies
experience increasing returns to scale in the number of participants. This also has important
implications for the number of platforms that can exist in equilibrium, and how they might be
structured; in general, platform markets will support only one or two platforms in equilibrium
because of these ``tipping point'' effects (Ambrus and Argenziano 2009; Ellison and Fudenberg
2003).
On the practical side, related to the existence of shared and transaction costs, computer sci-
entists have devoted considerable effort into analysis of reputation mechanisms that can enable
transactions to take place. Attracting members on one side is about guaranteeing enoughmarket
thickness to make it worthwhile for potential participants on the other side to use the platform;
reputation and payment mechanisms, on the other hand, are about reducing transaction costs in
order to overcomeother barriers to transactions thatmight exist, so that these surplus-generating
transactions actually do take place. Security has long been, and always will be, one of the central
concerns of e-commerce, and part of the reason that so many platforms seem to have emerged
with the rise of e-commerce is probably the need to provide a degree of trust that is otherwise ab-
sent in online interactions. This aspect of platforms is also relatively well understood, and more
often represents a technical challenge rather than a theoretical question: reducing transaction
costs, reducing asymmetric information, is just about always good, even if there are many tricky
details in the implementation.
The third domain of platforms – searchwithin platforms – has been developed to amuch lesser
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extent. To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have examined search within platforms,
both from the past couple of years. This may be partly due to the fact that search costs are some-
thing of a higher-order concern: in order for a platform to exist at all, it must attract enoughmem-
bers, and it needs to provide a way to ensure that the market does not break down. On the other
hand, as platforms begin to encompassmore andmoremarkets, and as platform services become
more specific to the user (individuals with specific tastes in music, movies, companions), the fa-
cilitation of search is becoming more and more important, and getting the answers to questions
about search effects becomes more urgent.
Of the two recent papers to address search, one is theoretical and one empirical. Hagiu and
Jullien (2011) analyze a Hotelling type model with two sellers and a continuum of buyers; their
main result is that platforms, which derive revenue from the number of matches generated, have
an incentive to divert search, in the sense that they may direct buyers to their less preferred sell-
ers and prevent some surplus-enhancing trades from taking place. Our model is similar in spirit
but different in focus: we ignore platform participation effects in order to analyze more closely
the within-platform effects of decreasing search costs. We also allow for continuous variation in
buyer valuations rather than search costs, which creates more subtle incentives for buyers and
consequences for sellers, since a buyer's valuation has immediate consequences for the competi-
tiveness of a buyer for a given auction as well as the contribution of the buyer's presence to total
surplus and revenue.
The other recent paper is a study by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2011), which provides a direct
motivation for our analysis: they find that decreasing search costs in an auction platform can raise
the revenues of all sellers on the platform. It is worth providing a brief overview of their results
to develop an idea of how search can affect the utilities of different agents on a platform. The au-
thors run an experiment in wholesale auto auctions, which are auctions for used automobiles, of
varying quality. For vehicles in their experimental group, a third-party is paid to assess the vehi-
cles and to assign to each one a quality score: the quality score is made publicly available with the
auction listing. The way that the auctions are run puts constraints on the abilities of individual
bidders to join multiple auctions easily: many auctions are run simultaneously, and participat-
ing in an auction usually entails a physical inspection of the vehicle, which is a time-consuming
9
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process. The only difference between the control and experimental groups is the availability of
the third-party quality score up front, prior to auction entry decisions. They find that revenues
increased for auctions of all qualities in the experimental group, and that the effect was most sig-
nificant for very high quality vehicles and very low quality vehicles, and least significant for those
in the middle.
Although there are similarities between these results and those in the information revelation
literature (Lewis 2011; Milgrom 1981; Myerson 1981; Riley and Samuelson 1981), there are sev-
eral facts that do not fitwith a purely asymmetric information interpretation: the prices increased
for all quality types, and especially for low-quality types. If a fear of lemons is what suppresses
prices in the control group, then the expected pattern would be lower prices for the low quality
types, and higher prices for higher quality types. Second, the quality score itself does not really
give any additional information at the time that bids are placed: since a thorough physical inspec-
tion is performed on the vehicles auctioned off, all participating bidders have a good idea of what
they are bidding on. The effect of the intervention, then, is to move this information forward in
the sequential game to the stage where buyers choose which auctions to join. If some buyers are
looking for high quality cars, and other buyers are looking for lower quality cars, moving this in-
formation forward allows them to end up in the auctions that they want to be in. This means that
buyers end up in auctions for goods that they value more, and sellers end up with more competi-
tive auctions, which explains the higher prices.
Our paper generalizes the findings of Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2011): we provide a formal
model to describe the effects of search in a large platform with many buyers and sellers. We
also show that under certain conditions, the most provocative of their results holds true: when
valuations and supplies for two types of goods (e.g., high quality and low quality vehicles) are
symmetric, then revenues of all types of sellers can be expected to increase. This gain can be
interpreted as a ``matching effect'', in that from a seller's point of view, increased search means
replacing relatively low-valuation buyers with relatively high-valuation buyers. Our continuum
model is also able, however, to give amore detailed account of what happenswhen there are large
numbers and shows that the rates at which low valuation buyers are traded for high valuation
buyers will not, generically be equal. The primary implication of this is that some sellers will see
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a decrease in market thickness that can dominate the gains from better matching.
The search mechanics of our model are based on well-established models of sequential search
(Diamond 1971; Mortensen 1970). What differentiates our model of search on platforms from
existing models of consumer search and job search, however, is the fact that the search match (in
the sense of the identity of seller and buyer) is no longer sufficient to determine the final payoffs.
On the auction platform, buyers are searching into competitive environments, where the utilities
they realize depend on the other buyers who end up matched with the same seller.
As alluded to in the introduction, this additional layer creates many additional technical chal-
lenges. We address them by noting that sequential search and random many-to-one matching
(many buyers to one seller) lead to a continuum of Poisson games in the limit. Themain technical
contributionof this paper exploits this relationship,which allowsus to characterize cleanly the ex-
pected utilities from search into auctions. Continuum frameworks have been used in continuous
double auction settings (Satterthwaite and Shneyerov 2007), but not in a general search setting.
We build upon the work of Myerson (2000), who establishes many of the convenient properties
of Poisson games. We apply several of the key results derived there, as well as show how such
games can arise naturally in sequential search settings.
1.3. Example
In this section, we present a modified version of the model presented by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer
(2011). This is a significantly simplified model of search, but it helps to illustrate both the effects
of search within an auction platform, as well as the difficulties of analyzing search effects in a full
environment.
Consider a platformmarket with two goods, 𝐴 and 𝐵, and four buyers. Buyers have quasilinear
utility and are one of two types, 𝑎 and 𝑏. valuations are given by 𝑣􀐍(𝐴) = 𝑣􀐎(𝐵) = 1 + 𝜀􀐕 and
𝑣􀐍(𝐵) = 𝑣􀐎(𝐴) = 𝜀􀐕 , where 𝜀􀐕 is a random perturbation for each buyer. The perturbations are
independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and there are two buyers of each type.
There are two stages to the game. In the first stage, buyers are matched to auctions, and in the
second stage the goods are auctioned off in second-price auctions. The solution concept that we
will use is Bayesian SPNE, and in the second stage we restrict ourselves to weakly undominated
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strategies, so all buyers bid their valuations.
In the matching stage, buyers are either randomly matched to auctions, or they can pay some
cost 𝑐 to bematched to an auction for a particular type of good. Wemotivate this setup by suppos-
ing that buyers cannot distinguish between auction types, so without additional information they
choose randomly – such a buyer would end up in each auction with probability 1/2. By paying
some cost, however, they can let the platform perform the match, which will direct them to the
good that they prefer. There are various mechanisms by which this might be effected: either we
could think of 𝑐 as additional effort required to get information on the auctions, or as a service
provided by the platform. Our full model will implement search as sequential search, but in this
simple example with only two goods, it is simpler to think of search as a cost to be paid to ensure
a favorable match.
Result 1.1. All pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies are characterized as follows:
• for 𝑐 > 13/48, nobody searches
• for 1/12 < 𝑐 < 13/48, one of each type searches
• for 𝑐 < 1/12, all buyers search
Proof. First, nobody will ever choose to search into an auction for which he does not have a high
valuation. For an 𝑎 type, going into an 𝐴 auction gives a payoff of at least 1/6 (what they expect
when the other 𝑎 type is present 1), whereas going into the other auction gives greater than 1/6
only if everybody else search into 𝐴, which is clearly suboptimal.
Consider the case of no searching. We consider the situation in terms of 𝑎; it is symmetric for
𝑏. 𝑎 going into an 𝐴 auction: he receives a payoff of 1/6 if the other 𝑎 is present, 3/2 if nobody
is present, 1 if only one 𝑏 is present, and 5/6 if both other 𝑏 are present (this is simply expected
value of winning minus expected payment; going against other types is trivial because 𝑎 always
wins, so pays the highest of the other bids, which is expected to be 2/3). Then the utility from an
1 To see this, note that he pays at least 1 when winning, so we can just scale everything down by 1. If 𝜖􀐕 = 𝑥, he wins
with probability 𝑥, and conditional upon winning pays 𝑥/2. Integrating gives an expected payment of 1/6. Benefit
is 𝑥 received with probability 𝑥, so integrating over 𝑥 gives 1/3
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𝐴 auction is simply the probability weighted sum:
1
2
(
1
6
) +
1
2
[
1
4
(3/2) +
1
2
(1) +
1
4
(
5
6
)] =
15
24
Utility from𝐵 is zerowhenever a 𝑏 participates, 1/2when nobody participates, and 1/6when the
other 𝑎 participates. Here, the probability weighted sum is (1/8)(1/6 + 1/2) = 1/12. Searching
is only optimal if half the difference between utilities from 𝐴 and from 𝐵 is greater than 𝑐, since
that is the difference between searching into 𝐴 and getting randomly matched to 𝐴 or 𝐵. So no
searching requires 𝑐 > 21/96.
Below that, either one 𝑎 or one 𝑏 will find it optimal to search. If a 𝑏 searches, then 𝑎 gets
zero from a 𝐵 auction, and (1/2)(1/6) + (1/4)(1) + (1/4)(3/2) = 17/24. Hence, his searching
threshold for 𝑐 is 17/48, which is satisfied conditional on 𝑏 searching; hence there will never be
only one side searching, as soon as one 𝑎 searches, so will one 𝑏.
When one of each side searches, then expected utility for the other 𝑎 is 1/6 for 𝐴 and 0 for 𝐵;
hence, he will search when 𝑐 goes below 1/12.
Using these strategies, we can get expressions for seller revenue as well.
Result 1.2. Let 𝑐􀍭 < 1/8 < 𝑐􀍮 < 21/64 < 𝑐􀍯. Let 𝑅(𝑐) denote the expected revenue when the
search cost is 𝑐. Then
𝑅(𝑐􀍭) > 𝑅(𝑐􀍮) > 𝑅(𝑐􀍯)
Proof. Under full searching, expectedpayment for seller𝐴 is4/3. Whenoneof each type searches,
it is 4/3 with probability 1/2 (the probability the other 𝑎 being there), and 1/2 with probability
1/4 (the probability that the other 𝑎 is in 𝐵, and 𝑏 is in 𝐴). Hence, 𝑅(𝑐􀍮) = 19/24. Under no
searching, with probability 1/16 it is 1/3 (both 𝑎 end up in 𝐵, both 𝑏 end up in 𝐴), and with
probability 1/4 it is 4/3 (both 𝑎 search into𝐴). With probability 1/4, there is only one participant,
so revenue is zero. With probability 1/16 there are no participants, so zero. With probability
1/4, it is 1/2 (with one 𝑎 and one 𝑏); with probability 1/8, it is 2/3 (one 𝑎 and two 𝑏). Hence
𝑅(𝑐􀍯) = 27/48.
The basic idea captured by this example is that lowering search costs encourage buyers to seek
out better matches. In an auction setting, this means that sellers end up with buyers who have
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higher valuations for their goods, and increased competition between buyers drives up the prices
forwhich the goods are sold. Allowing for continuous variation in 𝑐 shows that the improvements
will be incremental: as search costs are lowered, more buyers search.
These incremental improvements, however, also underline the difficulties that arise if we try to
generalize something like the abovemodel to a platformwith large numbers of buyers and sellers.
Since individual decisions affect the utilities received by other participants on the platform, it is
necessary to keep track of all these effects. Above, for instance, we needed to check how one
buyer of each type searching affected the incentives of the other buyer. As the number of buyers
and sellers on the platform grows, this task becomes very quickly unmanageable. By moving to a
continuum framework, however, we are able to get around this technical difficulty since auction
participation will vary continuously rather than discretely (according to parameters that we will
specify in the following section).
It will turn out that being able to do the bookkeeping in a tractable manner is also necessary to
capture the full effects of search. The above example is completely symmetric in the two goods:
we can interchange the labels 𝐴 and 𝐵 and nothing of the strategic situation will have changed.
One consequence of this symmetry, however, is that buyer incentives are always the same for
both goods, so that the number of buyers searching into an auction equals the number of buyers
searching into the other auction: the expected number of buyers for each does not change as
search costs decrease. The revenue ranking is only possible because of this: when themarkets are
asymmetric, one market will tend to lose buyers as the other gains them. Hence, it will generally
not be the case that all sellers are better off, and it can even sometimes be the case that total
revenues collected are lower.
1.4. Model
Let there be a measure 𝜇 of buyers, and a measure 1 of sellers on the platform. Sellers are one of
two types, 𝐴 and 𝐵, which denotes the type of good that they have. A fraction 𝑎 of sellers are type
𝐴.
Goods are sold off in second-price auctions. Buyers have quasilinear utilities, and their types
are independently and identically distributed on 𝐗 = [𝑥, 𝑥], where a buyers type 𝑥 also denotes
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his valuation for the 𝐴 good. A buyer of type 𝑥 has a valuation for a 𝐵 good given by 𝑦(𝑥), where
𝑦 is continuous and 𝑦􀚄 < 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝐗. Let 𝐘 = [𝑦, 𝑦] = [𝑦(𝑥), 𝑦(𝑥)] denote the range of 𝑦. This
means that buyers with relatively high valuations for the 𝐴 good have relatively low valuations
for the 𝐵 good. It is important to note that this is not a restriction on the absolute valuations: it
could be that every buyer values the 𝐴 good more than the 𝐵 good; rather, this is a restriction on
relative valuations. The main reason for this assumption is that it gives a ``best-case'' scenario in
terms of generating positive matching effects. It is likely that many actual platforms will not sat-
isfy this restriction, which would only worsen the results we have for revenue. Although a more
general formulation may be possible, one of the main goals of this paper is to test the ``everybody
wins'' intuition that is implicit in platform policies to promote search, so we have made the envi-
ronment as ``matching-friendly'' as possible. We show that even with this fairly strict condition
on preferences, total revenue on a platform can actually decrease – the effects will only worsen
withmore general preference structures. The reason for this is that this restrictionminimizes the
negative impact that buyers searching out of markets will have on sellers: the buyers searching
out – those who have a lot to gain from going for another good – are also those buyers with the
lowest valuations from the seller's point of view. A more general preference structure will mean
that this is no longer the case: buyers sorting outmay have relatively high valuations, and so their
absence will have a larger impact on seller revenues.
Buyer types are independently and identically distributed according to 𝐹, which we also use
to denote the cumulative distribution function. 𝐹 is massless and continuously differentiable; let
𝑓 denote its probability density function. We will also let 𝜇(𝑋), for measurable 𝑋 ⊆ 𝐗, denote
the measure of buyers with types in 𝑋, and 𝜇(𝑥) denote the density of buyers at 𝑥. Also, let 𝑃(𝑋)
denote the probability that a random buyer has a type in 𝑋. Then 𝜇(𝑋) = 𝜇𝑃(𝑋) and 𝜇(𝑥) =
𝜇𝑓(𝑥). It will also be convenient to define𝐻(𝑦) = 1−𝐹(𝑦􀍸􀍮(𝑦)) to be the cumulative distribution
function of valuations for the 𝐵 good.
The goods are allocated according to a two-stage game. In the first stage, buyers are matched
to sellers via sequential search; in the second stage, goods are sold off in second-price auctions.
The search process is sequential search mediated by platform technology. Buyers are initially
randomly matched to sellers. Upon being matched, buyers observe the type of good being sold
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on the auction. Each buyer can stay in the auction he is matched to, or at a cost 𝑐, he can draw
another match; the search stage ends when nobody chooses to draw any more matches. At each
match, the only observed characteristic is the type of good being sold in the auction – buyers do
not know the number of other buyers.
The success of each draw is determined by a platform-wide parameter 𝑝. With probability 𝑝, a
buyer will be matched with an auction for a type of good that he prefers; with probability 1 − 𝑝,
the match will be random. Hence, 𝑝 = 0 corresponds to completely-randommatching in sequen-
tial search, and 𝑝 = 1 corresponds to perfectly efficient search: an additional draw will always
yield a successful match. There are several ways that we might conceive of search and the role
of the platform in mediating search. An alternative formulation, for instance, would be to drop
the parameter and have the platform operate directly on the draw costs. The particular formu-
lation does not impact any of the below analysis: one could conceptualize reductions in search
costs either as reductions in the draw cost, or as increased probabilities of draw success. More
generally, however, it is reasonable to think of search improvements as benefiting primarily those
who are looking for goods that would be hard to find otherwise, which is whywe have formulated
search as platform intermediated search, following Hagiu and Jullien (2011). Depending on the
setting, it could be reasonable to think about search costs either as a reduction in draw costs or as
changes to the draw success probability – we choose the more general formulation, which keeps
both parameters.
The equilibriumconcept thatweuse is SPNE.Wealso restrict strategies toweakly undominated
strategies, so that all buyers bid their valuations in the auction stage. The solution will be by
backward induction: first, we solve for buyer utilities given the search strategies of other buyers.
This step is dramatically simplified by our continuum framework, since each buyer's individual
decision will have no impact on the aggregate environment, and the characterization of platform
matchings as a continuum of Poisson gameswill yield tractable expressions for the objects we are
interested in. We can then use these expressions to solve for the optimal search decisions.
16
1. Search in auction platforms
1.4.1. Discussion of Assumptions
It is worth pausing for a moment to discuss the assumptions within our model and what types of
restrictions they place on our findings. There are two main components to our platform model:
(1) the description of search outcomes in a continuum framework, and (2) the analysis of equi-
librium search decisions; these two parts require two distinct sets of assumptions. Although in a
certain light some assumptions may seem strict, it will turn out that our main qualitative results
are not fragile with respect to them.
The main property exploited in the development of our search model is random matching,
which is inherent to the sequential search process. Although our model is limited to two types of
sellers, it can be easily extended to continuous seller types with appropriately defined measures.
Since randommatching is a natural property of sequential search situations, this is not a restric-
tive assumption on the applicability of our search model: it can be easily extended to describe
matching outcomes with a continuum of seller types and arbitrary (but measurable) ``acceptance
sets'' for each buyer.
Our equilibrium analysis relies more heavily on a potentially less realistic assumption: that
buyer preferences are unidimensional, and buyers with higher valuations for one type of good
will have fixed lower valuations for the other type. We make two brief remarks about this as-
sumption. First, many markets may not in fact stray too far from this type of ``complementarity''
in preferences. For any good with multiple varieties, it is likely that consumers with very par-
ticular tastes, i.e., they derive significantly greater utility for getting their preferred variety, will
also dislike, to a greater extent than those without strong taste preferences, not receiving their
preferred choices.
The second point to note is that unidimensional preferences, while they play a key role inmuch
of our formal analysis, are notwholly essential for ourmain qualitative results; they serve primar-
ily to give tractability for our formal results, i.e., that equilibrium is unique and can be parsimo-
niously characterized. Our welfare result turns on the fact that social and individual welfare are
aligned in VCG mechanisms, and it can be proven in more general settings. Our other main result
is that seller revenue can decrease as search costs decrease. In this context, unidimensional ``com-
plementary'' preferences represent a best-case setting for generating positivematching effects on
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seller revenues: when a seller loses buyers due to more intense search, those buyers are always
the least valuable ones. A more general preference structure would only mean that the buyers
lost by a seller are not necessarily the least valuable, and the buyers gained are not necessarily
the most valuable, so the negative effects of search on revenue would only be more pronounced.
1.5. Analysis and Results
This section contains the analysis and results for our platform search model. We begin with a
slight detour to a simplermodelwith a single good andno search in order to develop the analytical
machinery necessary to solve for the full model with search. This will allow us to easily describe
the effects that search will have on the second-stage auctions. We then discuss the search stage
and characterize the search decisions of individual buyers. This will allow us to establish the
structure of equilibrium and show equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Using the fact that in a
second-price auction, a buyer's utility is equal to his contribution to social welfare (McAfee and
McMillan 1987), we can show that the search equilibrium is also efficient. The remainder of our
results address the effects of lowering search costs on platform revenues.
1.5.1. Single good without search
In this section, we develop the continuum model as a the limit of a sequence of discrete games
as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. In order to focus on the technical aspects of the
continuummodel, we consider a simplermodel that has only one good, so all sellers are identical,
and no search. We aremainly concernedwith characterizing thematches that result form random
search. Consider a sequence of discrete games {𝐺􀐕}
􀏯
􀐕􀍹􀍮, where 𝐺􀐕 is a game with 𝑛􀐕 sellers and 𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕
buyers, with 𝑛􀐕 strictly increasing and tending toward infinity (i.e., 𝑛􀐕 → ∞) and 𝜇􀐕 → 𝜇 as 𝑖 → ∞.
Buyers are matched to sellers randomly. Buyers have independently and identically distributed
valuations for the good, distributed according to a massless 𝐹, which we also use to denote the
cumulative distribution function of buyer valuations.
Since all buyers are identical, the key step is to characterize the number of buyers that shows
up at any given auction. All sellers are identical, so each will face the same distribution of buyers.
Theorem 1.1. In the continuum limit of the sequence of games {𝐺􀐕}, the number of buyers in any
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given auction is a Poisson random variable with parameter 𝜇.
Proof. For game𝐺􀐕 , there are𝑛􀐕 sellers and𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕 buyers. Randommatching implies that each buyer
has an equal chance of ending up in any auction, so from the point of view of any fixed seller,
the probability that any particular buyer joins his auction is
􀍮
􀐚􀔍
. Since there are 𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕 buyers, this
means that the number of buyers to join any particular auction 𝑗 is binomially distributed, with
𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕 draws and a ``success'' probability of
􀍮
􀐚􀔍
for each draw. Let 𝑘􀐕 denote be a random variable
denoting the number of buyers to show up at an auction in 𝐺􀐕 , then
𝑘􀐕 ∼ Binom (𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕 ,
1
𝑛􀐕
)
Let 𝑛􀚄􀐕 ≡ 𝜇􀐕𝑛􀐕 and 𝑝
􀚄
􀐕 ≡
􀍮
􀐚􀔍
, then we can write this as
𝑘􀐕 ∼ Binom (𝑛
􀚄
􀐕 , 𝑝
􀚄
􀐕)
where 𝑛􀚄􀐕𝑝
􀚄
􀐕 = 𝜇􀐕 , and we know that 𝜇􀐕 → 𝜇 as 𝑖 → ∞. Hence, as 𝑖 → ∞, 𝑛􀐕 → ∞ and 𝑛
􀚄
􀐕 → ∞, which
means that 𝑘􀐕 converges in probability to a Poisson random variable with parameter 𝜇.
The independence of buyer valuations also allows us to characterize attendance of buyers from
subsets of 𝑋. In particular, the number of buyers can be formulated as a spatial Poisson process
indexedbyvaluation𝑥, where thenumberof buyers fromany subset of𝑋 is a Poissonvariablewith
parameter equal to themeasureof that subset, and is independent from thenumberof buyerswho
show up outside of that subset. Formally, let 𝑝 ∶ 2􀐊 → ℝ be a probability measure denoting the
probability that a given buyer is in a subset of 𝑋, and let 𝜇 ∶ 2􀐊 → ℝ be the measure function for
buyers on 𝑋; here 𝜇(𝑋􀚄) = 𝜇𝑝(𝑋􀚄) for all 𝑋􀚄 ⊆ 𝑋.
Lemma 1.1. Let 𝑋􀍮 ⊂ 𝑋 be a measurable subset of 𝑋, and let 𝑘􀍯 be a random variable denoting the
number of buyers who show up at a given auction with valuations in 𝑋􀍮. Then 𝑘􀍮 ∼ Poisson(𝜇(𝑋􀍮)).
Furthermore, given a measurable subsets 𝑋􀍯 ⊂ 𝑋, with 𝑋􀍮 ∩ 𝑋􀍯 = ∅, let 𝑘􀍯 be random variables
denoting the number of buyers in a given auction𝑋􀍯. Then 𝑘􀍮 ∼ Poisson(𝜇(𝑋􀍮)) is independent from
𝑘􀍯 ∼ Poisson(𝜇(𝑋􀍯)).
Proof. Proof is given in appendix.
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One useful consequence of this characterization is that it allows us to pin down winning prob-
abilities quite easily.
Lemma 1.2. Consider a buyer of valuation 𝑥 prior to being matched to an auction. The prior prob-
ability that the highest bid among the other buyers is below 𝑥􀚄 is given by
𝐺(𝑥􀚄) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐤
􀚅))
Proof. Proof is given in appendix.
Lemma 1.3. A buyer of valuation 𝑥 receives utility
𝑢(𝑥) =∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝐺(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
=∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐥)) 𝑑𝑦
Seller revenue is
𝑅 =𝑚(1) − 𝜇∫
􀐤
􀍭
(1 − 𝐹(𝑦))𝐺(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
=𝑚(𝑥) − ∫
􀐤
􀍭
(1 − 𝐹(𝑦))𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐥)) 𝑑𝑦
Proof. Full proof is given in appendix. The derivation is quite standard (e.g. Krishna 2009), with
the exception that we substitute 𝐺(𝑥) for the usual winning probability 𝐹􀐚􀍸􀍮 for an auction with
𝑛 bidders.
1.5.2. Sequential search
The preceding lemmas provide closed-form expressions for buyer utilities in the second stage of
the full model with search. Using these, we can rigorously analyze the search decisions of individ-
ual buyers, and from there derive the equilibrium of the full game. For the search decision: the
only information that buyers have upon being matched to a seller is the type of the good that is
being sold – buyer search decisions can only be based on the type of good. Furthermore, since
the result of a draw does not depend on previous draws, the distribution of draw outcomes re-
mains the same for each draw, which means that the optimal search policy must also be station-
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ary2. The consequence of this is that some buyers will always end up searching into the auction
of their choice for the second stage, and others will remain with their randommatches. If a buyer
is matched with his preferred auction type, then he will always stay. If he is matched with his less
preferred auction type, then if it is optimal for him to search again today, it will also be optimal for
him to search again tomorrow – hence, he will continue to search until he ends up in the auction
of his choice.
We can exploit the stationarity of the search decision to characterize the decision rules. Before
stating the results, we introduce a little bit of notation: let 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) denote the utility a buyer of type
𝑥 gets from participating in an 𝐴 auction, and 𝑢􀏴(𝑥) denote his utility from a 𝐵 auction – we will
solve for these after establishing the structure of equilibrium search behavior.
Lemma 1.4. A buyer will search into an 𝐴 auction if
𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − 𝑢􀏴(𝑥) >
𝑐
𝑝􀐍
and will search into a 𝐵 auction if
𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − 𝑢􀏴(𝑥) < −
𝑐
𝑝􀐎
where
𝑝􀐍 = 𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎
𝑝􀐎 = 𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑎)
are the probabilities of successful draws by those who favor 𝐴 goods and those who favor 𝐵 goods
respectively. When the inequalities are reversed, buyers will not search, and when the two sides of
the above inequalities are equal, the buyer will be indifferent between searching and not searching.
Proof. Proof is given in appendix.
2 The search problem can be formulated as a standard dynamic programming problemand solvedwith a simple Bell-
man equation (Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott 1989). Since nothing in the environment changes between the current
period and the next, if we go to the next period, it must be that the current period's (optimal) decision rule – which
assigns an action, either search or stay, to the each realization of the draw outcome – is also optimal tomorrow.
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1.5.3. Equilibrium
Since the utility in each auction ismonotonic in the valuation for that object (increasedprobability
of winning, and increased surplus when auction won), it is clear that equilibrium will feature a
pair of threshold values, (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍), such that buyers with valuations higher than the threshold 𝑥􀐍
will search into 𝐴, and buyers with valuations that are high in the 𝐵 auction, hence of types less
than 𝑥􀐎 , will search into 𝐵. Basically, if it is optimal for some given 𝑥 to search into 𝐴, then it will
also be optimal for all buyers of types greater than 𝑥 to search into 𝐴, since their utilities from
doing so will be strictly higher. We state this in the following theorem:
Lemma 1.5. Equilibrium strategies can be characterized by a set of thresholds (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) such that all
buyers with type 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍 search into 𝐴, all buyers with type 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐎 search into 𝐵, and the remaining
buyers do not search3. Furthermore, for interior 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍 , the thresholds must satisfy
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐍) − 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐍) =
𝑐
𝑝􀐍
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐎) − 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐎) = −
𝑐
𝑝􀐎
Proof. The complete proof is omitted. The derivation is quite straightforward, and follows from
the monotonicity of 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − 𝑢􀏴(𝑥), as described above.
The next step is to establish that an equilibrium exists and is unique. The details of this will be
left to the appendix, but the steps are fairly straightforward, so we sketch them out here.
Let 𝑠(𝑥; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) ≡ 𝑢
􀏳(𝑥; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍)−𝑢
􀏴(𝑥; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) denote the difference in utility for a buyer of type
𝑥 betweenparticipating in an𝐴 and a𝐵 auction, when the thresholds are set at 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍. If we can
establish that this function is continuous in its parameters, 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍, then we can define a con-
tinuous mapping𝑀 ∶ 𝑋􀍯 → 𝑋􀍯 that gives for any pair of thresholds (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) a pair of types – those
that are indifferent between searching into 𝐵 and those that are indifferent between searching
into 𝐴 (with appropriate boundary conditions). Since𝑋􀍯 is a convex (a two-dimensional interval)
and 𝑀 is a continuous mapping from 𝑋􀍯 to itself, Brouwer's fixed point theorem ensures that a
fixed point to𝑀 exists – this will be an equilibrium. We can go further to show that 𝑠(𝑥; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) is
3 By ``search into 𝐴'', we mean that buyers stationary search rule is to continue drawing new auctions until they end
up in an𝐴 auction. The outcomeof this search, seen from the second-stage auctions, is that these buyerswill always
end up in 𝐴 auctions.
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also increasing in 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍, whichwill guarantee that the equilibrium is unique and the threshold
values change monotonically with search costs. The closed-form expressions for doing this will
draw on the continuummodel that we developed in the simpler single-good model.
Theorem 1.2. An equilibrium exists and is unique. Furthermore, if we reduce search costs, either
through a direct reduction in the per-draw cost 𝑐, or through an increase in 𝑝, then 𝑥􀐎 increases
and 𝑥􀐍 decreases: that is, the threshold values are monotonic in search costs, and lower search costs
expands the set of buyers who search into auctions of their choice.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
1.5.4. Welfare
Having ensured that a unique equilibrium exists and is well-behaved, we continue to examine
its properties. This section establishes two basic welfare properties of equilibrium, and gives
some support to the idea that reducing search costs is generally a good thing overall. First, the
equilibrium is efficient, in the sense that themarket equilibrium coincideswith the solution to the
social planner's problem – we will make this more precise momentarily, but the actions taken by
individuals in a market equilibrium are precisely those that a social planner would recommend
they take in order tomaximize total socialwelfare. Second, as search costs decrease, socialwelfare
is increasing. This follows immediately from the efficiency result: since the market equilibrium
maximizes welfare, and higher levels of welfare are possible – agents, for instance, can simply
retain the same actions, but total welfare will be raised since search costs paid are lower – it must
be that equilibrium welfare is increasing as search costs decrease.
The intuition behind the efficiency of themarket equilibrium comes from the observationmade
by McAfee and McMillan (1987), that in a VCG mechanism, which the second-price single-good
auction is, a buyer's utility is equal to his contribution to social welfare, since his payment is ex-
actly equal to the external effect of his presence on the other buyers. As a result, when buyers
maximize their own utilities in our platform model with search, they also maximize their con-
tribution to social welfare (total utilities net search costs). The optimal assignment of search
actions by the social planner must have every agent (except, possibly, a subset of measure zero)
23
1. Search in auction platforms
maximizing their contribution to social welfare, or there would be an alternative assignment that
generates higher welfare.
To show all of this formally, we first define the social planner's problem. The social planner
assigns to each buyer 𝑥 an action in the set {𝛼, 0, 𝛽}, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 correspond to searching into
𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively, and 0 corresponds to not searching. The objective function of the social
planner is total welfare net search costs, which we denote by 𝑊. To get a sense of what social
welfare looks like, note that each buyer's contribution to total welfare is his valuation of the object
that he bids for times his probability of winning. His presence has no effect on welfare if he does
not win, and if he does win, the total surplus generated is his valuation, which is split between
himself and the seller according to the price paid. We can then write the surplus generated in the
𝐴market as
∫
􀐤
􀐤
𝑥𝐺􀏳(𝑥)𝜇􀏳𝑓􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 =∫
􀐤
􀐤
𝑥𝑔􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
=𝐸[𝑋􀍮]
=𝑥 − ∫
􀐤
􀐤
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
=𝑚􀏳(𝑥)
where 𝑋􀍮 is the highest bid, or the valuation of the highest buyer, since all buyers bid their val-
uations. The surplus generated in market 𝐵 is similarly 𝑚􀏴(𝑦), or 𝐸[𝑌􀍮]. The total search cost
incurred across the platform is 𝑐 times the expected number of draws. Let 𝜇􀐍 = 𝜇(𝑋􀐍) = 𝜇 ⋅ (1 −
𝐹(𝑥􀐍)) and 𝜇􀐎 = 𝜇(𝑋􀐎) = 𝜇 ⋅ 𝐹(𝑥􀐎) be the measures of buyers who search into 𝐴 and 𝐵 markets
respectively. A fraction 1 − 𝑎 of those in 𝑋􀐍 need to search, and expect to search 1/𝑝􀐍 times, so
the total cost incurred by them is
(􀍮􀍸􀐍)􀑌􀔅
􀐜􀔅
𝑐, and the total cost incurred by those searching into 𝐵 is
􀐍􀑌􀔆
􀐜􀔆
𝑐. Hence, total welfare𝑊 can be written as
𝑊 =𝑎𝑚􀏳(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑎)𝑚􀏴(𝑦) − (
(1 − 𝑎)𝜇􀐍
𝑝􀐍
+
𝑎𝜇􀐎
𝑝􀐎
) 𝑐
=𝑎𝐸[𝑋􀍮] + (1 − 𝑎)𝐸[𝑌􀍮] − (
(1 − 𝑎)𝜇􀐍
𝑝􀐍
+
𝑎𝜇􀐎
𝑝􀐎
) 𝑐
=𝑎 (𝑥 − ∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥) + (1 − 𝑎) (𝑦 − ∫
􀐥
􀍭
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦) − (
(1 − 𝑎)𝜇􀐍
𝑝􀐍
+
𝑎𝜇􀐎
𝑝􀐎
) 𝑐
The lemmabelowestablishes that a solution to the social planner's problemmust havea thresh-
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old form, e.g., it will consist of a pair (𝑥∗􀐎 , 𝑥
∗
􀐍) such that all 𝑥 < 𝑥
∗
􀐎 search into 𝐵, all 𝑥 > 𝑥
∗
􀐍 search
into 𝐴, and the rest do not search. The full proof is given in the appendix, but the method is by
contradiction: suppose that the optimal assignment does not have a threshold form, and show
that total welfare can be improved by changing some of the assignments.
Lemma1.6. A solution to the social planner's problemmust consist of 𝑥∗􀐎 and 𝑥
∗
􀐍 such that all 𝑥 < 𝑥
∗
􀐎
search into 𝐵 and all 𝑥 > 𝑥∗􀐍 search into 𝐴.
Proof. Proof is given in appendix.
It is then straightforward to show that the optimal thresholds must be the same as the market
equilibrium. The intuition is given above; in the appendix, we provide an alternative method that
directly maximizes welfare by examining the first-order conditions of the social planner's maxi-
mization problem – because of the alignment of private and social surplus in a VCG mechanism,
they will coincide exactly with the threshold conditions for the market equilibrium.
Theorem1.3 (Efficiency). Let (𝑥∗􀐎 , 𝑥
∗
􀐍)be the social planner's solution, and let (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍)be themarket
solution for a given set of search cost parameters, (𝑐, 𝑝). Then 𝑥∗􀐎 = 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥
∗
􀐍 = 𝑥􀐍 . That is, the
market equilibrium maximizes total social welfare and is efficient.
Proof. Proof is given in appendix.
Adirectly corollary to this result is that a decrease in search costs always increases totalwelfare.
As stated previously, if search costs decrease, the previously experienced level of social surplus
is always achievable, since if no agents change their actions, the welfare will increase due to the
decrease in search costs paid (or stay the same if there is no search). Since themarket equilibrium
maximizes social welfare, the level of welfare it achieves must be at least that level.
Corollary 1.1. As search costs decrease, total social welfare is increasing.
These results lend some justification to the idea that agents are better off as a result of de-
creased search costs. The aggregate welfare consequences, however, do not tell us how the gains
are distributed. The following examines the effect of search on seller revenues.
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1.5.5. Revenue
Although total welfare is increasing, it is not necessarily the case that seller revenue increases
with search. This section will analyze more precisely the effects of search on seller revenue – in
particular, we exploit the infinite divisibility property of Poisson distributions to get a precise for-
mulation of how lower search costs, and increased search, affect buyer participation in auctions.
Asmore buyers search, two things are happening for each type of buyer: (1) they gain buyers in
the middle of the distribution, where previous non-searchers begin to search into their auctions;
(2) they lose buyers at the bottom distribution, where previous non-searchers were getting ran-
domly matched into their auctions, but now choose to search into the other auction. Hence, there
is a ``matching effect,'' of the type mentioned by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2011), in the sense that
lower valuation buyers are being ``traded'' for higher valuation buyers. This is now, however, the
entire story: there is no reason that the rate at which buyers leave should generically be equal to
that at which they enter. As a result, a seller may lose buyers overall as a result of search, if, for
whatever reason, the effect of decreasing search costs on the marginal searchers into the other
auction is greater than its effect on those search into the seller's auction. The loss in competitive-
ness would result in lower prices (in the form of a higher probability of the good commanding a
price of zero).
On the other hand, when the two markets are perfectly symmetric, the net effects of search
on revenue will be positive. This is because under symmetry, the scenario described above will
never occur: themeasure of buyers gained in amarket, in themiddle of the value distribution, will
always be exactly equal to themeasure lost at the bottomof the distribution. From the perspective
of the seller, this is equivalent to replacing every lowvaluationbuyerwith ahigher valuationbuyer,
which is strictly revenue enhancing.
Figure 1.1 showswhat happens to auction participation in an𝐴 auction as search increases, i.e.,
the searching thresholds change from (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) to (𝑥
􀚄
􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐍), with 𝑥
􀚄
􀐎 > 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥
􀚄
􀐍 < 𝑥􀐍. Recall that
auction participation can be conceptualized as a Poisson process, where the density parameter is
equal to the population density of participants, whichwedenote, againwith a slight abuse of nota-
tions, using 𝜇(𝑥). Independence of non-overlapping sets allows us to conceptualize participation
in a particularly straightforward way.
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Figure 1.1.: Effects of search on auction participation
The solid black line is the population density function, which is also then density function in an
𝐴 auction when no buyers search (since for any set in 𝑋, a fraction 𝑎 of them are placed into an 𝐴
auction, and we normalize by the measure of 𝐴 sellers, which is 𝑎). Now consider the density of
buyers in an 𝐴 auction under thresholds (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍). In [𝑥, 𝑥􀐎), all buyers search into 𝐵, which means
that no buyers appear in the 𝐴market, so the density is zero. Along [𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍], no buyers search, so
the density remains 𝜇(𝑥). Finally, along (𝑥􀐍, 𝑥], the platformdensity 𝜇 of buyers search into𝐴, and
we normalize that to 𝑎 sellers, so the density is 𝜇(𝑥)/𝑎, which is depicted by the dotted line. We
can partition 𝑋 into intervals defined by the points 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐍, and 𝑥􀐍: the number of buyers who
show up from each of these intervals is an independent Poisson variable with their respective
densities. Letting 𝑘􀐕 denote a Poisson variable with measure equal to the shaded region 𝑖 in the
figure, total participation in an 𝐴 auction can be written as 𝑘􀍮 + 𝑘􀍯 + 𝑘􀍰 + 𝑘􀍱.
If we move the thresholds now to (𝑥􀚄􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐍), two changes happen: the density in [𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐎) be-
comes zero, and the density in (𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍] changes from 𝜇(𝑥) to 𝜇(𝑥)/𝑝􀐍. This means that 𝑘􀍯 and
𝑘􀍱 remain the same, and 𝑘􀍮 is replaced by zero. 𝑘􀍰 is replaced with a Poisson random variable of
(1/𝑎)𝜇((𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍]). Since the density is only scaled up, however, and Poisson variables are infinitely
divisible, this is equivalent to two independent Poisson variables, one with parameter 𝜇((𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍])
and the otherwith parameter (1/𝑎)𝜇((𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍]) (or, alternatively, we can consider the Poisson pro-
cess in (𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍] to be the sum of two independent processes, one with density 𝜇(𝑥) and the other
with density (1/𝑎)𝜇(𝑥)). Hence, participation can be summarized as 𝑘􀍯 + 𝑘􀍰 + 𝑘􀍱 + 𝑘􀍲.
The net effect is that we remove the Poisson draw from [𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐎) with a Poisson draw from
(𝑥􀚄􀐍, 𝑥􀐍] (where the value distribution of a buyer in those regions is the conditional distribution
of valuations, conditional on being within the region). Obviously, the removal of 𝑘􀍮 by itself al-
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ways hurts revenue, and the addition of 𝑘􀍲 by itself always helps revenue. In general, the net
effect cannot be signed, since the measure of buyers sorting in and those sorting out will differ.
In the special case where the value distributions of each good are identical (i.e., the platform is
symmetric), however, the effect on revenue is unambiguously positive.
First, we give a formal definition for symmetry in this scenario.
Definition 1.1. A platform is symmetric if permuting the labels 𝐴 and 𝐵 (e.g., calling the 𝐴 good the
𝐵 good and vice versa) does not change any of the value distributions or proportions of goods in the
seller population.
Note that the conditions for this to be true are quite specific: it must be that 𝑎 = 1/2, 𝑥 = 𝑦(𝑥),
𝑥 = 𝑦(𝑥), 𝑦(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑥 and𝐻(𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, where𝐻(𝑥) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑦􀍸􀍮(𝑥)) is the cdf of
valuations in for 𝐵 goods, i.e., buyer valuations for 𝐴 and 𝐵 goods have the same distributions.
When a platform is symmetric, the two equilibrium sorting thresholds will also always be sym-
metric around the mean of the value distribution (since relabeling the goods does not change the
fundamentals, this is implied by uniqueness). Hence, the measure of new searchers when the
search cost decreases will be the same in each market; from the point of view of any seller, this
means that themeasure exiting is equal to themeasure entering. That is, there is no net change in
measure, but simply a replacement of all the lower buyer types with higher buyer types. In terms
of the figure, 𝑘􀍮 and 𝑘􀍲 have the same parameter – since they are independent, this is equivalent
to replacing each buyer in [𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥
􀚄
􀐎), should at least one show up, with a buyer in (𝑥
􀚄
􀐍, 𝑥􀐍], which is
always revenue improving. We state this in the following theorem:
Theorem 1.4. For a symmetric platform, as search costs decrease, either through a reduction in 𝑐
or an increase in 𝑝, expected revenue is increasing for all sellers.
By considering the symmetric case, it is also easy to see how revenuemight decrease: themea-
sure of buyers leaving may be much larger than the measure of buyers entering, and so even
though those enteringmay have higher valuations, their numbermay be insufficient to counteract
the negative effects of decreased buyer density.
In the generic case without symmetry, wemight conceptualize each seller as seeing two effects
ofmatching: one for one replacement of lowvaluation buyerswith high valuation buyers is always
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revenue enhancing, and can be though of as a valuation effect; on the other hand, there is no
guarantee that replacement is one for one, so the change inmeasure leads to a segmentationeffect:
as buyers enter the markets they like most, the composition of buyers in each market will shift,
and will generically decrease for one of the types of sellers. This will exert downward pressure
on revenues in one market and additional upward pressure on revenues in the other.
In addition, it is also possible that total revenuesmay decrease as a result of lower search costs.
Thismight happen, for instance, when themarket losing buyers also commands higher valuations
overall. We provide a simple numerical example to illustrate this.
Theorem 1.5. It is possible for overall revenue to decrease as search costs decrease.
We show this by constructing a numerical counterexample. Consider a platform where 𝑎 =
0.05, 𝑋 = [0, 1], 𝑦(𝑥) = 5 − 𝑥, and 𝜇 = 3. The following examines what happens as we decrease
search costs by moving 𝑝 from zero to one, when the per-draw cost, 𝑐 is equal to 0.01.
In this market, the relatively abundant good is also the one that people prefer, the 𝐵 good, for
which all buyers have valuations between two and three. Under perfectly random matching, it
is also the good that most buyers will draw into. The low valuation buyers, however, have little
chance of winning the good, and hence would prefer to receive the 𝐴 good with a higher chance
of winning and higher surpluses.
As search costs decrease (by increasing 𝑝), the effect is most dramatic for those who would
prefer to search into the 𝐴market, since that is the one that is harder to draw. When 𝑝 = 0, most
buyers would still be able to draw into the 𝐵 market relatively easily, but would not be able to
draw into the 𝐴market (the expected number of draws is 20). The expected number of draws for
a buyer who wants to get in to a 𝐵 auction, by contrast, is only 10/19 ≌ 1.052. A change from
𝑝 = 0 to 𝑝 = 1, then, represents a tenfold decrease in the effective search cost for those searching
into𝐴, and only an eleven percent decrease in search costs for those searching into𝐵. Hence, cost
decreases through 𝑝 will induce relatively more buyers to search into 𝐴 than into 𝐵.
Hence, the 𝐵 market will lose a large measure of buyers at the bottom, and gain some in the
middle, whereas the 𝐴market will gain a large measure of buyers in the middle, and lose some at
the bottom. Revenue decreases in the 𝐵market and rises in the 𝐴market.
Figure 1.2a shows the threshold values as 𝑝 changes, and figure 1.2b shows how themeasure of
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buyers in eachmarket changes. The dotted lines show results for the𝐴market, and the solid lines
show results for the 𝐵 market. As expected, 𝑥􀐎 rises and 𝑥􀐍 falls, since lower search costs induce
more searching. Although the threshold 𝑥􀐎 moves more than the threshold 𝑥􀐎 , 𝐵 loses buyers
overall, which is shown in figure 1.2b. The reason for this is that the additional ``searchers'' into
𝐵would mostly have ended up in 𝐵 anyways, as would the additional searchers into 𝐴: searching
into𝐵 has relatively little impact on themeasure of buyers in𝐵, and searching out of𝐵 has a large
impact.
These changes in participation are reflected in the market revenues, which are shown in figure
1.2c. Revenue in market 𝐵 drops, since 𝐵 auctions are overall losing buyers, and in this case the
valuations of the buyers that they gain are relatively low. In contrast, 𝐴 revenues increase. Finally,
figure 1.2d shows total revenues. Although the 𝐴 revenues do increase, there are relatively few 𝐴
sellers, so the effect on total revenues is dominated by the decrease in 𝐵 revenues.
Although in this example, the magnitude of the effects is small, it suffices to demonstrate the
possibility of an overall revenue decline as a result of improved matching. Our counterexample
was constructed around a particular type of asymmetry: the existence of a small market with
lower overall valuations and relatively low per-draw search costs. Our numerical solutions seem
to indicate that many parameter values do generate monotonically increasing total revenues as
search costs decrease, and that overall revenue decreases seem to be reserved for cases with sig-
nificant asymmetries and either high per-draw costs, so that a decrease in search costs induces
search into only one market, or when search costs are low, so that many of the gains from search
have already been achieved. Numerical results are similar when, instead of varying the search
success probability 𝑝 we directly vary the search cost 𝑐.
Althoughournumerical investigationsdo suggest that negativeoverall revenueeffects are ``rare'',
it should be kept in mind that we have constructed our model as a ``best case'' scenario in terms
of generating positive revenue effects as a result of matching: buyer valuations for each good are
deterministically negatively correlated with their valuations for the other good. In more general
settings, either with general joint distributions, or with joint distributions with certain mono-
tonicity properties on themarginal distributions, the negative revenue effects can only be exacer-
bated, since there would no longer be the guarantee that the buyers leaving a market as a result
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of search are always those with the lowest valuations.
The fundamental lesson in terms of revenue is that lowering search costs affects revenue in two
ways, and that the net effect is not a Pareto improvement – there are significant distributional
consequences in spite of the fact that welfare is increasing. Additional search (1) replaces low
valuationbuyerswith higher valuationbuyers for all sellers, which is generally good, and (2) shifts
buyers between the twomarkets, which will, in the two good setup, be good for one type of seller
and bad for the other. One might formally conceptualize these two different effects by breaking
down the new entrants and exits from a particular market into two separate components: one
component consisting of the largest set of buyers among the new entrants and exits whose effect
on the totalmeasure is zero (i.e., a set of entrants ofmeasuremin{𝜇􀐕􀐚, 𝜇􀐛􀐡􀐠}, and a set of exits of the
same – this set represents the one-for-one replacements that are always revenue enhancing) and
the second component consisting of the remainder, which will have either a positive or negative
effect on the total measure, depending on whether more or fewer buyers leave than enter.
The effect on revenue from the first component is strictly positive, since it is simply replace-
ment of low valuation with higher valuation buyers, which generates a positive valuation effect.
The effect of the second component is positive if there are more entrants than exits, and negative
in the converse situation. This comes from shifting buyers between markets, and constitutes a
segmentation effect, which benefits one seller and harms the other. Although one type of seller
will always gain, there is no guarantee that the total seller revenues generated on the platform
will increase as a result of decreasing search costs.
1.6. Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper aims to be a first step in analyzing the effects of
search in platform settings. There has been relatively little work on this, and part of the reason
may be technical: the continuum framework that we provide, which simplifies auction partici-
pation in a large network to a Poisson process, should help to overcome many of the technical
barriers associated with analyzing platforms with large numbers of agents on both sides of the
market in situations where search matters. We have also provided positive results to shed some
light onto the effects of search on platform welfare and revenue, results that may, in turn, help to
31
1. Search in auction platforms
􀑥.􀑮􀑬􀑪
􀑥.􀑮􀑭
𝑝
𝑥 􀐍
􀑥 􀑦
􀑥.􀑮
􀑥.􀑮􀑥􀑪
􀑥.􀑧 􀑥.􀑩 􀑥.􀑫 􀑥.􀑭
𝑝
𝑥 􀐎
(a) Thresholds
􀑨.􀑦􀑦􀑦􀑬
􀑨.􀑦􀑦􀑦􀑭
𝑝
𝜇
􀏴
􀑥 􀑦
􀑥.􀑭􀑬􀑬􀑪
􀑥.􀑭􀑬􀑭􀑪
􀑥.􀑧 􀑥.􀑩 􀑥.􀑫 􀑥.􀑭
𝑝
𝜇
􀏳
(b) Individual market measures
􀑨.􀑫􀑭􀑦􀑭
􀑨.􀑫􀑭􀑦􀑮
𝑝
𝑅
􀏴
􀑥 􀑦
􀑥.􀑩􀑫􀑭􀑮
􀑥.􀑩􀑫􀑮􀑪
􀑥.􀑧 􀑥.􀑩 􀑥.􀑫 􀑥.􀑭
𝑝
𝑅
􀏳
(c) Individual market revenues
􀑥 􀑦
􀑨.􀑪􀑧􀑦􀑧􀑧􀑮
􀑨.􀑪􀑧􀑦􀑧􀑨􀑧
􀑥.􀑧 􀑥.􀑩 􀑥.􀑫 􀑥.􀑭
𝑝
𝑅
(d) Total revenue
Figure 1.2.: Increasing 𝑝 under asymmetric conditions
explain and guide platform policy related to search investments. In particular, in a second-price
auction platform – and by revenue equivalence, all efficient, single-good auction platforms (Ri-
ley and Samuelson 1981) – total social welfare is increasing as search costs decrease. Moreover,
in a symmetric platform, all sellers will benefit from search, so that total seller revenues and in-
dividual seller revenues will increase as search costs decrease. If platform interests are aligned
with seller interests, then (as would be the case if the sellers were being charged, for instance),
then a platform would want to invest in decreasing search costs in symmetric situations. On the
other hand, we have also shown that in a generic setting, there are significant distributional con-
sequences to increased search: generally, one set of sellers will lose, while the other gains, but
there are also cases where total revenue can decrease.
Platforms exist in great variety and serve a large spectrum of functions, so the applicability of
our results to any particular platform must weigh in its specific characteristics. Our analysis has
the most direct bearing, of course, on auction platforms, but there are many other types of in-
termediary services that are not organized around auctions, about which we are able to provide
some insights. Themost generally applicable contribution of our paper is that for onemajor tech-
nical problem – the description of search outcomes in platforms with large numbers of agents –
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we have provided a general solution. In many platforms, going beyond those that deal exclusively
with auctions, search is many-to-one or many-to-many – the simplification to Poisson ``matching
sets'' in the continuum limit is applicable to almost all such settings. For instance, labor markets
and dating platforms are all situationswhere individuals ``search'' not into deterministicmatches,
but rather into competitive situations where their final utility is determined by which other sim-
ilar individuals have searched into the samematch. The fact that, in the limit, this set of individu-
als can be succinctly described given search decisions, is a tremendously powerful analytical tool
that can give greater formal insights into situations that would otherwise be difficult to analyze. It
should be noted that there are platform settings where this technical difficulty need not exist, i.e.,
when the utility of each agent is directly determined by the match and is independent of which
other agents received the same match.
The positive insights of our present paper are more restricted to auction platforms. While it is
generally true that bettermatchqualitywill generate higher total surpluses, whether or not better
matches overall take placewith lower search costs, andwhether or not the platformbenefits from
these matches, depends crucially on the distribution of match surplus between the two sides of
the platform. The search decision is based on the surplus of only one side of the market – in the
auction platform setting, this is perfectly aligned with the contribution to total surplus, but this
neednotbe the case forplatformsmoregenerally. Ournegative revenue result, however, is general
than the efficiency results, and applies to platforms other than auctions: even in a ``best-case''
scenario, where search incentives are aligned with total welfare, and where the reallocation of
buyers due to search ismost likely to be positive, one side of themarket can lose out on thewhole.
The previous platforms literature has focused almost exclusively on fee structures as the main
strategic choice variables of platforms; recent years, however, have shown that infrastructure in-
vestments to reduce platform frictions, such as those that enable more efficient search, also con-
stitute an important strategy choice, and it can be an important dimension of differentiation be-
tween competing platforms. We have shown that search can affect platform performance in sub-
tle, and possibly unanticipated ways: only in special cases is it true that both sides of a platform
are better off with more search, even though this ought to increase the total surplus generated by
the platform. An important practical consequence of this is that search policy needs to account
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not only for anticipated aggregate gains, but also the redistributive effects of search. This redistri-
bution can happen both between the two sides – as happens when sellers lose overall – or within
sides – as experienced by the buyers with middling valuations who manage only to face stiffer
competition in both markets. In practical scenarios, these losing participants may choose to exit
the market, a possibility that we explore in a fuller environment in a following paper.
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2.1. Introduction
In our previous work, we found that search within auction platforms can have subtle and some-
what unexpected effects on the properties of equilibria. In contrast to the basic intuition that has
motivated improvements in search technology on many platforms – namely, that enabling search
within a platform constitutes a ``win-win'' situation for both buyers and sellers – we found a gen-
eral tradeoff between better matching and market thickness. Though search might often pro-
duce desirable matching effects, within certain parameters it could also have undesirable conse-
quences. A stark illustration of this possibility is provided by the existence of cases where overall
seller revenues could decline with greater search, in spite of the fact that goods ended up sold to
buyers with higher valuations. The rationale for this is that some sellers on a platform can end
up with severely reduced market thickness – the pro-competitive effects of better matching are
undone by the loss of buyers to support the price of the good.
Though such cases do certainly exist, our explorations seemed to indicate that they are quite
rare; whenwe assumed symmetry, many of our nice intuitionswere restored. Even these positive
results, however, might be met with some skepticism in the context of real world platforms, since
we studied only thewithin-platform effects, taking as exogenous the participation of buyers. Most
platformsoperate in a rather different strategic setting anddonot enjoy the luxury of being able to
change parameters without worrying about participation effects. Here one might worry that the
matching effects generated by search – which generally bode well for sellers – can cut both ways
for buyers: while it makes it easier for them to end up in auctions that they want to participate
in, it also means that they face stiffer competition when they get there, which may reduce their
utilities. If this is the case, it may cost the platform in the form of reduced membership, lower
surpluses generated, and lower revenue.
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This paper extends our previouswork in twoways to analyze this situation: (1) we endogenize
buyer participation, which allows for pro-competitive effects of search to be offset by reduced
buyer participation; (2) we specify optimal platform search policy under two different revenue
instruments, a flat membership fee and fixed tax on transactions. Platform policy in the presence
of binding participation constraints becomes much more complex than in the case without: it
must decide whether it is better to encourage search and produce better matches for high val-
uation buyers – at the cost of alienating lower valuation buyers – or if it is better to maximize
the breadth of participation. To be able to weigh these effects meaningfully requires explicit for-
mulations of platform objective functions; this paper considers two common instruments, which
are the flat membership fee, where all buyers pay a fixed membership cost to participate on the
platform, and the transaction tax, where they take a fraction of all sales.
Our model here builds upon the technical insights developed in our earlier work, which al-
lowed us to tractably analyze the effects of search in settings with large numbers of buyers and
sellers. The basic modeling insight we use is the observation that sequential search into many-
to-one matches generates, in the continuum limit, Poisson games; in our case, these are auctions
where the number of buyers is a Poisson random variable. As in our previous work, we model a
continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers, where each seller has one good that is sold in an
auction. Participating buyers choose their auctions through a process of sequential search. When
all buyers are finished searching, second-price auctions are conducted and goods are sold. The
new feature here is that prior to running through the platform mechanism, buyers must choose
whether or not they want to participate, which they only do if their expected utilities from partic-
ipation exceed their reservation utilities, which we assume is the same for all buyers.
In some respects, the present model is more specialized than the previous one; for instance,
we assume uniform valuations and a symmetric platform. Our findings do not depend appear to
depend on any knife-edge properties of these assumptions, and sowe expect them to be generally
robust to small asymmetries; however, our proofs of a handful of key results, such as uniqueness
and the comparative statics, rely on symmetry to reduce the number of parameters. But on amore
general note: we also already know that search may be detrimental to platform revenues in the
asymmetric case evenwithout buyer exit effects, so the symmetric case is a naturalmotivation for
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the concerns this paper addresses.
Our main results are as follows: (1) we characterize equilibrium according to a set of thresh-
old and show that equilibrium is unique; (2) we derive comparative statics of buyer behavior on
platform parameters; (3) we show that our positive revenue result continues to hold even when
buyers exit, i.e., total seller revenue is always increasing as search costs decrease, in spite of neg-
ative participation effects; (5) we characterize optimal search policy – more specifically, we find
that a platform with a transaction tax always sets search costs to zero; a fee-collecting platform
always sets an extremal value for search costs, i.e., either at 0 or infinity. Moreover, when themar-
ket is sufficiently dense, the fee-collecting platformmaximizes revenue by setting search costs to
zero; conversely, when the market is sufficiently thin, the optimum is to dissuade search entirely.
The fact that a fee-collecting platformalways selects an extremal value comes from the interest-
ing relationship between search costs and participation levels. When search costs are very high,
so that there are few buyers searching, and the marginal participant does not search, reducing
search costs increases competition and decreases the utility of the marginal participant, so more
buyers exit. As search costs approach zero, however, we will arrive at a point where all partici-
pating buyers search search: in this case, a reduction in search costs actually increases the utility
of the marginal participant, causing membership to rise. Hence, the participation has a V-shaped
relationship to search costs; participation is lowest at the point when the marginal participant
switches his search behavior.
The relationship between optimal search policy for a fee-collecting platform and market den-
sity reflects the changing importance of participation breadth relative tomatching effects as over-
all competitiveness grows. When nobody searches andmatching is random, utilities are relatively
flat in buyer types: as we move across types, higher valuations for one good are offset by lower
valuations in the other, and a good ends up bidding for a good of any given type with equal proba-
bility. Thismeans that a platform's ability to raise the fee is limited. When buyers search, however,
their utility is more dependent on type, which improves a platform's ability to raise the fee. This
comes at the cost, however, of decreased participation to begin with. Hence, the choice between
zero and infinite search costs is basically a choice between extracting relatively low surplus from
more buyers, or relatively high surplus from fewer. The value of being collecting a higher fee is
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higher when the market is very dense, because in this case the competition drives down the util-
ity levels of all buyers; on the other hand, participation breadth is more valuable when all buyers
experience relatively high utility even without search, which occurs when the market is thin and
competition is low.
Although our results seem to paint a generally rosy picture of search effects for platform rev-
enues – lower search costs are always good for tax-collecting platforms, and seem to be good
much of the time for fee-collecting ones – the optimal policies for fee-collecting platforms can be
quite fragile, since they depend on the platform being able to set search costs that are effectively
zero or effectively infinite, if not then we can only tell that the optimal policy should be extremal,
but we cannot indicate which extreme. The V-shaped participation curve also means that for fee-
collecting platforms, moving search costs in the direction of local increase need not lead to the
global optimum.
The presence of these tensions may suggest that there is a sense in which search is ``incompat-
ible'' with membership fees. We interpret these as symptoms of the issue described earlier: a flat
membership fee can be set only at the level of the lowest utility, whereas the benefits of lower
search costs accrue to those who realize the highest utility; on the other hand, reduced search
costs will increase competition and induce exit, which does hurt platform revenues. Hence, a fee-
collecting platform might be wary to improve matching, since membership fees are not effective
at extracting the additional surplus generated by better matches.
2.2. Literature Review
This paper is a direct application of our previous work, to which it is most closely related. The
richer setting, however, allows us to bring the insights of those models to bear more clearly on
existing lines of research. In particular, it addresses some of the concerns of the existing platform
literature, which has extensively analyzed pricing decisions and market structure for platform
economies (Ambrus andArgenziano 2009; Armstrong 2006; Ellison and Fudenberg 2003; Rochet
and Tirole 2003, 2006; Rysman 2009; Weyl 2010). In some respects, our setting is simpler than
many of the aforementioned models, since we endogenize only one side of the market; however,
we offer several new results on how search fits into platform policy in general, and how it fits in
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with perhaps one of the most important concerns of platforms, which is membership.
Our work is also related to a few recent papers on search in platforms. Tadelis and Zettelmeyer
(2011) provide experimental evidence in support of positive matching effects in wholesale auto
auctions, which was a large motivation of our first paper. The results derived here also overlap
with questions raised by Hagiu and Jullien (2011), who examine platform incentives to divert
search. They find that a platform will always choose to divert search, which is different from our
findings, which are generally supportive of search, and in any case rule out interior equilibria.
These differences may be attributable, however, to significant modeling differences between our
model and theirs; their platform changes a ``per-match-attempt'' fee, for instance, which creates
incentives to maximize the number of attempts, i.e., to force buyers to search multiple times.
Our search framework extends the existing search literature by providing a way to tractably
model search into a competitive environment. Most existing searchmodels (including this one) are
based on the dynamic searchmodel byDiamond (1971), where consumers search into one-to-one
matches and match payoffs are completely determined by the types of the buyer and seller. Our
model allows us to model many other sequential search situations where theses properties may
not be specified. In particular, we provide a way to model search into many-to-one matches, of
which auctions are one possibility. The general framework should be adaptable to any number of
other strategic settings; the fundamental trick is to see that sequential search into many-to-one
settings can be modeled as a continuum of Poisson games in the limit, the theory to which is
developed in Myerson (2000).
Finally, there appears to be a relationship between our results and some findings in the infor-
mation revelation literature; this is somewhat to be expected, since facilitating search is often
almost synonymous with providing information. Lewis and Sappington (1994) study a setting
where a seller can provide or deny access, to varying degrees, to private information to consumers
regarding their personal tastes, and find that the optimum disclosure level will typically resolve
at one of the two extremes. Work on obfuscation of product information by firms Ellison and
Wolitzky (e.g., 2009) identifies similar tradeoffs between extracting high surpluses from smaller
segmented markets, and extracting lower surpluses from larger broader markets. The analogy is
not exact, however, since buyers in our model always discover all relevant information prior to
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submitting any bid, which may account for differences in the flavor of our results.
2.3. Model
We extend the model in our previous paper by endogenizing buyer participation. Seller partic-
ipation remains exogenous, since we are primarily interested in the interaction of the matching
effect with potential buyer exit induced by increased competition. We also specialize the previous
model in several ways: utilities are linear in types, distributions are uniform, and the platform is
perfectly symmetric. Linearity and uniformity are primarily for convenience, andwe expect most
results to hold without them. Symmetry, on the other hand, is crucial to some key portions of the
proofs. Asymmetriesmay generate additional equilibria, although our comparative statics should
still hold along equilibrium paths.
The platform outcome ismodeled as the equilibrium of a three-stage game, as described below
1. Participation: buyers decide whether or not they want to participate in the platform.
2. Search: buyers search sequentially over auctions andmatch up (many-to-one) with sellers,
until all buyers are satisfactorily matched
3. Auction: each seller sells his good via a second-price auction, held between all buyers that
have been matched to him.
Below, we specify the agents and their utilities, and we describe the stages of the game. We
present several results from our previous paper here without proofs; the interested reader is
directed there for more detailed discussions of the search sub-game details and the specification
of the continuum game.
2.3.1. Environment
There is a measure 1 of sellers and a measure 𝜇 of buyers. There are two types of goods, 𝐴 and 𝐵;
each seller has one good to sell, with 1/2 of the sellers having 𝐴 goods and 1/2 having 𝐵 goods.
Buyers have varying tastes for the two goods, according to their types: buyers have types 𝜃 ∈
Θ ≡ [0, 1], which are uniformly distributed, i.e., the density of types at 𝜃 is given by 𝑓(𝜃) = 𝜇 for
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all 𝜃 ∈ Θ. We assume that buyers with relatively high valuations for one good have relatively low
valuations for the other, so that there are gains to be made from matching buyers to the sellers
they like the most. In particular, the valuations of a type 𝜃 buyer for 𝐴 and 𝐵 goods, respectively,
are given by
𝑣􀐍(𝜃) = 𝜃
𝑣􀐎(𝜃) = 1 − 𝜃
Goods are allocated through second-price single-unit auctions, which each seller conducts indi-
vidually. Bidders choose which auction to participate in via a process of sequential search.
2.3.2. Search
Buyers find their auctions via a sequential search process, where the search costs are determined
by platform-wide parameters, 𝑐 the cost of searching for another auction, and 𝑝, the efficiency of
a platform's search technology.
Buyers are initiallymatched randomly to auctions—hence, each buyer has a 1/2 probability of
initially finding an auction for each type of good. Upon beingmatched, buyers observe the type of
good being auctioned off, but not the number of other buyers who are also matched. Each buyer
can then choose to stay with the initial draw, or to search again and incur a cost of 𝑐.
If the buyer searches again, then with probability 𝑝 he is matched with an auction of his pre-
ferred type; with probability 1 − 𝑝, the match is again random, which gives 1/2 probability for
each type. After viewing the type of the good being auctioned off in the new draw, a buyer may
again either to stay or to draw again at a cost of 𝑐. The search stage is completed when all buyers
choose to stay.
The platform parameters 𝑐 and 𝑝 correspond to different channels that may affect a buyer's
search costs: either the per-draw cost 𝑐 may vary, directly affecting incurred search costs, or the
success probability 𝑝 of any particular draw may change, so that the expected number of times a
buyer searches changes. In more general settings, which channel a platform uses to vary search
costs will matter: when the measure of 𝐴 and 𝐵 sellers is not equal, variation in 𝑝 will affect the
total search costs of buyerswho favor𝐴 differently from that of thosewho favor𝐵. We restrict our
attention here to the symmetric setting, however, which allows us to collapse total search costs
41
2. Optimal platform search policy
into a single parameter,
𝑐∗ =
𝑐
2𝑝∗
where
𝑝∗ = 𝑝 + 1/2(1 − 𝑝)
is the probability that a buyer's next draw yields an auction for his preferred type of good.
We will see in our analysis that 𝑐∗ is sufficient to describe search decisions and outcomes, so
that the effects of changes in 𝑐 or 𝑝 individually can be analyzed through their effects on 𝑐∗. We
note here that 𝑐∗ also has a natural interpretation as the total ex ante expected search costs for a
buyer who engages in search (to see this, note that 1/𝑝∗ is the expected number of times a buyer
will search if his first draw is not of his preferred type, which happens with probability 1/2).
In the symmetric setting thatwe consider here, the sequential searchprocess canbemodeled in
a ``reduced form'' search consisting of one stage only, where a buyer can pay 𝑐∗ and be guaranteed
to find an auction of his preferred type, or to pay nothing and be matched randomly. Hence, for
our analysis on platform policy, we consider 𝑐∗ to be the choice variable, and take most of our
comparative statics on 𝑐∗ rather than 𝑐 and 𝑝 separately.
2.3.3. Participation
The new feature of this model vis-à-vis our previous paper is that we endogenize buyer participa-
tion. In the first stage of the game, buyers must decide whether or not they wish to participate on
the platform at all. If buyers do not participate, they receive a utility of 𝑠. We use different inter-
pretations of 𝑠 for each instrument: when the platform collectsmembership fees, we treat 𝑠 as the
level of the fee, so that a buyer who participates must expect utility higher than the membership
fee; whenmembership fees are not charged, we interpret 𝑠 as an exogenously determined outside
option value.
2.3.4. Platform Objectives
Platforms choose the level of search costs, 𝑐∗. We assume for our main results that they are free
to choose any 𝑐∗ ∈ [0,∞), but discuss how a limited range (due, for instance, to technological
constraints) affect optimal strategies.
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Transaction tax platform Since we do not model seller participation, we assume that 𝑐∗ is the only
choice variable for a platform that taxes sales. It collects a fixed portion 𝑡 of all sales, so its
revenue is equal to 𝑡𝑅, where 𝑅 is the total seller revenue. As mentioned previously, such
a platform's interests are perfectly aligned with sellers, so it chooses 𝑐∗ to maximize seller
revenue. Furthermore, in this case we consider 𝑠 to be exogenously fixed.
Fee collecting platform A fee collectingplatformderives its revenues fromall participatingbuyers,
each of whom pays a flat fee. In addition to 𝑐∗, a fee collecting platform sets a level of 𝑠 to
maximize the total fees collected, which is the total measure of participating buyers (which
depends on the fee level) times the level of the fee.
Aside from characterizing search effects with binding participation constraints, the ultimate
goal of this paper is to characterize the optimal platform search policy under different instru-
ments. Search can have rather subtle effects on participation and revenue, so whether or not it is
in the interest of a platform to reduce search costs will depend critically on which aspects of the
platform outcomes its revenues depend on, i.e., whether it is trying to maximize seller revenues,
or whether it is trading off participation levels and surplus extraction by imposing a membership
fee.
2.4. Analysis
The equilibrium concept that we use to describe outcomes is SPNE, which we solve for by back-
ward induction. Given a characterization of individual auction participation, we can solve for the
utilities that buyers experience in the two types of auctions, and hence their optimal search de-
cisions. Aggregate search decisions then determine the ex ante utility that platform participation
gives to individual buyers. The final step is to make sure that participating buyers receive suffi-
cient utility.
2.4.1. RandomMatching and Auction Utility
Weuse the randommatching platformmodel fromour previous paper. Given ameasure of buyers
who is randomlymatched tomeasure 1 of sellers, the number of buyers showing up at any partic-
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ular auction is Poisson distributed with parameter equal to themeasure of buyers. We reproduce
several of the key results here without discussion; a more thorough discussion is provided in our
previous paper.
Lemma 2.1. Let 𝑓􀐕(𝜃) denote the density of buyers of type 𝜃 in a platform for identical goods, where
density is normalized to a measure 1 of sellers, and suppose that buyers are randomly matched to
sellers. Then for any Borel-measurable subset 𝑇 ⊂ 𝜽 of types, the number of buyers with 𝜃 ∈ 𝑇 who
shows up in any particular auction is Poisson distributed with parameter ∫􀐆 𝑓􀐕(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃.
Furthermore, the probability that the highest bid in an auction is below 𝑣 is given by 𝐺(𝑣) =
𝑒􀍸􀑇(􀐢), where 𝜂(𝑣) is the measure of total buyers with valuations above 𝑣.
The distribution of the first-order statistic allow us to derive buyer utilities, using standard
arguments (details can be found in most auction theory texts, e.g., Krishna 2009).
Lemma 2.2. Consider a buyer of type 𝜃. His utility from participating in an 𝐴 auction is
𝑢􀐍(𝜃) = ∫
􀑈
􀍭
𝐺􀐍(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣
And his utility from participating in a 𝐵 auction is
𝑢􀐎(𝜃) = ∫
􀍮􀍸􀑈
􀍭
𝐺􀐎(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣
where
𝐺􀐍(𝜃) = 𝑒
􀍸􀑇􀔅(􀑈) 𝜂􀐍(𝜃) = ∫
􀍮
􀑈
𝑓􀐍(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡
𝐺􀐎(𝜃) = 𝑒
􀍸􀑇􀔆(􀑈) 𝜂􀐎(𝜃) = ∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑓􀐎(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡
where 𝜂􀐕(𝜃) denotes themeasure of buyers with valuations above that of 𝜃 participating in auctions
of type 𝑖.
Note that the measures 𝜂􀐕(𝜃) are endogenously determined by search behavior. When buyers
of type 𝜃 do not participate in auctions of type 𝑖, their density is zero; when they actively search
into auctions of that type, their density is2𝜇, since all buyers of that type endup in auctions of type
𝑖, who have a platform-wide density of 𝜇, normalized to the measure 1/2 of sellers. Otherwise,
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𝜇/2 buyers show up, normalized to a measure 1/2 of sellers, so their density is 𝜇. Formally,
𝑓􀐕(𝜃) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 if type 𝜃 buyers do not participate in 𝑖 auctions
2𝜇 if type 𝜃 buyers search into 𝑖 auctions
𝜇 otherwise
2.4.2. Search Decision
The search model is sequential search, which is a simple dynamic programming model that we
solve by writing out the Bellman equation.
Suppose a buyer has drawn into a 𝐵 auction initially. Let 𝑢􀐍 and 𝑢􀐎 denote his utilities from 𝐴
and 𝐵 auctions respectively, and let 𝑉􀐍 denote his continuation utility from continuing to search.
Since his problem is stationary, if it is optimal for him to continue searching this period, it will
also be optimal to continue searching next period if he draws 𝐵 again, and so on until he ends up
in an 𝐴 auction.
He searches if
𝑉􀐍 − 𝑐 ≥ 𝑢􀐎
If he continues, with probability 𝑝∗ he receives 𝑢􀐍; otherwise he pays 𝑐 again and receives the
continuation utility. Hence
𝑉􀐍 = 𝑝
∗ + (1 − 𝑝∗)(𝑉􀐍 − 𝑐)
which rearranges to
𝑉􀐍 = 𝑢􀐍 +
1 − 𝑝∗
∗
Substituting into decision rule above and rearranging gives
1
2
(𝑢􀐍 − 𝑢􀐎) ≥
𝑐
2𝑝∗
= 𝑐∗
Theanalysis is identical for searching into𝐵 auctions; wepresent thedecision rule in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.3 (Search Decision). A buyer of type 𝜃 searches into 𝐴 if
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃)] ≥ 𝑐
∗
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and into 𝐵 if
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃)] ≤ −𝑐
∗
Otherwise the buyer does not search.
As a conceptual aside, note that this is precisely the decision rule of buyer in a reduced search
model who can either pay 𝑐∗ to guarantee an 𝐴 auction, or pay nothing and be randomlymatched.
Search requires that
𝑢􀐍(𝜃) −
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃)] ≥ 𝑐
∗
which is exactly the sequential search condition.
2.4.3. Participation Decision
The participation decision is straightforward: a buyer participates on the platform only if his util-
ity is greater than 𝑠.
Lemma 2.4. Buyers participate if and only if 𝑢(𝜃) ≥ 𝑠.
2.4.4. Equilibrium
The decision rules above allow us to characterize equilibrium in terms of a set of threshold types.
To see this, note that
1. 𝑢(⋅) is convex, which means that the set {𝜃 ∶ 𝑢(𝜃) < 𝑠} is convex, i.e., an interval (𝜃􀐡, 𝜃􀐢)
for any given 𝑠.
2. 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃) is increasing with 𝜃.
Since in equilibrium, all buyers who receive 𝑢(𝜃) < 𝑠 do not participate in the platform, and
we know that this set is always an interval, we can characterize participation decisions with two
threshold values, 𝜃􀐡 and 𝜃􀐢 with 𝜃􀐡 ≤ 𝜃􀐢 such that buyers of type 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐡, 𝜃􀐢) do not participate,
and 𝑢(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑢(𝜃􀐢) = 𝑠.
The second condition tells us that search decisions can likewise be characterized by a set of
thresholds (𝜃􀐎 , 𝜃􀐍) such that all 𝜃 < 𝜃􀐎 search into 𝐵, 𝜃 > 𝜃􀐍 search into 𝐴, and the rest do not
search.
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Theorem 2.1. The equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
The number of free parameters makes it a little tricky to establish the above result – there are
four parameters that have different effects on the equilibrium conditions. Our approach will be
to prove symmetry of equilibria first, which allows us to characterize all equilibria using only two
thresholds. We can then show that the comparative statics of any equilibrium arewell-defined, so
that each equilibriummust have a unique path as we vary 𝑠. Our previous paper established that
there is a unique equilibrium when 𝑠 = 0, so the we know that equilibrium must also be unique
for any given 𝑠 > 0.
Lemma 2.5. Any equilibrium is symmetric.
Proof. We first consider the case where 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 ≤ 𝜃􀐢 < 𝜃􀐍. For convenience, we let
𝑠􀐍(𝜃) = 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃)
If we consider parametrized equilibrium paths that vary by 𝑠, note that each pathmust contain
some set of equilibria fulfilling these conditions, since as we transition from full participation,
the first exits must lie between the search thresholds (the buyers earning the least utility at full
participation are those not searching).
Symmetry of equilibriumwouldmean 𝜃􀐍 = 1−𝜃􀐎 and 𝜃􀐢 = 1−𝜃􀐡. Suppose not. First, 𝑢(𝜃􀐡) =
𝑢(𝜃􀐢) = 𝑠. Since there are no participants between the 𝜃􀐡 and 𝜃􀐢 , their winning probabilities in
each market are the same: 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) = 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐢) and 𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡) = 𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐢). Since we know that 𝑢􀐕(𝜃) =
∫
􀐢􀔍(􀑈)
􀍭
𝐺􀐕(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣, this implies that
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐢) = 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + (𝜃􀐢 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡)
and
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐢) + (𝜃􀐢 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡)
Substituting into 𝑢(𝜃􀐡) and 𝑢(𝜃􀐢) gives
𝑢(𝜃􀐢) =
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐢) + (𝜃􀐢 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡)]
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and
𝑢(𝜃􀐡) =
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐢) + (𝜃􀐢 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡)]
Since these twomust be equal, we have that 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) = 𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡), and consequently 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐢) = 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡)
and 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐢). This means that
𝑠􀐍(𝜃􀐡) = −𝑠􀐍(𝜃􀐢)
Furthermore,
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
𝑢􀐕(𝜃) = 𝐺􀐕(𝑣)
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
𝑣􀐕(𝜃)
A consequence of this is that 𝑠􀐍 changes at the same rate going down from 𝜃􀐡 and going up from
𝜃􀐢 . Consider again the equilibrium conditions for search thresholds:
𝑠􀐍(𝜃􀐎) = −
𝑐
𝑝∗
and
𝑠􀐍(𝜃􀐍) =
𝑐
𝑝∗
We get that 𝜃􀐍 − 𝜃􀐢 = 𝜃􀐡 − 𝜃􀐎 . Since we know also that 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) = 𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡), 𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡 = 2 − 𝜃􀐍 − 𝜃􀐢 ,
which together imply that 𝜃􀐍 = 1 − 𝜃􀐎 and 𝜃􀐢 = 1 − 𝜃􀐡, as desired.
The final step is to rule out the possibility that 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 < 𝜃􀐍 < 𝜃􀐢 , i.e., onemarginal participant
searches while the other does not.
We show that the equilibrium conditions together with 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 < 𝜃􀐍 < 𝜃􀐢 are mutually
incompatible. Since 𝜃􀐍 does not participate, 𝑢(𝜃􀐍) < 𝑠. At 𝜃􀐎 and 𝜃􀐍, buyers are indifferent be-
tween searching and not searching, meaning that their utilities are equal to their utilities fromnot
searching. Hence we have that
𝑢(𝜃􀐎) =
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐎)] > 𝑠 >
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍)] = 𝑢(𝜃􀐍)
which, rearranging terms, yields
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐎) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍) > 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) − 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎) (2.1)
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The search conditions imply that
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐎) − 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎) =
𝑐
𝑝∗
= 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍)
which can be rearranged as
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐎) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍) = 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎) + 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) (2.2)
Subtraction equation (2.2) from (2.1) and simplifying gives that
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍) < 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎)
or, expanding 𝑢􀐕 and using the fact that 𝜃􀐍 and 𝜃􀐎 are the lowest valuation buyers in the 𝐵 and 𝐴
markets, respectively,
𝜃􀐎𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀔆 < (1 − 𝜃􀐍)𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀔅 (2.3)
If we let 𝜇􀍭 be the measure of buyers who participate but do not search, we know that 𝜇􀐎 =
2𝜇𝜃􀐎 + 𝜇􀍭 and 𝜇􀐍 = 2𝜇(1 − 𝜃􀐍) + 𝜇􀍭, which means the above expression can only be satisfied if
𝜇􀐎 > 𝜇􀐍.
At the same time, we know that 𝑢(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑠 > 𝑢(𝜃􀐍) since 𝜃􀐍 does not participate. Since there
are no participants between the 𝜃􀐡 and 𝜃􀐍, their winning probabilities within that range do not
change, so we can write their utilities as follows:
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) = 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + (𝜃􀐍 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡)
𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍) + (𝜃􀐍 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡)
which, together with
𝑢(𝜃􀐡) =
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡)] = 𝑠 >
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍)] = 𝑢(𝜃􀐍)
imply that
𝐺􀐎(𝜃􀐡) > 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐍)
which can only be true if 𝜇􀐎 < 𝜇􀐍. This contradicts the above finding that 𝜇􀐎 > 𝜇􀐍; hence, there
can be no asymmetric equilibria.
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Lemma 2.6. Equilibrium is unique
Proof. This follows from a result in the next section, that the equilibrium path as we vary 𝑠 is
unique, since the Jacobian of a function 𝐅, where 𝐅(𝐱) = (𝑠, 𝑐∗) defines equilibrium, is non-
singular. This means that there is a one-to-one mapping between equilibria for some 𝑠 > 0 and
𝑠 = 0, and since there is only one equilibrium at 𝑠 = 0, there can only be one equilibrium at given
𝑠 > 0 (for given 𝑐∗). The missing step is proven below in Theorem 2.2
2.4.5. Comparative Statics for Buyer Behavior
In this section, we establish how buyer behavior changes with changes in the parameters 𝑐∗ and
𝑠. There are be two different types of equilibrium: (1) the marginal participant does not search,
and (2) the marginal participant searches; how changes in parameters affect outcomes in these
two situations will be different.
Before formally presenting the results, let us consider the incentives for searching and how
participationand searchbehavior interact. Morebuyers searchwhen themarginal searcher either
sees an increase in the utility difference between the two types of auctions, or a decrease in the
search costs. Analogously, more buyers participate when the marginal participant experiences
either an increase in his platform utility or a decrease in his reservation utility.
When the marginal participant searches, i.e., 𝜃􀐡 < 𝜃􀐎 , then changes in the search threshold do
not affect utilities or behavior of any of the participants. However, it also means that themarginal
participant's utility is directly affected by changes in search costs, which he pays. Hence, as search
costs decrease, participation must also increase, since the utility of the marginal participant de-
creases. It is also straightforward to see that as reservation utility increases, participation must
decrease.
When the marginal participant does not search, the interaction between search and partici-
pation is a bit more interesting. In particular, a decrease in search costs induce more buyers to
search, which raises the competitiveness of both auctions; the increased competitiveness mean
that themarginal participant, who does not search, experiences reduced utility. More buyers then
exit, since the previousmarginal participant no longer achieves his reservation utility on the plat-
form. Similarly, as reservation utility increases, both markets become less competitive, but this
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will have a larger effect on each buyer's utility in his preferredmarket; in other words, fewer buy-
ers will increase the size of the difference between utilities of the two different types of auctions,
which induces more search. Hence, when the marginal buyer does not search, search and partici-
pation will generally move in opposite directions: more search means more competition and less
participation.
First we consider the case where both marginal participants are non-searchers, which corre-
sponds to 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 < 𝜃􀐢 < 𝜃􀐍 above. As we have established, equilibria of this form are unique
and symmetric, so that we may characterize them by the pair (𝜃􀐎 , 𝜃􀐡)with 0 < 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 < 1/2.
Theorem 2.2. When the marginal participant does not search (i.e., when 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡) An increase in
the reservation utility leads to lower participation and higher search. An increase in search costs
leads to higher participation and lower search. In other words
𝑑𝜃􀐎
𝑑𝑠
> 0
𝑑𝜃􀐎
𝑑𝑐
< 0
𝑑𝜃􀐡
𝑑𝑠
< 0
𝑑𝜃􀐡
𝑑𝑐
> 0
Proof. The proof is by construction: in our setting, it is possible to derive explicit expressions
for the derivatives above by differentiating the equilibrium conditions. Recall the equilibrium
conditions:
𝑢(𝜃􀐡) =
1
2
[𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐡)] = 𝑠
1
2
(𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) − 𝑢􀐎(𝜃􀐍)) = 𝑐
∗
Symmetry guarantees that 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) = 𝑢􀐎(1 − 𝜃); we know that 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) = ∫
􀑈
􀍭
𝐺􀐍(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣; and since
there are no participants between 𝜃􀐡 and 1 − 𝜃􀐡, 𝐺􀐍(𝜃) = 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) for all 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐡, 1 − 𝜃􀐡). If we
substitute these into the equilibrium conditions, and divide the second condition by 2, we get the
following expressions:
𝜃􀐎𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) +
1
𝜇
[𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)] +
1
2
(1 − 2𝜃􀐡) 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) = 𝑠
and
1
2𝜇
[𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)] +
1
2
(1 − 2𝜃􀐡) 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) = 𝑐∗
Denote the left hand sides of the above equations by 𝐹􀍮(𝜃􀐎 , 𝜃􀐡) and 𝐹􀍯(𝜃􀐎 , 𝜃􀐡) respectively, and
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let 𝐅(𝜽) = (𝐹􀍮(𝜽), 𝐹􀍯(𝜽)). We can rewrite the above conditions in vector form as
𝐅(𝜽) = (
𝑠
𝑐∗
)
Let 𝐩 = (𝑠, 𝑐∗) denote the right hand side of the above expression; then the above implicitly
defines 𝜽 as a function of 𝐩. By the inverse function theorem, we get
(𝐷𝜽)(𝐩) = 𝐽􀍸􀍮(𝜽)
In other words
⎛
⎜
⎝
􀐐􀑈􀔆
􀐐􀐟
􀐐􀑈􀔆
􀐐􀐏∗
􀐐􀑈􀔙
􀐐􀐟
􀐐􀑈􀔙
􀐐􀐏∗
⎞
⎟
⎠
= 𝐽􀍸􀍮(𝐅)
Since 𝐽 is a two-by-two matrix, the inverse can be readily calculated as
𝐽􀍸􀍮 =
1
|𝐽|
⎛
⎜
⎝
􀑚􀏸􀑧
􀑚􀑈􀔙
−
􀑚􀏸􀑦
􀑚􀑈􀔙
−
􀑚􀏸􀑧
􀑚􀑈􀔆
􀑚􀏸􀑦
􀑚􀑈􀔆
⎞
⎟
⎠
Differentiating 𝐹􀍮 and 𝐹􀍯 yields
𝜕𝐹􀍮
𝜕𝜃􀐎
= − [𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) +
1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]
𝜕𝐹􀍮
𝜕𝜃􀐡
= − [2 (𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)) +
1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) + 𝜇(2𝜃􀐎)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)]
𝜕𝐹􀍯
𝜕𝜃􀐎
= − [𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆) +
1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]
𝜕𝐹􀍯
𝜕𝜃􀐡
= − [𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀍯􀑈􀔙 +
1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]
Note that all the partial derivatives are less than zero, and
|𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐡)| > |𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐎)| = |𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍯, 𝜃􀐡)|
|𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍯, 𝜃􀐎)| > |𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐎)| = |𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍯, 𝜃􀐡)|
Consequently the Jacobian is negative:
|𝐽| = 𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐎)𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍯, 𝜃􀐡) − 𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐡)𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍯, 𝜃􀐎) < 0
And the inverse Jacobian, which is equal to the derivatives of 𝜽with respect to (𝑠, 𝑐∗), is signed as
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stated in the theorem.
Next, we consider equilibria where the marginal participant searches.
Theorem 2.3. When the marginal participant searches, participation increases with decreases in
either search costs or participation costs. That is
𝑑(𝜃􀐡, 𝑠) < 0 𝑑(𝜃􀐡, 𝑐
∗) < 0
Proof. Since themarginal searcher does not participate in themarket, marginal changes in search
behavior have no effect on the behavior of platform participants, who all search into their pre-
ferred markets; hence, equilibrium can be fully characterized by 𝜃􀐡, and is described by the con-
dition
𝑢(𝜃􀐢) = 𝑢(1 − 𝜃􀐡) = 𝑢􀐍(1 − 𝜃􀐡) − 𝑐
∗ = 𝑠
A buyer with type 1 − 𝜃􀐡 has the lowest valuation in the 𝐴market, his utility is given by 𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) =
(1 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡), and 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) = 𝑒
􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙), where the exponent is the measure of all buyers in the 𝐴
market with valuations higher than 𝜃􀐡, which in this case is all buyers in 𝐴, who have measure
𝜇2𝜃􀐡. Hence the equilibrium expression is
(1 − 𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) − 𝑐∗ = 𝑠
Differentiating with respect to 𝑐∗ gives
−(1 + 2𝜇(1 − 𝜃􀐡))𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙
𝑑𝜃􀐡
𝑑𝑐∗
− 1 = 0
which rearranges to
𝑑𝜃􀐡
𝑑𝑐∗
= −
𝑒􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙
1 + 2𝜇(1 − 𝜃􀐡)
< 0
A similar procedure with 𝑐∗ gives
𝑑𝜃􀐡
𝑑𝑠
= −
𝑒􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙
1 + 2𝜇(1 − 𝜃􀐡)
< 0
which completes the proof.
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2.4.6. Comparative Statics for Seller Revenue
Our previous paper provided a positive revenue result in a symmetric settingwith exogenous par-
ticipation: as search costs decrease, improved matching always led to increased seller revenues.
This section shows that this result also holds up in our present model, when participation con-
straints are binding.
The intuition behind a positive revenue result is that more search leads to higher valuation
buyers, andhigher valuation buyerswill paymore for their goods. This resultwas straightforward
with exogenous participation, since symmetry could be leveraged to show that the distribution
of the number of buyers in any given auction did not change with search, but the distribution
of valuations increased in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Hence, with exogenous
participation, symmetry precluded any negative effects for sellers coming from search.
With a binding participation constraint, the effect of increased search is a bit more nuanced,
since we must now balance potentially cross-cutting effects, which happens when the marginal
participant is a non-searcher. When themarginal buyer is a searcher, the effect is straightforward,
since decreasing search costs also increases participation, which has an unambiguously positive
effect on seller revenues.
On the other hand, when the marginal participant is a non-searcher, the effects need to be
tracked more carefully, since increased competitiveness drives buyers out of the market. The re-
mainder of the section derives the revenue effect; our model produces a positive effect of search
on revenue despite the binding budget constraint, i.e., the gains frommatching always exceed the
revenue lost from buyer exit.
First, we derive an explicit expression for revenue, which is expressed in the lemma below; the
main theorem of this section then states the result.
Lemma 2.7. Since the platform is symmetric, revenue in each market is equal, and the revenue of
the platform as a whole is equal to the revenue in each market. The expression for revenue is
𝑅 = 1 − 𝑢􀐍(1) − ∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑢􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
where 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) is the utility of a type 𝜃 buyer from participating in an 𝐴 auction, and 𝑓􀐍(𝜃) is the
density of buyers of type 𝜃 in 𝐴markets.
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Proof. From symmetry it follows that the expected revenue of sellers in each market is the same.
Since there are measure 1/2 of each type of seller, the total platform revenue is 𝑅 = 1/2𝑅􀐍 +
1/2𝑅􀐎 = 𝑅􀐍, as desired.
The rest focuses on the 𝐴market. The expected utility of a type 𝜃 buyer in the 𝐴market is the
expected value of his winnings, 𝜃𝐺􀐍(𝜃), subtracted his expected payment, or 𝑢􀐍(𝜃) = 𝜃𝐺􀐍(𝜃) −
𝑚􀐍(𝜃), which can be rearranged to give
𝑚􀐍(𝜃) = 𝜃𝐺􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐍(𝜃)
The total revenue is just the total of all expected payments, which in this case means that we
integrate over the measure of all buyers in the 𝐴market:
𝑅􀐍 =∫
􀍮
􀍭
(𝜃𝐺􀐍(𝜃) − 𝑢􀐍(𝜃)) 𝑓(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
=∫
􀍯
􀍭
𝜃𝑓􀐍(𝜃)𝐺􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃 − ∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑢􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
Since 𝐺􀐍(𝜃) = 𝑒
􀍸(􀑌􀍸􀏸􀔅(􀑈)), 𝑓􀐍(𝜃)𝐺􀐍(𝜃) = 𝑔􀐍(𝜃), which means that the first term is simply the
expectation of the highest bid. This also happens to equal the expected payment of the highest
type, which is 1 − 𝑢􀐍(1). Substituting this in gives the desired expression.
Theorem 2.4 (Revenue). Revenues increase as search costs decrease.
Sketch of proof. We present the full proof in the appendix. As noted earlier, the statement is
clearly locally true for low search costs, when all participants are searchers. We then just need
to show it is also true when the marginal participant is a non-searcher. The derivative of revenue
with respect to 𝑐∗ can be signed algebraically, but the process is quite involved.
2.4.7. Platform Search Policy
With the above results in place, we can turn our attention to the question of optimal platform
search policy. As mentioned earlier, we consider the optimum policies for platforms with two
different revenue instruments: (1) a platform that generates its revenues by taxing transactions,
i.e., taking a fixed percentage of seller revenues; and (2) a platform that generates its revenues by
collecting membership fees.
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A transaction taxing platform has only search costs as a strategic variable, and it selects costs
to maximize seller revenue. Hence, the optimal search policy for such a platform follows directly
from the revenue result.
Corollary 2.1. A platform that levies a transaction taxwill choose theminimal possible search costs.
Theorem2.5. A platform collectingmembership costs will choose an extremal value of search costs:
it will set search costs either as high or as low as possible.
Proof. Whatever the optimal pair (𝑠, 𝑐∗), it must be the case that 𝑐∗ maximizes participation given
𝑠. If not, revenue could be increased by keeping 𝑠 the same and setting 𝑐∗ to the participation-
maximizing value. We know from above that when participation is first decreasing with 𝑐∗, then
increasing; hence the optimal 𝑐∗ must be at one of the extremes.
In practice, it may not be the case that a platform is able to reduce search costs all the way to
zero, or to increase it to a high enough level that search is entirely dissuaded, and given the shape
of the participation-search-cost curve, the optimal values will generally depend on the range over
which a platform can actually manipulate search costs. For the full range, however, we need only
compare the optimal full search and no search equilibria, which allows us to pin down which of
the two extremes will be optimal in select situations. More specifically, for 𝜇 high enough, 𝑐∗ = 0
is optimal, whereas for 𝜇 low enough, infinite search costs, or completely dissuading search, is
optimal.
Theorem 2.6. There exists 𝜇 such that for 𝜇 < 𝜇, the optimal search policy is to set search costs
high enough to dissuade search completely.
Additionally, there exists ?̄? such that for 𝜇 > ?̄?, the optimal search policy sets 𝑐∗ = 0, i.e., all
members of the platform search.
Proof. Note that total membership fees collected is equal to 𝜇2𝜃􀐡𝑠, maximizing which is equiva-
lent to maximizing 𝜇𝜃􀐡𝑠, which we denote here with 𝑅. The utility of the marginal participant is
always equal to 𝑠, so we canwrite revenue as a function of 𝜃􀐡, transforming the problem of setting
𝑠 to one of setting 𝜃􀐡.
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At zero search costs, this is given by 𝑅􀍭(𝜃) as
𝑅􀍭(𝜃) = 𝜇𝜃𝑠􀍭 = 𝜇𝜃(1 − 𝜃)𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈
At infinite search costs,
𝑅􀍮(𝜃) = 𝜇𝜃𝑠􀍮 = 𝜇𝜃 [
1
𝜇
(𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈) +
1
2
(1 − 2𝜃)𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈]
= 𝜃 (𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈) +
1
2
𝜇𝜃(1 − 2𝜃)𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈
First, we construct a ?̄? that satisfies the property given; note that it is not the lowest possible
value for ?̄?.
The way that we do this is to show that for certain 𝜃􀐡 corresponding to infinite search cost
equilibria, 𝜃􀐡/2 in a zero search cost equilibrium yields greater revenue. Then, as long as 𝜇 is
great enough, the optimal 𝜃􀐡 under infinite search costs is one of those for which 𝜃􀐡/2 offers
greater revenue, so that the optimal revenue under zero search costs must exceed the optimal
revenue under infinite search costs.
To see this, substitute 𝜃􀐡/2 into 𝑅􀍭:
𝑅􀍭 (
𝜃􀐡
2
) =
1
2
𝜇𝜃􀐡 (1 −
1
2
𝜃􀐡) 𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙
This exceeds 𝑅􀍮(𝜃􀐡) as long as
3
2
𝜃􀐡 >
2
𝜇
(1 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙)
or when
𝜇𝜃􀐡 > 𝑊 (−
4
3
𝑒􀍸􀍱/􀍰) +
4
3
where𝑊(⋅) is the Lambert W function, i.e.,𝑊(𝑥) satisfies𝑊(𝑥)𝑒􀍸􀐉(􀐤) = 𝑥.
The optimal 𝜃􀐡 under zero search will satisfy the above if the 𝜃􀐡 satisfying the above condi-
tion with equality is below the maximum revenue, i.e., revenue is increasing it that point. The
derivative of 𝑅􀍮 with respect to 𝜃􀐡 is
𝑑𝑅􀍮
𝑑𝜃􀐡
= 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙 − 𝜇𝜃􀐡 (𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙) + (
1
2
𝜇 − 2𝜇𝜃􀐡 −
1
2
𝜇􀍯𝜃􀐡 + 𝜇
􀍯𝜃􀍯􀐡) 𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙
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Letting𝑤 ≡ 𝑊(−3/4𝑒􀍸􀍱/􀍰) and 𝜇𝜃􀐡 = 𝑤 + 4/3, we can show that
𝑒􀍸􀑌􀑈􀔙 = −
3
4
𝑤
We can substitute this into our requirement that 𝑑𝑅􀍮/𝑑𝜃􀐡 > 0 and rearrange terms to get
𝜇 >
(𝑤 + 11/6)(𝑤 + 3/4)
1 − (𝑤 + 4/3)
≌ 1.69989
To show that for low enough 𝜇, no search is always optimal. From the above expression for 𝑅􀍭,
we can actually find the optimal level of 𝑅􀍭 by setting 𝑅
􀚄
􀍭(𝜃
∗) = 0, which yields
𝜃∗ =
1
2𝜇
[1 + 𝜇 − √1 + 𝜇􀍯]
Plugging back in to 𝑅􀍭 gives the explicit value for 𝑅
∗
􀍭:
𝑅∗􀍭 =
1
2
(
√1 + 𝜇􀍯 − 1
𝜇
) 𝑒􀍸(􀑌􀍷􀍮􀍸√􀍮􀍷􀑌
􀑧)
We show that for small enough 𝜇, the no search equilibriumwith threshold at 1/2 beats this. Call
this value 𝑅∗􀍮,then
𝑅∗􀍮 =
1
2
(𝑒􀍸
􀑦
􀑧
􀑌 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌)
Since 𝑅∗􀍭 and 𝑅
∗
􀍮 are both zero at 𝜇 = 0 (taking the limit using L'Hôpital's rule for 𝑅
∗
􀍭), it suffices to
show that the derivative of 𝑅∗􀍮 with respect to 𝜇
∗ exceeds that of 𝑅∗􀍭 at 𝜇 = 0.
For 𝑅∗􀍮, this derivative is equal to 1/4. To find the corresponding derivative of 𝑅
∗
􀍭, note that
1, 𝜇, and √1 + 𝜇􀍯 correspond to sides of a right triangle with hypotenuse √1 + 𝜇􀍯, so if we let
𝜌 = arcsin 𝜇, we can rewrite the term in parentheses as
√1 + 𝜇􀍯(1 − cos 𝜌)
Taking the derivative of 𝑅∗􀍭 at 𝜇 = 0, which corresponds to 𝜌 = 0, yields 1/2 sin 0 = 0. Hence,
there must be a region around zero where platform revenues with no search are strictly greater
than revenues under full search.
In spite of these results that seem to establish the benefits of search even for a fee-extracting,
they should be interpretedwith caution. Asmentioned above, they are sensitive to the range over
which the platform can actually change search costs; a small technological restriction may make
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it optimal to set costs as high as possible. If we fix 𝑠, then platform revenue is similarly V-shaped
with search costs. This is somewhat disconcerting, and suggests that the revenue instrument
here, membership fees, fails to pick up on the additional surplus generated by additional search
– which is the whole point that a platform would want to facilitate search in the first place.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper takes a first step in bringing the insights from our previous work into broader discus-
sionsof platformstrategy. Manyplatforms invest heavily in reducing search frictions,whether this
be through more sophisticated search services, or through recommendation engines, or through
information provision; it is not very well-known, however, whether we should always expect bet-
ter outcomes in such situations. Our earlier work suggested that in symmetric settings, lower
search costs should have an unambiguous benefit; even that finding, however, needs to be tem-
pered by the fact that the potential downsides of search, which stem from the increase in compe-
tition between buyers, are heavily dampened by the fact that participation is exogenous.
We find that the positive revenue result continues to hold in our current model with endoge-
nousparticipation. This is an encouraging result, and suggests that thebenefits to bettermatching
can be very significant, since they must be at least as great as the losses incurred by exit. We also
present new results on optimal platform search policy. In particular, a taxing platformwill always
gain by decreasing search costs; a fee-collecting platform, however, has an optimal policy that de-
pends on the thickness of themarket; in thickmarketswith high levels of competition, zero search
costs are optimal, whereas in thin markets with low competition, infinite search costs do better.
Furthermore, we find that the optima for fee-collecting platforms are more fragile than those
for tax-collecting ones. When a platform does not have access to all values of 𝑐∗ – if, for instance,
technological impose a binding lower bound on 𝑐∗ where some remaining participants do not
search – then optimal search policy will further depend on the range available. The only guaran-
tee is that the optimal policy will be extremal, but which of the two extremes generates higher
revenues cannot be determined in general – it really depends on the precise definitions of ``as
much as possible''.
Ultimately, our results are generally supportive of the ability of search to improve platform
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revenue: revenue is always increasing as search costs decrease; and for competitive enough plat-
forms, zero search costs are also optimal for a fee-collecting platform. We leave, however, with
a cautionary remark. The fragility of our the optima for fee-collecting platforms, along with the
non-monotonicities of revenue as a function of search costs, are a strong hint that a membership
fee is simply the wrong instrument for extracting any additional surplus created by search. The
intuition is fairly straightforward: a fee extracts a level of surplus from each participant equal to
that of the lowest-utility buyer on the platform, whereas matching generates additional surplus
only for high-utility buyers. Hence, even if there are significant, positive matching effects, a plat-
form that collects membership fees may not see them. A tax, by contrast, moves with revenue,
and hence captures at least partially the benefits of better matches, i.e., in a manner of speaking,
revenue is able to ``pick up'' on the additional surplus, since it manifests itself at least partially in
the form of higher prices. From a broader perspective, we might posit that there are many situa-
tions in which search can increase the total surplus generated on a platform; whether or not that
facilitating that search is good for the platform itself, however, may depend onwhether or not the
platform's instrument is sensitive to the matching effects created.
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3.1. Introduction
Campaigning has become an increasingly important – and increasingly expensive – reality of po-
litical competition in the United States. Total campaign expenditures have been growing rapidly
over the course of the last decade: in 2000, total campaign contributions amounted to $528 mil-
lion; in 2008, this figure was over $1.7 billion1 Recent institutional developments, notably the
controversial Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission and consequent emergence of so-
called ``Super PACs'', have also sparked lively debate on the role of money in American political
competition, raising the question of what rapidly increasing campaign spending levels portend
for the future of American politics. Are large campaign expenditures merely the price to pay for
a smoothly functioning democracy in a large developed country, i.e., the price of maintaining an
informed electorate? Or are they evidence of an emerging de facto plutocracy that is increasingly
able to game the democratic system with its superior resources?
Even though campaigning is perhaps the most conspicuous aspect of political competition,
there has been little consensus on either the purpose or the effects of campaigning and campaign
spending – a fact that is underscored by several puzzling but persistent empirical findings. For in-
stance, incumbent spending seems to have negligible effects on electoral outcomes, which stands
in uneasy tension with the large sums of money that are poured into incumbent campaigns. How
campaigning affects political outcomes also bears significantly on the issue of campaign finance
reforms: what types of effects should we expect to see with campaign finance liberalization, of
the type implemented by Citizens United, and how will it affect the quality of electoral outcomes?
What types of spending reformmake sense, and how are they likely to affect electoral outcomes?
1 http://www.opensecrets.org
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This paper presents a model of political campaigning as an all-pay contest between two candi-
dates, where the prize is the median voter, and hence the election. Each candidate releases some
numberof arguments in support of his position, andwhoever releases thehighest numberof argu-
ments wins the contest. Constraints on candidate actions come in two forms: (1) candidates have
costs that are functions of the numbers of arguments released, and we assume that the incum-
bent has a cost advantage; (2) the maximum number of arguments each candidate can release
is given by his type, which is private information. A more detailed discussion of our modeling
choices follows below; the central idea, however, is to capture two aspects of campaign spending
that are often at odds in formal models. The first is that campaign spending may be good, since
they provide information to the public; the second is that there is some inefficiency in the pro-
cessing of information, so that spending also has direct effects on behavior and may be abused to
create skewed outcomes.
The main theorem of this paper characterizes equilibria. Although there are multiple equilib-
ria, the ex ante distribution of candidate actions is unique2, so that it is possible to describe ex
antewinning probabilities as well as expected campaigning levels. To be more specific: (1) a cost
advantage leads the incumbent to campaign more, and to win with higher probability ex ante –
we call this advantage the bias of the election; (2) a greater cost advantage worsens the maxi-
mal informational efficiency of equilibria; (3) equilibria involve mixed strategies, so that over the
range of mixing, the marginal effect of additional arguments for each candidate is equal to his
marginal cost of producing them; this has implications for several empirical findings, which we
discuss later in the section.
We also derive results on the impact of campaign finance policies on electoral outcomes. The
ideal competition would be between candidates with identical cost functions, since this elimi-
nates bias and can produce fully efficient outcomes; this is not realistically achievable, however,
since there is no obvious direct way to fine-tune the cost functions. First, we consider what the
impact of the Citizens United decision is likely to have: we represent this as a reduction in both
candidates cost functions, but a potential worsening of the asymmetry (i.e., the advantaged candi-
date gets a larger reduction). The effects of this are ambiguous: candidates spend more, and bias
2 Up to a set of measure zero
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and inefficiency are reduced for competitions between lower types, but greater for competitions
involving higher types. That is, such a change is changes the efficiency properties of the equilib-
ria, but its measured impact on winning probabilities might not be very great, since the changes
partially cancel. Second, we consider spending caps, which turn out to have rather subtle effects.
Properly chosen, they can reduce the bias and improve informational efficiency in the presence
of great enough asymmetries; if they are too high, however, but still binding, they do nothing
to improve the bias while degrading informational efficiency. The potentially negative effect on
informational efficiency is similar to predictions of signaling models of campaigning (Daley and
Snowberg 2007), but the relationship between cap effects and cap levels appears to be new.
Although all-pay contest have been apopularway tomodel different types of competition, rang-
ing from R&D races to political lobbying (Che and Gale 1998; Siegel 2009), there have been few
efforts to apply them to campaign contests. This represents an alternative modeling approach
to one more widely used in the literature, where spending levels are inputs into an exogenously
specifiedwinning probability function, which leads to pure strategies, but a probabilistic outcome
as a function of outcomes. (e.g., Benoit and Marsh 2008; Erikson and Palfrey 2000; Gerber 2004;
Gius 2009). In contrast, the election outcome in our model is deterministic in actions played, but
features mixed-strategy equilibria. Although the picture of campaigning is painted in very broad
strokes, it is able to capture many of the empirical properties that similar models address, while
using fewer moving parts, e.g., it does not require a specification of a probabilistic outcome func-
tion, which suggests that an all-pay contest may not be a bad approximation for political cam-
paigns. One empirical regularity that has received a great deal of attention, for instance, is the
fact that incumbent spending significantly less effective than challenger spending. In our model,
this is an immediate consequence of mixing, since each additional dollar has a marginal effect
equal to the cost of raising it. This prediction is not necessarily hard to generate in a setting with
probabilistic outcome and incumbent advantage, but the all-pay framework does offer a unique
additional insight: the effect of a cost advantage is likely to show up in a constant term in esti-
mations, rather than in the average effect of spending, since it induces the challenger to play with
a mass point at a low level of campaigning. The probabilistic nature of strategies can also shed
some light on the presence of asymmetries that seem too extreme to be reasonable; for instance,
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in 2006 incumbent Roy Blunt of Mississippi spent over $3 million, whereas his challenger spent
nothing.
Ourmodel diverges from existing treatments of all-pay auctions and contests (Baye, Kovenock,
and De Vries 1996; Siegel 2009) in one critical way, which does not appear to have been exten-
sively explored in the literature: all candidates have same valuation for the prize, but differ in
their budget constraints, which are given by their types. In our model, the candidate's type is con-
ceived as the ``objective'' amount of support for a candidate's position, i.e., the number of effective
arguments that they can bring to bear on the campaign. Although it is true that candidates can in
general always spend more money, spending itself is largely a proxy for campaign intensity, and
there does seem to be a point at which a candidate's ``type'' bounds his ability to make gains by
further campaigning, even of the money to do so is available. The inefficacy of self-financing is
fairly well-documented (see Mueller 2003, for survey), and recent election cycles have produced
several conspicuous well-funded candidates who proved to have a limited reach: MegWhitman's
bid for California governor in 2010 was unsuccessful, in spite of effectively unlimited funds, with
$144millionbeing spent fromherpersonal fortune; RickPerry's run at being theGOPpresidential
nominee for 2012 startedwith a strong lead in funding, but the advantageswaned over the course
of the primaries as his image solidified. As a general modeling choice, however, equal valuations
with private budget constraints may apply to any number of settings where a ``buyer's'' private
valuation is not equal to the social, or seller's, benefit of that player winning, and any contest that
offers a fixed prize and hopes to select the highest ``revealed'' type, which might be independent
of his cost function3, might be modeled in such a way.
While ourmodel is admittedly very stark – and very partial in the sense that it does not address
other related closely related aspects of political competition such as policy choice – it captures
many of the empirical regularities of the campaign finance literature. A fuller specification would
undoubtedly benefit its explanatory power, but the basic point of this paper is that all-pay mod-
els, which have been profitably employed to analyze many other forms of competition, including
political lobbying, can offer additional insights into the campaigning process. We offer a very sim-
plemodel parsimoniously accounts formany stylized facts and empirical puzzles, while clarifying
3 Usually, signaling games select on the cost function as an indicator of quality; there might be instances, however,
where the max output is more apt.
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the role and effects of campaign spending efforts. We then use the model to derive new results
regarding the effects of campaign finance policy and spending caps.
3.2. Model Environment
There are two candidates, 𝐿 and 𝑅, who compete for the median vote. Each candidate receives a
utility of one if he wins the election, and zero otherwise. The candidates compete in an all-pay
contest, where each candidate supports his platform by producing arguments, and the candidate
who releases tho most arguments wins the election.
Candidates will differ along two dimensions: the cost of producing arguments, which is known
beforehand, and the maximum number of arguments to which he has access, which is a random
variable that is private information to each candidate – this should be thought of as the objective
strength of a candidate's position.
We describe a candidate's strength as his type: each candidate 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑅} will have a type
𝜃􀐕 ∈ Θ􀐕 = [0, 1] that denotes the maximum number of arguments to which he has access – it
is effectively a stochastic bidding cap. The types 𝜃􀐕 for 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝑅 are independently and uniformly
distributed across [0, 1].
After observing his type, each candidate releases some number of arguments to the public;
call 𝜆 the number of arguments released by 𝐿, and 𝜌 the number of arguments released by 𝑅;
these are bound by the types of their respective candidates, so they must satisfy 𝜆 ∈ [0, 𝜃􀏾] and
𝜌 ∈ [0, 𝜃􀐄]. Releasing arguments is costly, and each candidate 𝑖 has an exogenous cost function
𝑐􀐕(𝑥), which is common knowledge, that determines his cost of releasing 𝑥 arguments. Let 𝑅 be
the cost-advantaged candidate, so that 𝑐􀐄(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑐􀏾(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1], where 𝛼 < 1
4.
Furthermore, we assume that 𝑐􀚄 > 0, 𝑐􀚆 > 0, 𝑐(0) = 𝑐􀚄(0) = 0, and 𝑐(1) > 1; the final condition
means that the cost-disadvantaged candidate𝐿will never find it optimal to always release all argu-
ments available to him, even if doing so would guarantee victory; the prior condition guarantees
that it will always be optimal to release at least some arguments.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Candidates 𝐿 and 𝑅 observe their types, i.e., the total number of arguments to which each
4 The multiplicative form is not essential to our results, but simplifies the analysis somewhat.
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has access
2. Candidate 𝐿 releases 𝜆 arguments, 𝑅 releases 𝜌 arguments, subject to the constraint that
𝜆 < 𝜃􀏾 and 𝜌 ≤ 𝜃􀐄 .
3. The candidate with the most arguments wins the election.
Candidates have quasilinear utility:
𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝜆, 𝜌) = 𝑃(𝜆 > 𝜌) − 𝑐􀏾(𝜆)
𝐸𝑢􀐄(𝜆, 𝜌) = 𝑃(𝜆 < 𝜌) − 𝑐􀐄(𝜌)
For each candidate, a strategy consists of a mapping from the observed type to a probability dis-
tribution (possibly degenerate) over all feasible actions. We denote these strategies by ℎ􀏾(⋅, 𝜃􀏾)
and ℎ􀐄(⋅, 𝜃􀐄)where ℎ
􀏾(𝜆, 𝜃􀏾) is the probability density function at 𝜆 for an 𝐿 candidate of type 𝜃􀏾 .
3.3. Model discussion
Although the model is highly stylized, it manages to capture two competing effects of campaign-
ing that are often difficult to describe simultaneously: direct campaigning effects and ``signaling''
motives behind campaigning. The main point of departure vis-à-vis the all-pay contest literature,
as well as the signaling literature, is the idea that a candidate's type is represented as a budget
constraint rather than a cost function (as it would be in Spence-type signaling models). The no-
tion here is that a candidate's ability to campaign may be quite independent of his quality as a
representative. As a result, easier access to campaign finance may lead elections to select the
most able campaigners rather than the best quality politicians – it is this intuition that has been
mostly absent from other models of competition. The simple outcome rule, however, also clearly
delineates a space for direct campaign effects.
One way to motivate this setup is with a boundedly-rational median voter, who is exposed to
campaigning and decides who they believe is the best candidate. In reality, campaign spending
may be targeted, but they are often targeted in the same areas; most campaign spending in the
recent 2012 presidential election, for instance, has been focused on the ``swing states'' with rela-
tively equal intensity by both parties.
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In a way, our model represents ``middle-ground'' between direct effects models and signaling
models. A potentially undesirable characteristic of rational signalingmodels is that theymay sup-
press the effects of cost asymmetries: rational voters will often reason away differences in spend-
ing ability, and so all that matters is whether a separating equilibrium can be sustained or not.
On the other hand, direct effects models ignore any informational purpose of campaign spending,
and hence do not capture the arguments that exist in favor of allowing for more spending, i.e., the
production of a more informed electorate. By considering a contest with a simple decision rule,
we present a model that avoids the problems of these extreme assumptions; the important thing
is that we consider a mechanism whereby information is important, but not entirely extracted in
a way that nullifies cost asymmetries.
Another way to approach this type of ``bounded rationality'' comes from the political psychol-
ogy literature. There is a fairly extensive list of studies to confirm the existence of biases in voter
behaviors and to identify the channels through which campaign advertising and media affects
voter behavior (for survey, see Kinder 2003). Of particular relevance to our model is the litera-
ture on ``priming,'' which is also framed in terms of ``issue ownership''. The intuition behind these
theories is that parties do not directly confront each other in their policy platforms, but rather
focus on different issues. The intent of media communications is not to directly with each other,
but rather to try tomake voters think in a specific waywhen they vote, e.g., to weighmore heavily
fiscal policy than welfare policy. In such cases, the argument can be made that greater the me-
dia exposure of a particular issue topic, the greater its importance in the mind of the voter, and
themore likely the voter will vote according to policy positions on that issue, potentially ignoring
other important issues (for instance, Petrocik 1996).
For the purposes of the remainder of the paper, we will think of arguments released as cor-
responding roughly to campaign spending, i.e., to release more arguments is more costly. The
other important parameter is the cost asymmetry. Although this is not directly measurable, it
may be correlated with some observable characteristics, such as the number of different sources
or organizations fromwhich a candidate receives funds, or pre-existing connections or campaign
experience. In the context of recent campaign finance liberalizations, the concentration of donors
also becomes important: if individual spending becomes unlimited, then a candidate with access
67
3. Arguing about politics: An all-pay model of political campaigns
to concentrated, wealthy donors willing to spend large amounts of money will benefit more from
liberalization than a candidate with a broader, less concentrated donor base.
3.4. Equilibria Characterization
The solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium: each type maximizes his expected utility.
ℎ􀏾(⋅, 𝜃􀏾) ∈ argmax
􀐔􀚅
𝐸[𝑢􀏾 ∣ ℎ􀚄, 𝜃􀏾]
ℎ􀐄(⋅, 𝜃􀏾) ∈ argmax
􀐔􀚅
𝐸[𝑢􀐄 ∣ ℎ􀚄, 𝜃􀐄]
Since candidate types are independent, the argument distribution each candidate faces does not
depend on his own type. Let𝐺􀑋 and𝐺􀑑 denote the ex ante cumulative distribution functions of the
arguments released by each candidate. Then the probability that candidate 𝐿 when he releases
𝜆 arguments is simply 𝐺􀑑(𝜆). Using this fact, we can write each candidates expected utility from
releasing a particular number of arguments as follows:
𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝜆) = 𝐺􀑑(𝜆) − 𝑐􀏾(𝜆)
𝐸𝑢􀐄(𝜌) = 𝐺􀑋(𝜌) − 𝑐􀐄(𝜌)
Note that 𝐺􀑑 and 𝐺􀑋 are related to strategies by the following
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = ∫
􀍮
􀐤
𝐻􀐄(𝑥, 𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) = ∫
􀍮
􀐤
𝐻􀏾(𝑥, 𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
Our characterization of equilibria will pin down the induced ex ante action distributions 𝐺􀑑 and
𝐺􀑋. It will turn out that the only distributions consistent with equilibrium involve regions over
which candidates are indifferent between different options; moreover, the cost asymmetry will
necessitate that one player must play a strategy that has probability mass, which rules out pure-
strategy equilibria.
The following theorem presents the result; the remainder of this section details the proof.
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Theorem 3.1. Let 𝑥 satisfy 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥) = 1. Then, let
?̄? ≡ 𝑐􀍸􀍮􀏾 [1 − (𝑥 − 𝑐􀏾(𝑥))]
𝑣􀏾 ≡ 1 − 𝑐􀏾(?̄?)
𝑣􀐄 ≡ 1 − 𝑐􀐄(?̄?)
All equilibria of the campaigning game described above generate the following action distributions:
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?]
1 for 𝑥 > ?̄?
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣􀐄 + 𝑐􀐄(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?]
1 for 𝑥 > ?̄?
That is, any candidate with fewer than 𝑥 releases all of them, and any candidate with greater than
𝑥 arguments releases some number 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥 of them in a way consistent with the distributions above;
since candidates are indifferent between all alternatives within the range, any manner of mixing
that generates the above distributions will constitute an equilibrium.
Since the space of all possible strategies is quite large, we proceed by gradually narrowing the
space of candidate strategies until we arrive at the given expressions. First, note that equilibrium
strategies cannot have both candidates playing strategies with mass points at the same point in
their action distributions, 𝐺􀑑 and 𝐺􀑋; if they did, then playing at that point would be strictly dom-
inated by playing above that point whenever possible. Playing mass at zero is also never optimal,
so 𝐺􀑑(0) = 𝐺􀑋(0) = 0.
Furthermore, since 𝑐􀚄(0) = 0, there must exist some 𝜀 > 0 such that whenever 𝜃􀐕 < 𝜀, the
optimal strategy for candidate 𝑖 is to release all 𝜃􀐕 arguments. If not, then one player would have
to play mass at zero. To see this, note that if such an 𝜀 does not exist, then for every 𝜀 > 0, we
can find some 𝛿 ∈ (0, 𝜀) such that a candidate with access to 𝜀 arguments does at least as well by
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playing 𝛿 as by playing 𝜀, i.e., from the point of view of candidate 𝐿, this amounts to
𝐺􀑑(𝛿) − 𝑐􀏾(𝛿) ≥ 𝐺
􀑑(𝜀) − 𝑐􀏾(𝜀)
Since this holds for arbitrarily small 𝜀, 𝐺􀑑 and 𝑐􀏾 are weakly increasing, and 𝑐
􀚄(0) = 0, this would
imply that 𝑔􀑑(0) = 0. Since a candidate of type 𝜃􀐕 can release at most 𝜃􀐕 arguments, the proba-
bility that a candidate releases 𝑥 or fewer arguments is at least as great as the probability that his
type is below 𝑥, which is also equal to 𝑥. This means that
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) ≥ 𝑥
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) ≥ 𝑥
Hence, the only way that 𝑔􀑑(0) = 0 can hold is if 𝐺􀑑 > 0, which cannot happen in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. The supports of 𝐺􀑑 and 𝐺􀑋 are the same up to a set of measure zero.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., there is some open set (𝑎, 𝑏) ⊂ [0, 1] not in the support of 𝐺􀑑. Then,
whenever releasing 𝜆 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏) is possible for 𝐿, it is dominated by releasing 𝑎 messages, with
gives the same winning probability with lower costs. Hence (𝑎, 𝑏) cannot be in the support if 𝐺􀑋.
Repeating the argument with an open set in the support of 𝐺􀑋 completes the proof.
Lemma3.2. The supports of𝐺􀑑 and𝐺􀑋 must not have ``gaps'', in the following sense: if 𝑎 and 𝑏, with
𝑎 < 𝑏 are in the support of 𝐺􀑋 (or 𝐺􀑑), then there cannot exist an open set (𝑎􀚄,􀚄 𝑏) ⊂ [𝑎, 𝑏] such that
(𝑎􀚄, 𝑏􀚄) ∩ Supp(𝐺􀑋) = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that such a gap exists. Then let
𝑚 ≡ sup {𝑥 < 𝑎 ∶ 𝑥 ∈ Supp(𝐺􀑋)}
𝑛 ≡ inf {𝑥 > 𝑏 ∶ 𝑥 ∈ Supp(𝐺􀑋)}
Basically,𝑚 and 𝑛 are the boundaries of the gap if we widen it as much as possible. Then for any
𝜀 > 0, there exist𝑚􀚄 < 𝑚 − 𝜀 and 𝑛􀚄 > 𝑛 − 𝜀 in the support of 𝐺􀑑 satisfying
𝐺􀑑(𝑚􀚄) − 𝑐􀏾(𝑚
􀚄) ≥ 𝐺􀑑(𝑛􀚄) − 𝑐􀏾(𝑛
􀚄)
Weknow this from revealed preference: 𝑛􀚄 is always available as an optionwhenever𝑚􀚄 is played,
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so𝑚􀚄 must do at least as well as 𝑛􀚄. We can rearrange the above expression as
𝐺􀑑(𝑚􀚄) − 𝐺􀑑(𝑛􀚄) ≥ 𝑐􀏾(𝑚
􀚄) − 𝑐􀏾(𝑛
􀚄) > 0
Since this difference is strictly positive for all 𝜀, this implies that there must be mass either at𝑚,
or at 𝑛, or at both i.e., on one or both sides of the gap. The argument also holds for 𝐺􀑋, so that if a
gap exists, each candidate must play with mass on at least one side of the gap.
None of the possibilities, however, are consistentwith equilibrium. Wehave already shown that
both players cannot play withmass at the same point, since one candidate could do strictly better
bymoving thatmass upby 𝜀 > 0whenever suchplay is feasible. The only remaining configuration
possible is for one candidate to havemass at𝑚, the bottom of the gap, and the other to havemass
at 𝑛, the top of the gap. This is clearly not optimal, however, for the candidate with mass at 𝑛,
who would reduce his costs and achieve the same winning probability with any strategy in the
interval (𝑚, 𝑛). Since this exhausts all possibilities, our original assumption must not be true,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Candidates 𝐿 and 𝑅 must be indifferent between the same portions of their supports.
Proof. Suppose not, that there exists (𝑎, 𝑏) over which 𝐿 is indifferent, but 𝑅 is not. If there is
a sub-interval in which 𝑅 always releases the most arguments possible, then 𝑔􀑑 = 1, which is
inconsistent with 𝐿 being indifferent. The other possibility is for 𝑅 to be indifferent over disjoint
open subintervals, and to keep 𝑔􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏). Let 𝑐 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏) be the boundary
between the indifference regions of 𝑅, i.e.r 𝑅 is indifferent between actions in (𝑐 − 𝜀, 𝑐), and then
gets higher utility in the interval (𝑐, 𝑐 + 𝜀). This means that all 𝜃􀐄 > 𝑐 will never play below 𝑐, so
that 𝐺􀑑􀍸(𝑐) = 𝑐, where 𝐺
􀐕
􀍸(𝑥) represents the limit from below of 𝐺
􀐕 . However, since 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) ≥ 𝑥
for all 𝑥, and 𝑔􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏), this would entail mass at 𝑐. Mass at 𝑐, however, would
make 𝐿 any point slightly above 𝑐 to 𝑐, contradicting indifference.
Lemma 3.4. If a candidate ever plays some strategy 𝑥 when a higher strategy is possible, then for
that player there will never be a strategy 𝑥􀚄 > 𝑥 that strictly beats it.
Proof. Suppose not, that candidate 𝐿 (without loss of generality) plays 𝑥when some higher action
is feasible, but that there exists some 𝑥􀚄 > 𝑥 that strictly beats it when feasible. Since there are no
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gaps in the support of𝐺􀑋, thismeans that there is some interval above𝑥 overwhich𝐿 is indifferent.
The reason is that 𝑥􀚄 will be played when it becomes possible, so 𝑥 and 𝑥􀚄 are in the support of
𝐺􀑋. Since we established that this cannot have any gaps, this means that all values (except for a
potentially a subset of measure zero) in the interval [𝑥, 𝑥􀚄) must be played by some types. But
since 𝑥 is played by some type 𝜃􀏾 > 𝑥, it means that 𝑥 must do at least weakly better than all
actions in the interval (𝑥, 𝜃􀏾]. Since these valuesmust also be in the support of𝐺
􀑋, they are played
at some point, which means that they also do weakly better than 𝑥. This means that 𝐿 must be
indifferent between playing any action in the interval [𝑥, 𝜃􀏾].
Let 𝑥􀍭 ≡ inf{𝑥
􀚆 ∶ 𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝑦) = 𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝑥) ∀𝑦 ∈ [𝑥􀚆, 𝑥]} and 𝑥􀍮 ≡ sup{𝑥
􀚆 ∶ 𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝑦) = 𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝑥) ∀𝑦 ∈
[𝑥, 𝑥􀚆]}, that is, [𝑥􀍭, 𝑥􀍮] represents the widest possible interval including 𝑥 over which 𝐿 is indif-
ferent. Again, let 𝐺􀐕􀍸(𝑥) = lim􀐤􀚅↑􀐤 𝐺
􀐕(𝑥) denote the limit from below of 𝐺􀐕(𝑥).
By the previous lemma, 𝐿 and 𝑅 must both be indifferent over actions in the set (𝑥􀍭, 𝑥􀍮). Since
this is the largest set over which they are indifferent, candidates with types above 𝑥􀍮 will never
play below 𝑥􀍮, and similarly candidates with types in (𝑥􀍭, 𝑥􀍮) will never play below 𝑥􀍮, which
means that 𝐺􀐕􀍸(𝑥􀍭) = 𝑥􀍭 and 𝐺
􀐐
􀍸(𝑥􀍮) = 𝑥􀍮. Furthermore, indifference of the candidates implies
that
𝑔􀑑(?̃?) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(?̃?)
𝑔􀑋(?̃?) = 𝑐􀚄􀐄(?̃?)
Where ?̃? is used to represent an arbitrary actionwithin the range (𝑥􀍭, 𝑥􀍮). Since only types within
(𝑥􀍭, 𝑥􀍮) play actions within the interval, all actions must be played in equilibrium, and 𝑐
􀚆 > 0, it
must be the case that𝑔􀑑 ≤ 1. If there is some ?̃? forwhich this is not satisfied, then the indifference
condition implies that 𝑔􀑑 is increasing in (?̃?, 𝑥􀍮). Then the probability of actions being played in
the region (?̃?, 𝑥􀍮) is ∫
􀐤􀑦
?̃?
𝑔􀑑(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 > 𝑥􀍮 − ?̃?. However, the only types who play within this range
are those within the range itself, so the maximum probability with which strategies in the range
can be played is 𝑥􀍮 − ?̃?, a contradiction.
Given that 𝑔􀑑(?̃?) ≤ 1 and 𝑔􀑋(?̃?) ≤ 1, and that 𝐺􀐕􀍸(𝑥􀍭) = 𝑥􀍭, it must be that both candidates
play with a mass point at 𝑥􀍭, which cannot happen, and so delivers the desired contradiction.
The above lemmas pin down the basic character of all equilibria. At the lower end, candidates
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will reveal all arguments to which they have access. Then above a certain threshold, candidates
will be indifferent betweenall strategiesplayedabove that threshold. All that remains is to find the
two values 𝑥 and ?̄?, which mark these thresholds, i.e., candidates are indifferent between actions
in [𝑥, ?̄?], and actions above ?̄? never get played.
First, not that neither candidate can play mass at ?̄?, since otherwise the best response of the
other candidate would entail playing actions just above it. For 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?], indifference means
𝑔􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥)
𝑔􀑋(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀐄(𝑥)
No candidate can play strategies that induce mass above 𝑥, since there can be no mass at ?̄?, be-
tween 𝑥 and ?̄? strategies must satisfy the indifference conditions. This means that for at least
one candidate, 𝐺􀐕(𝑥) = 𝑥. Since 𝑐􀚄􀐄 < 𝑐
􀚄
􀏾 , and 𝐺
􀑑(?̄?) = 𝐺􀑋(?̄?) = 1, it must be the case that
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) < 𝐺􀑋(𝑥), which means that 𝐿 will be playing with mass at 𝑥.
To pin down 𝑥, note that 𝑐􀚄􀐕(𝑥) ≤ 1 for 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝑅. If not, then immediately below 𝑥 it would
not be optimal for one candidate to release all arguments, which contradicts our definition of 𝑥,
since the marginal benefit of releasing arguments is 1 (assuming that the other candidate always
releases all arguments). We also know, that 𝑅 does not play with mass at any point, and no type
above 𝑥 ever plays below 𝑥. As a result, it must also be the case that 𝑔􀑑􀍷(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥) ≥ 1, where
𝑔􀍷 represents the one-sided derivative of 𝐺 from above. To see this, consider some type 𝜃􀐄 just
above 𝑥; all such types must play strategies between 𝑥 and 𝜃􀐄 . Since the action distribution is
continuous at 𝑥, 𝑔􀑑 must exceed 1. Since 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥) ≤ 1 and 𝑐
􀚄
􀏾(𝑥) ≥ 1, it must be that 𝑐
􀚄
􀏾(𝑥) = 1,
which pins down the value of 𝑥.
The top of the distribution is also easy to pin down, since 𝐺􀑑 has no mass points and is well-
defined above and below 𝑥; we just need to find the value at which 𝐺􀑑(?̄?) = 1. Writing out 𝐺􀑑(?̄?)
as
𝐺􀑑(?̄?) = 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) + ∫
?̄?
􀐤
𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
= 𝑥 + 𝑐􀏾(?̄?) − 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) = 1
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We can rearrange and take the inverse:
?̄? = 𝑐􀍸􀍮􀏾 (1 − (𝑥 − 𝑐􀏾(𝑥)))
To verify that these strategies are optimal, not that 𝑐􀏾(?̄?) < 1, since below 𝑥, 𝑐
􀚄
􀏾 < 1, so 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) <
𝑥. Below 𝑥 it is clearly optimal for both candidates to release all arguments that they have, since
the marginal benefit of doing so is 1 (taking opponent's strategy as given), and the marginal cost
is less. Above 𝑥, strategies are constructed such that each is indifferent, so it is optimal to mix
within the range.
To characterize the cumulative distribution functions of the actions played, we exploit the in-
difference conditions: each candidate's realized utility for any action in [𝑥, ?̄?] is equal to his utility
at ?̄?, when he wins almost certainly. Let 𝑣􀏾 be this utility for 𝐿, and 𝑣􀐄 be this utility for 𝑅, then
𝑣􀏾 = 1 − 𝑐􀏾(?̄?) = 𝑥 − 𝑐􀏾(𝑥)
Since 𝐿 is indifferent between all actions 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?], his expected utility is always equal to 𝑣􀏾:
𝐸𝑢􀏾(𝑥) = 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) − 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) = 𝑣
􀏾
Rearranging gives
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐􀏾(𝑥)
Similarly, we can get
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) = 𝑣􀐄 + 𝑐􀐄(𝑥)
where 𝑣􀐄 = 1− 𝑐􀐄(?̄?). Since 𝐺
􀑑 and 𝐺􀑋 must both equal one at ?̄?, and they must equal 𝑥 below 𝑥,
the strategies all entail 𝐿 playing with mass at 𝑥. When 𝑐􀐄 = 𝛼𝑐􀏾 , we have that 𝑣
􀐄 = 1 − 𝛼(1 −
𝑥 + 𝑐􀏾(𝑥)), so that we can solve out
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) = 𝑣􀐄 + 𝑐􀐄(𝑥)
= 1 − 𝛼 (1 − 𝑥))
Furthermore, we know that 𝐺􀑋􀍸(𝑥) = 𝑥, which implies a probability mass of 𝐺
􀑋(𝑥) − 𝐺􀑋􀍸(𝑥) =
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥) at 𝑥.
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3.5. Analysis and Discussion
Although there are multiple equilibria, the characterization above allows pins down many prop-
erties of all equilibria, which we now explore in greater detail. In particular, since the action dis-
tribution is unique, the bias of the election is well-defined, and we can consider how it changes
with changes in the parameters. We first place the findings of our model in the context of some
puzzling empirical findings in the literature, such as the seeming inefficacy of incumbent spend-
ing. We show that the basic findings are all consistent with the presence of cost asymmetries in
an all-pay contest.
We would like the contest to select as often the high-type candidate, i.e., we would like it to
be informationally efficient. In general, different equilibria will have different informational ef-
ficiency characteristics, since there is no guarantee of monotonicity. Our analysis focuses on the
maximal efficiency of equilibria, and show that it declines with growing asymmetries.
Finally, we consider the impact of policy that affects campaign finance, namely, asymmetric lib-
eralization and spending caps. Liberalization alone can be beneficial, but worsening asymmetries
have counteract the benefits. We find that spending caps can be beneficial, both for reducing bias
aswell as for improving efficiency, but that it depends critically on the choice of the cap andmodel
parameters. In particular, when costs are more similar, all caps may worsen the informational ef-
ficiency; furthermore, binding caps that are set ``too high'' may have no impact on the bias, but
reduce informational efficiency.
3.5.1. The incumbency paradox
Our model allows us to explain the ``incumbency paradox'' quite neatly, as a result of the asym-
metric cost functions. In particular, our equilibrium involves asymmetries both in the levels of
spending and in the marginal effects of additional spending in ways consistent with the observa-
tions noted in the introduction.
Inmanyways, it makes sense for themarginal effects of spending to differ between candidates:
since they are engaged in competition, themarginal effects of spendingwill depend on the actions
of other candidates, i.e., against a relatively evenly matched challenger, additional spending will
likely havemore of an effect on the final outcome than against a challengerwhohad little chance of
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winning in the first place. This basic idea is present in previous efforts to explain the incumbency
paradox5, but often an incumbency advantage in vote share or popularity needs to be assumed in
addition to cots asymmetries; here, the only fundamental asymmetry between the two candidates
is the difference in cost functions, or fund-raising capacity, and the differences in the marginal
productivity of their efforts is a consequence of equilibrium strategies in the political contest. The
main advantage of ourmodel vis-à-vis existing explanations is that it allowsus to pin down several
of the observed ``anomalies'' on one fundamental asymmetry. While other sources of candidate
asymmetry are certainly important in electoral outcomes, the fact that cost asymmetries alone
can explain all of the major campaign spending anomalies gives a clearer picture on the potential
impact of money in the electoral process.
This section describes some of the characteristics of our equilibria. We show that cost asym-
metries generate asymmetries in both spending levels as well as marginal effects, and show that
they also generate an incumbency advantage when candidates are otherwise ex ante identical.
We formalize the differences in spending levels in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. When 𝛼 < 1, 𝐺􀑑 strictly first-order stochastically dominates 𝐺􀑋.
Proof. The proof is straightforward: for 𝑥 < 𝑥, 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = 𝐺􀑋(𝑥), and for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?], 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) < 𝐺􀑋(𝑥),
since within this range
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = 1 − ∫
?̄?
􀐤
𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
whereas
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) = 1 − ∫
?̄?
􀐤
𝑐􀚄􀐄(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
= 1 − 𝛼∫
?̄?
􀐤
𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
which gives the desired result.
There are two consequences to this: (1) the incumbent will campaign more intensively in ex-
pectation, which can explain the differences in observed levels, and (2) for the same amount of
spending, the incumbent will typically win with higher probability. Although the second effect is
5 For instance, Moon (2006), looking at vote shares, presents a model where incumbent spending targets more ex-
pensive extreme voters in the presence of weak challengers
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a relatively straightforward consequence of asymmetric cost functions, and the fact that equilib-
rium involves mixing, it nevertheless bears on the interpretation of empirical studies into cam-
paign finance effects. Most estimates of campaign spending effects measure the average effect
of spending, but this may not really capture the role of financing in campaigns; the strategies
generated in our model would make it likely to show up in the constant term, or the incumbency
advantage, even though its fundamental cause is the incumbent's easier access to campaign funds.
We can capture the idea of incumbency advantage by the bias of the outcome; this is a measure
of the advantage an incumbent has because of his access to easier funds.
Definition 3.1 (Bias). Let the bias 𝑏 be the difference between the incumbent's ex ante probability
of winning and 1/2 (the ``fair'' probability – how often the incumbent would win if all information
were revealed), i.e.,
𝑏 = 𝑃(𝜌 > 𝜆) −
1
2
Corollary 3.2. The incumbent wins with higher probability; more specifically,
𝑏 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼)
Furthermore, reductions in the incumbent's cost increase the bias, i.e., 𝑑𝑏/𝑑𝛼 < 0.
Proof. Wecan find the bias easily by looking at separate cases. When at least one of the candidates
has type below 𝑥, the outcome is efficient, since the candidate below 𝑥 reveals all arguments, and
no candidate at or above 𝑥 ever reveals fewer than 𝑥.
The only cases remaining are those where both candidates have types above greater than or
equal to 𝑥; which occurs with probability (1 − 𝑥)􀍯. Note that conditional on 𝜆 ≥ 𝑥, the prob-
ability that 𝜆 = 𝑥 is 1 − 𝛼, since the probability mass is (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥), and the condition-
ing event has probability 1 − 𝑥. Furthermore, conditional on 𝐿 playing above 𝑥, we have that
𝑔􀑋(𝑥|𝑥 > 𝑥) = (1/𝛼)𝑐􀚄􀐄(𝑥) = 𝑐
􀚄
􀏾(𝑥) = 𝑔
􀑑(𝑥|𝑥 ≥ 𝑥), i.e., the distribution is the same as the
conditional distribution of 𝑅 actions, which means that of these, 𝐿 wins 1/2. The only remain-
ing case is when 𝐿 actually plays 𝑥: here, he loses with probability 1, and this is the only subcase
where the conditional probability deviates from the ``fair'' outcome. This case occurs with overall
probability (1 − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼), and the deviation from the fair probability is 1/2 of that, which gives
the bias.
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The second issue related to the incumbency paradox is the effect of themarginal dollar spent,
or in our case, the marginal effect of an additional argument. Consider the issue from the point of
view of candidate 𝐿. His probability of winning with 𝑥 arguments is simply the probability that 𝑅
releases fewer arguments, 𝐺􀑑(𝑥). Consequently, the marginal effect of an additional argument is
the probability density of the actions of 𝑅 at 𝑥, or 𝑔􀑑(𝑥). Suppose that we are in the range [𝑥, ?̄?],
then the marginal benefit of additional campaigning for 𝐿 is given by 𝑔􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀏾(𝑥), whereas the
benefit of additional campaigning by 𝑅 is 𝑔􀑋(𝑥) = 𝑐􀚄􀐄(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑐
􀚄
􀏾(𝑥) < 𝑔
􀑑(𝑥); in other words, the
marginal benefit of campaigning for each party is equal to the marginal cost of campaigning for
the other party, which means that 𝐿 raises his winning probability by more with each additional
argument.
This actually suggests quite a different interpretation of campaign spending effects than the
ones usually offered, where the ``gains'' of additional spending are supposed to be exogenous, and
so the question becomes shifted onto that of why the incumbent seems to be buying more ex-
pensive goods with his campaign spending. In our model, the efficacy of campaign spending is
endogenously determined in response to differences in campaigning costs. Moreover, we do not
suppose any other asymmetries, such as the typical incumbency advantage, where voters have
some type of predisposition to vote for the incumbent – the candidates are, aside from cost dif-
ferences, ex ante identical.
3.5.2. Informational efficiency
Another question that is potentially of interest is whether or not we can expect election winners
to correspond to the candidates with the stronger positions, i.e., those with more arguments at
their disposal.
Consider the following set of strategies, which we will call equilibrium A:
Definition 3.2 (Equilibrium A). Let 𝜆(𝑥) denote the number of arguments released by an 𝐿 can-
didate of type 𝑥, and let 𝜌(𝑥) be the number of arguments released by candidate 𝑅 of type 𝑥. Call
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equilibrium A that which consists of the following strategies:
𝜌(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
𝑥 if 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑥 + ∫
􀐤
􀐤
􀍮
􀐏􀚅􀓶(􀐟)
𝑑𝑠 if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥
𝜆(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 if 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝜌(𝑥) with probability 𝛼, if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥
𝑥 with probability 1 − 𝛼, if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥
This particular equilibriumhas several nice properties: it is intuitive,monotonic, andhas a very
simplemixing rule (arguably, this is as ``close'' to a pure strategy as we can get). It also happens to
be, however, maximally informationally efficient, in the sense that it reduces the probability that
the candidate with fewer arguments wins. We present this in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Equilibrium A minimizes the probability of the lower type candidate winning the
election.
Proof. First, note that the bias forms a lower bound for the error probability in question: since
candidate𝐿 is the high-type candidate1/2 the time, andhe loseswith1/2−𝑏 of them, the ``wrong''
candidate must be chosen with at least probability 𝑏.
All that is left to show is that the strategies described in equilibriumAachieve this lower bound,
which is straightforward since, aside from 𝐿 types above 𝑥 playing 𝑥 with probability 1 − 𝛼, their
strategies are the same, so whenever 𝐿 plays 𝜌(𝑥), the outcome is efficient. The only inefficient
outcomes are those where 𝐿 plays 𝑥 and both types are above 𝑥, which happens with probability
(1 − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼). 𝐿 loses all of these, when he is the higher type candidate in 1/2 of them, so the
error probability is (1/2)(1 − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼), which is equal to the bias.
One consequence of this is that the more severe the asymmetry, the greater the mass that 𝐿
must play at 𝑥, which reduces the informational efficiency of the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3. As 𝛼 decreases from one down to zero, the minimum achievable probability that the
lower type candidate gets elected increases.
Proof. As argued above, the minimal error rate is equal to 𝑏, and we have previously shown that
this increases with 𝛼.
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3.5.3. Campaign finance reform
In this section we consider how changes in the financing environment would be expected to
change the outcomes of the contest. We consider two types of changes: (1) a change that affects
the cost functions of each candidate directly, such as Citizens United, where the costs for both par-
ties of any particular amount of campaigning are lowered, but possibly asymmetrically; (2) the
imposition of spending caps, where there is a hard cap on the amount of campaigning that can be
done in equilibrium.
Changes in financing costs
Let us parameterize the cost functions with an additional term 𝛾, so that 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) = 𝛾𝑐(𝑥) and
𝑐􀐄(𝑥) = 𝛼𝛾𝑐(𝑥). Arguably, we can model the effect of the Citizen's United decision as a reduc-
tion in 𝛾, and possibly also a reduction in 𝛼, if we think that the cost-advantaged party gains more
– one justification would be if one party has access to more wealthy or more intensely interested
single donors, so that the lift on single-source spending greatly eases fund-raising efforts on one
party.
Corollary 3.3. A reduction of 𝛾 raises ?̄?, so that the set of 𝐿 types that mixes shrinks. It also leads to
higher spending levels by both parties. The minimal error rate is still expressed as (1/2)(1−𝛼)(1−
𝑥)􀍯, which decreases if 𝛼 remains constant.
Proof. The results followdirectly fromthe increase in ?̄?, which is nowdefined implicitly by𝛾𝑐􀚄(?̄?) =
1; clearly, as 𝛾 falls, ?̄? must rise since 𝑐􀚆 > 0 by our assumptions.
Hence, a symmetrical reduction in cost functions will improve the maximum achievable effi-
ciency of equilibrium. There is, however, a catch, which is that if the reduction is not symmetric,
then the effect is ambiguous, since it also reduces informational asymmetry conditional on both
candidates having types above ?̄?: an asymmetric reduction hence increases the contests ability
to discriminate between lower types, but may decrease its ability to discriminate between higher
types, with the net effect being dependent on the precise parameters and cost functions.
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Spending caps
Wenow consider a different type of campaign finance reform: caps on total spending. Hence, now
define 𝑥∗ as the upper bound of the permissible action space. Let us suppose that 𝑥∗ is set such
that it is in the range (𝑥, ?̄?), which remain as defined above.
The binding upper bound makes specifying equilibria more complicated by allowing for mass
at 𝑥∗, and the results will be sensitive to the choice of spending cap. For 𝑥∗ low enough, it will be
optimal for all types above 𝑥∗ to play exactly at 𝑥∗. In particular, define ?̃? ∈ [𝑥, ?̄?] to be the point
where the following is satisfied:
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐(?̃?) =
1
2
(1 + ?̃?)
To see that such a point must exist, consider the difference between the left hand side and the
right hand side:
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐(𝑥) −
1
2
(1 + 𝑥)
This is negative at 𝑥, positive at ?̄?, and strictly increasing with 𝑥 in between, so at some unique
point it must equal zero, which gives ?̃?.
We first present results for caps in the range [𝑥, ?̃?]. A cap in this range always reduces the bias,
and with sufficiently low 𝛼 also improves informational efficiency.
A spending cap greater than ?̃?, on the other hand, has an effect different from what one might
expect: it has no effect on the bias, and strictly reduces efficiency. It turns out that the mass 𝐿
plays at 𝑥 stays the same, but now both players must also playmass at 𝑥∗, with that of 𝐿 being less
than that of 𝑅.
Theorem3.4. All equilibria in the gamewith a spending cap 𝑥∗ ∈ [𝑥, ?̃?] can be described as follows.
First, define
𝑥􀚄 = 𝑐􀍸􀍮(𝑥∗ − (𝑥 − 𝑐(𝑥)))
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Then equilibrium strategies for each candidate must satisfy the following action distributions:
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐􀏾(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, 𝑥
􀚄)
𝑥∗ for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥􀚄, 𝑥∗)
1 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗
and
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣∗􀐄 + 𝑐􀐄(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̃?)
𝑥∗ for 𝑥 ∈ [?̃?, 𝑥∗)
1 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗
where 𝑣∗􀐄 = 𝛼𝑣􀏾 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥
∗ + 𝑥) is the expected utility of 𝑅 when he plays 𝑥.
Proof. The proof follows almost exactly as the main theorem, with the exception that we can no
longer rule out mass being played at the top. It is easy to establish that the lowest types must
continue to release all arguments, up to 𝑥. If a candidate's opponent plays with mass at 𝑥∗, and all
actions below 𝑥∗ are played in equilibrium, then all types 𝑥∗ and above will find it optimal to play
𝑥∗, since the winning probability jumps up discretely at that point, which ensures that it is also
optimal for the opponent to play a mass at 𝑥∗. Since 𝑥∗ is below ?̄?, this must be the case.
Thismeans that all types in [𝑥, 𝑥∗)mustbe indifferent betweenactionsplayedwithin that range.
If we condition on both candidates having types strictly below 𝑥∗, the strategies will look exactly
like they do in the uncapped game: all types in the range [𝑥, 𝑥∗)mix between actions in [𝑥, ?̃?) for
some ?̃? that we need to determine.
We know that for action ?̃?, the winning probability must be 𝑥∗; also, we can repeat the argu-
ments from earlier to conclude that𝑅 plays amassless strategywithin this range, and 𝐿 playswith
mass at 𝑥, so we know that 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑥, as before. Then the fact that 𝐿 is indifferent between 𝑥 and
𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑥 means
𝐺􀑑(?̃?) − 𝑐(?̃?) = 𝐺􀑑(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥)
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or
?̃? = 𝑐􀍸􀍮(𝑥∗ − (𝑥 − 𝑐(𝑥)))
Then letting
𝑣∗􀏾 = 𝑥
∗ − 𝑐(?̃?)
𝑣∗􀐄 = 𝑥
∗ − 𝛼𝑐(?̃?)
we get
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) = 𝑣∗􀏾 + 𝑐(𝑥)
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) = 𝑣∗􀐄 + 𝛼𝑐(?̃?)
for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, ?̃?), and the winning probabilities remain constant at 𝑥∗ until 𝑥∗.
As with the case with no spending caps, we can determine the bias and minimum efficiency.
Corollary 3.4. The bias of the game with a binding spending cap ?̃? > 𝑥∗ > 𝑥 is given by
𝑏 =
1
2
(𝑥∗ − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼)
Proof. When both candidates have types above 𝑥∗, each wins with probability 1/2, the fair out-
come; the only non-trivial case is when both candidates play actions in [𝑥, 𝑥∗), which corresponds
to both types being within that range. Again, conditional on 𝐿 playing above 𝑥, the conditional
action distributions of both candidates are the same, so each wins with 1/2. Conditional on both
players being in [𝑥, 𝑥∗), only when 𝐿 plays 𝑥 does he lose all the time; this case happens with
probability (𝑥∗ − 𝑥)(1 − 𝛼), which then leads to the value of bias given above.
What this means is that the bias of the contest decreases, in the sense that the ex antewinning
probabilities become more even. In fact, setting a very low spending cap, below 𝑥, would bring
the bias down to zero. There is a cost to be paid in terms of informational efficiency, however: the
maximal efficiency of equilibrium suffers, since whenever both candidates have types above 𝑥∗,
the outcome is random, which will select the higher type candidate with probability only 1/2 –
this is the same informational efficiency as setting thewinner always equal to the same candidate.
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Corollary 3.5. For a gamewith spending cap 𝑥∗ ∈ [𝑥, ?̃?], the minimum error probability is less than
that of the game without a spending cap if 𝛼 < 2(𝑥∗ − 𝑥)/(1 − 2𝑥 + 𝑥∗).
Proof. The reasoning is similar to the case without caps, but now the maximal (conditional) effi-
ciencywhen both candidates have types above 𝑥∗ is 1/2, since the outcome here is random, Hence
the minimum error probability is at least (1/2)(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯.
Of the remaining, cases, we know that 𝑅 wins 1/2 + 𝑏, but is the higher-type candidate only
1/2 of the time, so the error rate is at least
1
2
(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 + 𝑏
This is achieved by an equilibrium where strategies for 𝑥 < 𝑥∗ are exactly as prescribed by
equilibrium A, and candidates with higher types play with mass at 𝑥∗. It is easy to verify that
the only inefficient outcomes generated by these strategies (additional to those described above)
occurs when both candidates are in [𝑥, 𝑥∗) and 𝐿 plays 𝑥 – precisely half of all such cases are
inefficient, and it is the same expression as the bias.
Hence, the minimum error probability is
1
2
[(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 + (𝑥∗ − 𝑥)􀍯(1 − 𝛼)] =
1
2
[𝛼(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 + (1 − 𝛼)((1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 + (𝑥∗ − 𝑥)􀍯)]
=
1
2
𝛼(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 +
1
2
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥)􀍯 −
1
2
(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 𝑥∗)(𝑥∗ − 𝑥)
The middle term is the minimum error probability without spending caps, so spending caps im-
prove efficiency as long as
𝛼(1 − 𝑥∗)􀍯 − 2(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥∗)(𝑥∗ − 𝑥)
which we can rearrange to get the expression stated.
Hence, in the presence of severe asymmetries, a properly chosen spending cap can effectively
reduce bias and increase efficiency. The potential benefits of a spending cap are only realized,
however, for caps below ?̃?, and the consequences of a cap change significantly when we cross the
threshold. We now turn our attention to the case a spending cap 𝑥∗ ∈ (?̃?, ?̄?).
Theorem3.5. The equilibria of a gamewith a spending cap 𝑥∗ ∈ (?̃?, ?̄?) are characterized as follows.
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Let
𝑝􀐄 ≡ 2(1 − 𝑣􀏾 − 𝑐(𝑥
∗))
and
𝑥􀚄 ≡ 𝑐􀍸􀍮 (1 − 𝑣􀏾 − 𝑝􀐄)
where 𝑣􀏾 = 𝑥 − 𝑐(𝑥), as before. Then the action distributions must satisfy
𝐺􀑑(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, 𝑥
􀚄)
1 − 𝑝􀐄 for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥
􀚄, 𝑥∗)
1 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗
𝐺􀑋(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝑥 for 𝑥 < 𝑥
𝑣􀐄 + 𝑐(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥, 𝑥
􀚄)
1 − 𝛼𝑝􀐄 for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥
􀚄, 𝑥∗)
1 for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗
where 𝑣􀐄 = 𝛼𝑣􀏾 + (1 − 𝛼), as before.
In other words, 𝑅 plays mass 𝑝􀐄 , and 𝐿 plays mass 𝛼𝑝􀐄 at 𝑥
∗; 𝐿 plays mass (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥) at 𝑥;
below 𝑥, both candidates play 𝑥, and in the remaining region, each plays with density equal to the
marginal cost of his opponent, as before.
Proof. As before, all candidates below 𝑥 play their types; afterwards, there is a region over which
they are indifferent; after that, there is a gap in the support, andmassmust be played at 𝑥∗ by both
candidates. Since 𝑥∗ > ?̃?, however, playing at the boundary can no longer strictly beat actions
below 𝑥∗ for both candidates. Nor can it be a unique best response for a single candidate (which
must be 𝑅, because of his cost advantage); hence, both candidates must be indifferent between 𝑥∗
and actions below it.
Let𝑝􀐄 be themass that𝑅 plays at𝑥
∗. Thenwhen𝐿 plays𝑥∗, hewinswithprobability1−(1/2)𝑝􀐄 ,
which gives him utility 1 − (1/2)𝑝􀐄 − 𝑐(𝑥
∗). This must equal 𝑣􀏾 , which pins down 𝑝􀐄:
𝑝􀐄 = 2 [1 − 𝑣􀏾 − 𝑐(𝑥
∗)]
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Since 𝑥∗ > ?̃? which would equate 𝑝􀐄 with 1 − 𝑥
∗, we know that 𝑝􀐄 < 1 − 𝑥
∗ and is feasible.
As before, 𝑅 cannot play with mass at 𝑥, so 𝑥∗ is his only mass point. This means that his action
distribution on the support below 𝑥∗ is completely determined: 𝑔􀑑(𝑥) = 1 for 𝑥 < 𝑥, and 𝑔􀑑 =
𝑐􀚄(𝑥) for 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥, and this must continue up to the point where the measure of types ``left over'' is
equal to 𝑝􀐄 , i.e.,
𝑣􀏾 + 𝑐(𝑥
􀚄) = 1 − 𝑝􀐄
which pins down 𝑥􀚄.
As for 𝐿, 𝑔􀑋 is fixed in the region [𝑥, 𝑥􀚄], which means that all the remaining types must play
with mass points at 𝑥 and 𝑥∗. Furthermore, we know that 𝑅 must also be indifferent between 𝑥􀚄
and 𝑥∗; since his cost increases between the two by𝛼 times the cost increase experienced by 𝐿, his
winning probability must go up by 𝛼 times the increase in the winning probability of 𝐿 between
those points; this fixes the mass that 𝐿 plays at 𝑥∗ at 𝛼𝑝􀐄 .
The mass at 𝑥 played by 𝐿 makes up the remainder (so that the total measure of all actions
played is equal to 1). Themeasure of 𝑅 actions in the range (𝑥, 𝑥􀚄] is 1−𝑥−𝑝􀐄 , whichmeans that
the measure of 𝐿 actions in that range is 𝛼(1−𝑥−𝑝􀐄); when we add the 𝛼𝑝􀐄 point mass at 𝑥
∗, we
get that the actions played in (𝑥, 𝑥∗] have measure 𝛼(1 − 𝑥). Since the total measure of actions in
[𝑥, 𝑥∗] is 1−𝑥, this leaves a point mass of (1−𝛼)(1− 𝑥) at 𝑥, which is the same as the point mass
played in the equilibrium without caps.
Corollary 3.6. A spending cap in the range (?̃?, ?̄?) has no effect on the bias and reduces the maximal
informational efficiency relative to the game without spending caps.
Proof. As before, if we condition on 𝐿 both candidates playing above 𝑥, their strategy distributions
are identical. Since themass point it 𝑥 remains unchanged, the bias also remains unchanged, since
conditional on 𝐿 not playing 𝑥, both candidates win half the time, and, as before, 𝐿 loses whenever
he plays 𝑥 against an opponent with type higher than 𝑥.
The efficiency properties of the cases where at least one candidate is below 𝑥, or both candi-
dates are above 𝑥 with 𝐿 playing at 𝑥) remain the same. The only case we need to examine, then,
is when both candidates play strictly above 𝑥. With the spending cap, we can no longer achieve
perfect efficiency because of the mass points, whereas we could in the equilibrium without caps,
so the error rate must increase.
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The implication of all this is that a spending cap can help to produce better outcomes, provided
that it is suitably chosen. A spending cap that is binding but ``too high'' will do nothing to even
the competition, and serves only to reduce the potential efficiency of the outcome. A lower cap
can reduce the bias introduced by the cost asymmetry, but it has subtle effects on informational
efficiency: effectively, it reduces the contest's ability to distinguish between types above the cap,
but improves its ability to distinguish types above the cap from those below.
As a result, in the case of very severe asymmetries, a spending cap is clearly beneficial; when
the asymmetries are not great, however, then there is a trade-off between informational efficiency
and bias. How this should be valued will depend on the broader policy game; if we worry that
candidates may choose less beneficial policies in order to attract lower their cost function, then
we might value bias more than informational efficiency, since a random pick between two good
options may be better than the better out of two bad ones.
3.6. Empirical predictions
Our model offers several new empirical predictions on the determinants of election outcomes
and campaign spending. Although informational efficiency is at the center of much of our above
analysis and discussion, it is not an easily measured quantity, so we turn our attention here to the
determinants of the bias of the election.
The first set of empirical predictions is related to the effects of cost asymmetries. One effect of
a greater incumbent cost advantage is that the incumbent advantage increases, in the sense that
his winning probability is higher. In ourmodel, this effect does not, however, come about through
higher incumbent spending: rather, in equilibrium, the challenger's spending levels adjust down-
ward, while the incumbent's equilibrium strategy remains the same. Hence, we should expect
that, ceteris paribus, the greater the incumbent's cost advantage, the lower the level of challenger
spending.
The second set of predictions is on the effects of spending caps. A unique feature of our model
is the non-monotonic effect of spending caps: with very restrictive caps, the bias should decrease,
but even at mild levels, where the cap is binding for both candidates, it has no effect on the ex-
pected outcome of the election.
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The main challenge to overcome in an empirical test is the measurement of our key variable:
the fund-raising capacities of candidates. There is no direct measurement available on the fund-
raising capacity of candidates; only campaign spending is available, but that must form the de-
pendent variable in our tests of the first prediction. We posit a couple tentative identification
strategies, to be pursued in a laterwork. First, campaign finance policy, such as the Citizens United
decision, should have different effects on different candidates; in particular, since it lifts the limit
on single-source contributions, we should expect the costs of campaignswith narrower,more con-
centrated donor bases to decreasemore dramatically, whereas campaigns that already drew form
a greater variety of sources would see their marginal costs decrease by less. Hence, candidates
who represent narrow, but concentrated interests may be more directly affected by recent liber-
alization policy. An advantage of this approachwould be that contributors are likely uncorrelated
with other important candidate characteristics that might impact election results; other observ-
able candidate characteristics correlatedwith funding capacitymay also be correlatedwith other
aspects of candidate quality with a direct impact on elections.
3.7. Conclusion
In spite of the fairly wide-spread use of all-pay auctions to analyze various types of contests, they
have not been applied extensively to political campaigns, where the literature has also produced
several puzzles that have been difficult for models of electoral competition to accommodate.
This paper has hoped to shed a new perspective on some of the empirical evidence by pro-
ducing a relatively straightforward model of the campaigning process that helps to explain these
effects and to offer additional insights into how cost asymmetries manifest themselves in equi-
librium, and hence also empirical estimates. We are able to explain several of the most puzzling
asymmetries as equilibrium effects in our model, i.e., the incumbent advantage in winning prob-
ability, as well as the fact that incumbent spending appears to have less of an effect on election
outcomes than does challenger spending. In addition, we explain wide asymmetries in spending
levels, an issue that does not appear to garner as much attention is the differences in marginal
impact.
Our all-pay model also offers new results on how different types of campaign finance reform
88
3. Arguing about politics: An all-pay model of political campaigns
might affect campaign outcomes. We find that symmetric liberalization, which simply leads to
more campaigning, will generally be a good thing, but asymmetric liberalization may have some
undesirable effects. Spending caps are effective at mitigating both the biases and informational
distortions introduced by cost asymmetries, with the proviso that it is properly chosen: too low
of a cap incurs a high cost on informational efficiency, while too high of a cap does nothing to even
out the competition while degrading the informational efficiency of the contest.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1. Proofs
This appendix includes the full proofs of details omitted over the course of the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Let 𝑛 denote the number of buyers who shows up in a given auction, so 𝑛 ∼
Poisson(𝜇). For any given 𝑛 ≥ 𝑘, the probability that exactly 𝑘 of them have valuations in 𝑋􀍮 is
given by
𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑘 | 𝑛) = (
𝑛
𝑘
)𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐗(1 − 𝑝)􀐚􀍸􀐗
𝑘􀍮 | 𝑛 is binomially distributed, since there are 𝑛 buyers, each with an independent probability of
being in 𝑋􀍮 of probability 𝑝(𝑋􀍮). Since 𝑛 is Poisson distributed, we know that
𝑃(𝑛) =
𝑒􀍸􀑌𝜇􀐚
𝑛!
The prior probability of exactly 𝑘 buyers from 𝑋􀍮 is then simply
𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑘) =
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗
𝑃(𝑛) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑘 | 𝑛)
=
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗
𝑒􀍸􀑌𝜇􀐚
𝑛!
(
𝑛
𝑘
)𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐗(1 − 𝑝)􀐚􀍸􀐗
=
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗
𝑒􀍸􀑌𝜇􀐚
𝑛!
𝑛!
𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘)!
𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐗(1 − 𝑝)􀐚􀍸􀐗
=
𝑒􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑦)􀑌𝜇􀐗
𝑘!
𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐗
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗
𝑒􀍸(􀍮􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑦))􀑌𝜇􀐚􀍸􀐗
(𝑛 − 𝑘)!
(1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮))
􀐚􀍸􀐗
=
𝑒􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑦)􀑌(𝑝(𝑋􀍮)𝜇)
􀐗
𝑘!
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗
𝑒􀍸(􀍮􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑦))􀑌((1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮))𝜇)
􀐚􀍸􀐗
(𝑛 − 𝑘)!
=
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀐊􀑦)𝜇(𝑋􀍮)
􀐗
𝑘!
To see independence, consider the probability that 𝑘􀍮 = 𝑙 and 𝑘􀍯 = 𝑚, again letting 𝑛 denote
the total number of buyers in an auction. Any given buyer is in 𝑋􀍮 with probability 𝑝(𝑋􀍮), in 𝑋􀍯
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with probability 𝑝(𝑋􀍯), and in neither with probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮) − 𝑝(𝑋􀍯). Given 𝑛, The number
of buyers in each of these groups – 𝑋􀍮, 𝑋􀍯, and 𝑋 ⧵ (𝑋􀍮 ∪ 𝑋􀍯) – is multinomially distributed, so
𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑙 and 𝑘􀍯 = 𝑚 | 𝑛) =
𝑛!
𝑘! 𝑙! (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑙)!
𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐘𝑝(𝑋􀍯)
􀐙(1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮) − 𝑝(𝑋􀍯))
􀐚􀍸􀐘􀍸􀐙
Taking the probability weighted sum over all 𝑛 gives the desired expression:
𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑙 and 𝑘􀍯 = 𝑚) =
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐗􀍷􀐘
𝑒􀍸􀑌𝜇􀐚
𝑛!
𝑛!
𝑘! 𝑙! (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑙)!
𝑝(𝑋􀍮)
􀐘𝑝(𝑋􀍯)
􀐙 (1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮) − 𝑝(𝑋􀍯))
􀐚􀍸􀐘􀍸􀐙
=
𝑒􀍸􀑌􀐜(􀐊􀑦)(𝜇𝑝(𝑋􀍮))
􀐘
𝑙!
⋅
𝑒􀍸􀑌􀐜(􀐊􀑧)(𝜇𝑝(𝑋􀍯))
􀐙
𝑚!
⋅
􀏯
∑
􀐚􀍹􀐘􀍷􀐙
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑦)􀍸􀐜(􀐊􀑧))(𝜇(1 − 𝑝(𝑋􀍮) − 𝑝(𝑋􀍯)))
􀐚􀍸􀐘􀍸􀐙
(𝑛 − 𝑙 − 𝑚)!
=
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀐊􀑦)𝜇(𝑋􀍮)
􀐘
𝑙!
⋅
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀐊􀑧)𝜇(𝑋􀍯)
􀐙
𝑚!
=𝑃(𝑘􀍮 = 𝑙) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑘􀍯 = 𝑚)
Proof of Lemma 1.2. The proof involves separately considering the number of buyers who show
up with valuations on disjoint subsets of 𝑋 around 𝑥.
Suppose that 𝑥􀚄 > 𝑥. Then the probability that the highest bid among the other buyers is
below 𝑥􀚄 is simply the probability that no bidder with valuation in 𝑋􀚄 = [𝑥􀚄, 𝑥] shows up. There is
a measure 𝜇 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) of such bidders, and their number is Poisson distributed with parameter
𝜇 ((1 − 𝐹(𝑥)), so the probability that zero of them shows up is 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐤)), as desired.
If𝑥􀚄 ≤ 𝑥, then theprobability that thehighest bid among theothers is below𝑥􀚄 is theprobability
that zero bidders show up in the ranges [𝑥􀚄, 𝑥) and (𝑥, 𝑥].
We are able to exclude 𝑥 itself since the conditional probability of no other buyers of valua-
tion 𝑥 showing up is one. To see this, consider a small neighborhood of valuations around 𝑥; let
𝜇􀚄 be the measure of buyers with valuations in this neighborhood, and let 𝑘􀚄 be a random vari-
able denoting the number of buyers who shows up in a given auction. We know from above that
𝑘􀚄 ∼ Poisson(𝜇􀚄). A buyer with valuation 𝑥 conditions on his own presence, so the probability
that no other buyers with valuations in this neighborhood appear is the probability that 𝑘􀚄 = 1
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conditional on 𝑘􀚄 ≥ 1, which is
𝑃(𝑘􀚄 = 1 | 𝑘􀚄 ≥ 1) =
𝜇􀚄𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀚅
1 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀚅
by Bayes' rule. The conditional probability when we condition exactly on 𝑥 is the limit of this as
𝜇􀚄 → 0 (we make the neighborhood tighter and tighter around 𝑥). Since the above expression is
indeterminate at 𝜇􀚄 = 0, we apply L'Hôpital's rule to find the limit:
lim
􀑌􀚅→􀍭
𝜇􀚄𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀚅
1 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀚅
= lim
􀑌􀚅→􀍭
􀐐
􀐐􀑌􀚅
(𝜇􀚄𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀚅
)
􀐐
􀐐􀑌􀚅
(1 − 𝑒􀍸􀑌􀚅)
= lim
􀑌􀚅→􀍭
𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀚅
− 𝜇􀚄𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀚅
𝑒􀍸􀑌􀚅
= lim
􀑌􀚅→􀍭
1 − 𝜇􀚄
=1
Thismeans that we only need to consider intervals that do not include 𝑥 itself, [𝑥􀚄, 𝑥) and (𝑥, 𝑥].
Themeasureof buyers in the first range is𝜇 (𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥􀚄)), and that of buyers in the second range
is 𝜇 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)). Since these are independent events, the probability of both being true is
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀏸(􀐤)􀍸􀏸(􀐤
􀚅))𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐤)) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐤
􀚅))
which proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Buyers have quasilinear utility, so𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥𝐺(𝑥)−𝑚(𝑥), where the first term
is simply the benefit fromwinning, 𝑥, times the probability of winning, and the second term is the
expected payment for a buyer of valuation 𝑥. The expected payment is equal to the expectation of
the highest bid among other buyers, conditional on that highest being below 𝑥. An application of
Bayes' rule gives
𝑚(𝑥) =∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝑦𝑔(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
=𝑥𝐺(𝑥) − ∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝐺(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦
where the second line follows from integration by parts, letting 𝑢 = 𝑥 and 𝑑𝑣 = 𝑔(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦. Substi-
tuting this in to 𝑢(𝑥) gives the desired result.
The expected revenue is equal to the expectation of the second highest bid, which we denote
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𝑋􀍯. We can calculate the cumulative distribution function for 𝑋􀍯 as the probability that zero or
one buyer shows up from the subset (𝑥, 1] for any 𝑥:
𝐺􀍯(𝑥) = 𝐺(𝑥) + 𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝐺(𝑥)
where the first term is the probability that no buyers show up with valuations higher than 𝑥, and
the second is the probability that exactly one such buyer shows up. The density function is then
𝑔􀍯(𝑥) =𝑔(𝑥) + [−𝜇𝑓(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥) + 𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑔(𝑥)]
=𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑔(𝑥)
The second line follows from the fact that𝑔(𝑥) = 𝜇𝑓(𝑥)𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍮􀍸􀏸(􀐤)) = 𝜇𝑓(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥). The expectation
of 𝑋􀍯 is then
𝐸[𝑋􀍯] =∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝑥𝑔􀍯(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
=∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑥𝑔(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
=𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑥𝐺(𝑥)|􀐤􀍭 − ∫
􀐤
􀍭
[−𝜇𝑓(𝑥)𝑥𝑔(𝑥) + 𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝐺(𝑥)] 𝑑𝑥
=𝑚(1) − 𝜇∫
􀐤
􀍭
(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝐺(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
The transition from the second to third lines again integrates by parts, with 𝑢 = 𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑥
and 𝑑𝑣 = 𝑔(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥. The final line follows from the third by noticing that ∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝜇𝑓(𝑥)𝑥𝐺(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 =
∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝑥𝑔(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥, which is the expected payment of the highest valuation buyer.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. Consider a buyer 𝑥 for whom 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − 𝑢􀏴(𝑥) > 0, i.e., who prefers to be in
an𝐴 auction, and suppose he is randomlymatched into a𝐵 auction. Let 𝑣 denote his continuation
payoff from searching, so that he will search if and only if 𝑣 − 𝑐 > 𝑢􀏴(𝑥). The only step we need
to do is to solve for 𝑣.
If he searches, with probability 𝑝􀐍, he will be matched with an 𝐴 seller (with probability 𝑝, he
gets his preferred match for certain, and with probability 1 − 𝑝 he is randomly matched, which
gives his preferredmatchwith probability 𝑎). Hence, with probability 1−𝑝􀐍 hewill have to search
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again, which yields 𝑣 − 𝑐. This gives
𝑣 = 𝑝􀐍𝑢
􀏳(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝􀐍)(𝑣 − 𝑐)
⇔ 𝑝􀐍𝑣 = 𝑝􀐍𝑢
􀏳(𝑥) − (1 − 𝑝􀐍)𝑐
⇔ 𝑣 = 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) −
1 − 𝑝􀐍
𝑝􀐍
𝑐
Substituting back into the decision rule shows that search is optimal if only if
𝑣 − 𝑐 > 𝑢􀏴(𝑥)
⇔ 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − (1 +
1 − 𝑝􀐍
𝑝􀐍
) 𝑐 > 𝑢􀏴(𝑥)
⇔ 𝑢􀏳(𝑥) − 𝑢􀏴(𝑥) >
𝑐
𝑝􀐍
The proof is analogous for searching into 𝐵.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. As described in the main text, existence follows from the continuity of the
mapping from a pair of thresholds to the types that are indifferent between searching and not
searching – all equilibria are fixed points of such a mapping, and all fixed points are equilibria, so
we can use Brouwer's fixed point theorem to establish the existence of a fixed point, and hence
equilibrium. The main step is to establish continuity.
Here we will introduce a little bit of additional notation, since we will need to consider the
market for 𝐴 goods separately from the market for 𝐵 goods. Let us define 𝜇􀏳 and 𝜇􀏴 to be the
measures of buyers in the 𝐴 and 𝐵markets. Remember from our derivation that the appropriate
measure is the ratio of buyers to sellers (when we take the limit of discrete games, the ratio of
buyers to sellers goes to 𝜇), so these correspond to the measures of buyers who end up in 𝐴 and
𝐵 auctions, taking into account the search strategies, divided by the measure of sellers of each
type. We also define 𝜇􀏳(𝑥), 𝜇􀏳(𝑋), 𝜇􀏴(𝑥), and 𝜇􀏴(𝑋) analogously to 𝜇 (as the density andmeasure
functions in the markets).
If the thresholds are (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍), then we can get easily get 𝜇
􀏳 and 𝜇􀏴 . The easiest way to see
this is to consider the density of buyers in each market. If 𝑥 ∈ (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍), so that buyers at 𝑥 are not
sorting, then a fraction 𝑎 go into𝐴 auctions, which havemeasure 𝑎; hence, the normalized density
of buyers, from the point of view of𝐴 sellers, remains the same, i.e., 𝜇􀏳(𝑥) = 𝜇(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍).
On the other hand, for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍, all the buyers end up in 𝐴 auctions, but there is only a measure
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𝑎 of sellers, so the normalized density is 𝜇(𝑥)/𝑎. Finally, no buyers of type 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐎 show up in 𝐴
auctions, since they all search into 𝐵 auctions, so the density is zero. We can then write the total
measure in each auction, given thresholds (𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍), as
𝜇􀏳 = 𝜇 (𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎) +
1
𝑎
(1 − 𝐹(𝑥􀐍)))
𝜇􀏴 = 𝜇 (𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎) +
1
1 − 𝑎
𝐹(𝑥􀐎))
Since we know the measures of types in each auction, we can simply apply the results from the
single-good model to get expressions for utility.
We show this below in lemma A.1, which gives the closed form expressions for the first-order
statistic distribution. It is easy to see that they are continuous in 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍 (since the measure on
buyers ismassless, variation is continuous), and utility is a continuous function of the distribution
of the first-order statistic; as a result, 𝑠 is continuous. This delivers existence.
Lemma A.1. Let 𝐺􀏳 and 𝐺􀏴 denote the distributions of the first-order statistics in auctions for each
type of good. Then
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀓫(􀍮􀍸􀏸􀓫(􀐤))
and
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀓬(􀍮􀍸􀏸􀓬(􀐥))
where
𝜇􀏳 =
1
𝑎
− (
1
𝑎
− 1) 𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)
𝜇􀏴 = 𝐹(𝑥􀐍) +
𝑎
1 − 𝑎
𝐹(𝑥􀐎)
𝐹􀏳(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 for 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐎
􀑌
􀑌􀓫
(𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)) for 𝑥􀐎 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐍
􀑌
􀑌􀓫
[
􀍮
􀐍
𝐹(𝑥) − (
􀍮
􀐍
− 1) 𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)] for 𝑥􀐍 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥
1 for 𝑥 > 𝑥
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𝐹􀏴(𝑦) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 for 𝑦 < 𝑦􀐍
􀑌
􀑌􀓬
(𝐻(𝑦) − 𝐻(𝑦􀐍)) for 𝑦􀐍 ≤ 𝑦 < 𝑦􀐎
􀑌
􀑌􀓬
[
􀍮
􀍮􀍸􀐍
− (
􀍮
􀍮􀍸􀐍
− 1)𝐻(𝑦􀐎) − 𝐻(𝑦􀐍)] for 𝑦􀐎 ≤ 𝑦 < 𝑦
1 for 𝑦 > 𝑦
where 𝐻(𝑦) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑦􀍸􀍮(𝑥)) is the population-wide distribution of 𝐵 good valuations, 𝑦 = 𝑦(𝑥),
𝑦 = 𝑦(𝑥), 𝑦􀐍 = 𝑦(𝑥􀐍), and 𝑦􀐎 = 𝑦(𝑥􀐎) are the 𝐵 good valuations for the respective buyers.
Proof. As before, we will prove the result for the 𝐴market. The total measure of buyers in the 𝐴
market, normalized by sellers, is given by 𝜇􀏳, since
𝜇􀏳 =𝜇(𝑋􀍭) +
1
𝑎
𝜇(𝑋􀐍)
=𝜇 [𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)] +
𝜇
𝑎
[1 − 𝐹(𝑥􀐍)]
=𝜇 [
1
𝑎
− (
1
𝑎
− 1) 𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)]
Let 𝜈(𝑥) be the measure of buyer above 𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥], then
𝜈(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
􀑌
􀐍
[1 − 𝐹(𝑥)] for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍
𝜇 [𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥)] +
􀑌
􀐍
[1 − 𝐹(𝑥􀐍)] for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥􀐍
The probability that 𝑥 is above the highest bid in a given auction is the probability that buyer with
valuation 𝑥􀚄 > 𝑥 shows up, which is 𝑒􀍸􀑍(􀐤). It is straightforward to verify that this is equal to the
expression given.
The form given emphasizes the role that independence plays in our analysis: since the number
of buyers showing up from each interval is independent, the above is equivalent to thinking of
𝐴 auctions as a single-good platform where the total measure of buyers is 𝜇􀏳 and valuations are
independently and identically distributed according to the population frequencies (since 𝐹􀏳 is
simply the measure function scaled by 𝜇􀏳, the total measure.
Proof of Theorem 1.2 continued: Uniqueness and Monotonicity. Toshowmonotonicity andunique-
ness, let
𝐅(𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) = [
𝑠(𝑥􀐎; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍)
𝑠(𝑥􀐍; 𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍)
]
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Then equilibrium is defined by 𝐅(𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍) = (−𝑐/𝑝􀐎 , 𝑐/𝑝􀐍). By the Gale-Nikaido theorem (Gale and
Nikaido 1965), this is unique if the Jacobian of 𝐅 has positive determinant; furthermore, we can
establish monotonicity by signing the terms of the inverse Jacobian.
First, recall that𝑢􀏳(𝑥) = ∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥􀚄) 𝑑𝑥􀚄, and note that changes to either threshold, 𝑥􀐎 or 𝑥􀐍, only
affects the winning probabilities of buyers with types below those thresholds. The derivatives of
𝑢􀏳 and𝑢􀏴with respect to the threshold valueswill followalmost immediately from thederivatives
of 𝐺􀏳 and 𝐺􀏴 with respect to 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍. establish these, recall from Lemma A.1 that
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀓫(􀍮􀍸􀏸􀓫(􀐤))
Let 𝜈(𝑥) be the measure of buyers in 𝐴markets with valuations above 𝑥, then
𝜈(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
􀑌
􀐍
[(1 − 𝐹(𝑥)] for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍
􀑌
􀐍
[1 − 𝐹(𝑥􀐍)] + 𝜇 [𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥)] for 𝑥􀐎 < 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐍
􀑌
􀐍
[1 − 𝐹(𝑥􀐍)] + 𝜇 [𝐹(𝑥􀐍) − 𝐹(𝑥􀐎)] for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥􀐎
Taking the derivatives with respect to 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍 yields
𝑑𝜈(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥􀐎
=
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
−𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥􀐎
0 otherwise
𝑑𝜈(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥􀐍
=
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
− 𝜇 (
􀍮
􀐍
− 𝑎) 𝑓(𝑥􀐍) for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍
0 for 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐍
where both inequalities are strict in the cases for 𝑑𝜈(𝑥)/𝑑𝑥􀐍 because the change at precisely 𝑥􀐍
depends on the direction in which 𝑥􀐍 is changing.
From this, we can see how 𝐺􀏳 changes with 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍:
𝑑𝐺􀏳(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥􀐎
=
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎)𝐺
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥􀐎
0 otherwise
𝑑𝐺􀏳(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥􀐍
=
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
(
􀍮
􀐍
− 1) 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍)𝐺
􀏳(𝑥) for 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐍
0 for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍
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Using these expressions in 𝑢􀏳, we get
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐎) =
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
∫
􀐤􀔆
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
= 𝐺􀏳(𝑥􀐎) + ∫
􀐤􀔆
􀍭
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎)𝐺
􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
= 𝐺􀏳(𝑥􀐎) + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎)𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐎) =
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
∫
􀐤􀔆
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
=
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍)𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐍) =
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
∫
􀐤􀔅
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
= 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎)𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐍) =
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
∫
􀐤􀔅
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
= 𝐺􀏳(𝑥􀐍) +
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍)𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐍)
Utilities on the 𝐵 side can be expressed equivalently using 𝐵 valuations (i.e., writing utilities as
functions of 𝑦􀐎 and 𝑦􀐍) and𝐵 densities; the derivatives with respect to 𝑥will involve an additional
𝑦􀚄 term. Further simplifications are can bemade by observing that ℎ(𝑦)|𝑦􀚄(𝑥)| = 𝑓(𝑥), which we
substitute in to the expressions for 𝑑𝑠(⋅)/𝑑𝑥􀐕 to get:
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑠(𝑥􀐎) = 𝐺
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) + |𝑦
􀚄(𝑥􀐎)|𝐺
􀏴(𝑥􀐎) + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) +
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝑢􀏴(𝑥􀐎)]
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑠(𝑥􀐎) = 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝑢􀐍(𝑥􀐎) + 𝑢􀐎(𝑥􀐍)]
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑠(𝑥􀐍) = 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝑢􀐎(𝑥􀐍) + 𝑢􀐍(𝑥􀐎)]
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑠(𝑥􀐍) = 𝐺
􀏳(𝑥􀐍) + |𝑦
􀚄(𝑥􀐍)|𝐺
􀏴(𝑥􀐍) + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐍) + 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐍)]
The determinant of the Jacobian is equal to
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐍)
𝑑𝑥􀐍
−
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐍)
𝑑𝑥􀐎
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To see that this is strictly positive, consider only the final terms of 𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐎)/𝑑𝑥􀐎 and 𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐍)/𝑑𝑥􀐍:
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑠(𝑥􀐎) = 𝐾􀐎 + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) +
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝑢􀏴(𝑥􀐎)]
≥ 𝐾􀐎 + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) +
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝑢􀏴(𝑥􀐍)]
= 𝐾􀐎 +
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐍)
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝑠(𝑥􀐍) = 𝐾􀐍 + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐍) + 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐍)]
≥ 𝐾􀐍 + 𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
𝑢􀏳(𝑥􀐎) + 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐍)]
= 𝐾􀐎 +
𝑑𝑠(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑𝑥􀐍
where𝐾􀐎 and𝐾􀐍 are strictly positive and represent all termsother than the last two. Since all other
terms are positive, multiplying these two and subtracting the cross term yields a determinant
strictly greater than zero.
Finally, since the determinant of the Jacobian is positive, the inverse Jacobian is signed as fol-
lows (using standard expressions for the inverse of a two-by-two matrix):
sgn(𝐽􀍸􀍮) = (
+ −
− +
)
Since 𝑑(𝑥􀐎 , 𝑥􀐍)/𝑑𝑐 = 𝐽
􀍸􀍮 ⋅ 𝑑(−𝑐/𝑝􀐎 , 𝑐/𝑝􀐍)/𝑑𝑐, this tells us that 𝑑𝑥􀐎/𝑑𝑐 < 0 and 𝑑𝑥􀐍/𝑑𝑐 > 0, as
desired
Proof of Lemma 1.6. Suppose not. Consider the set of individuals that is assigned to sort into 𝐴
and those that are assigned to sort into𝐵 (we can consider any sets of two possible strategies and
the analysis follows similarly). If the optimal assignment does not have the structure described in
the lemma, then we can find some set 𝑋􀏳 of buyers who sort into 𝐴, and another set 𝑋􀏴 of buyers
who sort into𝐵, each of measure 𝜀 > 0, such that inf 𝑋􀏴 > sup𝑋􀏳. That is, there is a set of buyers
who sort into 𝐵 each with strictly higher 𝑥 than another set of buyers who sort into 𝐴 of same
measure.
Consider what happens if we change the assignments of 𝑋􀏳 and 𝑋􀏴; that is, we construct an
alternative assignment that leaves all other search decisions the same, but tells those in 𝑋􀏳 to
search into 𝐵 and those in 𝑋􀏴 to search into 𝐴. Since 𝑋􀏳 and 𝑋􀏴 have the same measure, the
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alternative assignment results in the same measure of bidders in each market. Furthermore, the
value distribution in each auction first order stochastically dominates the value distribution in the
original assignment, since the change is to have replaced a measure of low valuation buyers with
an equal measure of higher valuation buyers. This means that the distribution of the first-order
statistics in the alternative distribution also first-order stochastically dominate the first-order
statistic distributions of the original assignment, since
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) = 𝑒􀍸􀑌
􀓫(􀍮􀍸􀏸􀓫(􀐤))
and 𝜇􀏳 stays the same in the alternative assignment. This means that 𝐸[𝑥􀍮] and 𝐸[𝑦􀍮] are greater
under the alternative assignment, and search costs remain the same, so total welfare is raised
by switching strategies. This contradicts the original assumption that the allocation was socially
optimal.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Recall the expressions for welfare and the derivatives of 𝐺􀏳 and 𝐺􀏴 with
respect to 𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥􀐍:
𝑊 = 𝑎 (𝑥 − ∫
􀐤
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥) + (1 − 𝑎) (𝑦 − ∫
􀐥
􀍭
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦) − (
(1 − 𝑎)𝜇􀐍
𝑝􀐍
+
𝑎𝜇􀐎
𝑝􀐎
) 𝑐
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎)𝐺
􀏴(𝑥) for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥􀐎
0 otherwise
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) (
􀍮
􀐍
− 1) 𝐺􀏳(𝑥) for 𝑥 < 𝑥􀐍
0 for 𝑥 > 𝑥􀐍
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐎
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
−𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) (
􀍮
􀍮􀍸􀐍
− 1) 𝐺􀏴(𝑦) for 𝑦 < 𝑦(𝑥􀐎)
0 for 𝑦 > 𝑦(𝑥􀐎)
𝑑
𝑑𝑥􀐍
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
−𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍)𝐺
􀏴(𝑦) for 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦(𝑥􀐎
0 otherwise
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This gives
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑥􀐎
=𝑎𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [−∫
􀐤􀔆
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 + ∫
􀐥􀔆
􀍭
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦 −
𝑐
𝑝􀐎
]
=𝑎𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐎) [− (𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) − 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐎)) −
𝑐
𝑝􀐎
]
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑥􀐍
=(1 − 𝑎)𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [−∫
􀐤􀔅
􀍭
𝐺􀏳(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 + ∫
􀐥􀔆
􀍭
𝐺􀏴(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦 −
𝑐
𝑝􀐍
]
=(1 − 𝑎)𝜇𝑓(𝑥􀐍) [− (𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐍) − 𝑢
􀏴(𝑥􀐍)) −
𝑐
𝑝􀐍
]
The terms in brackets are easily signed: when 𝑥􀐎 is below the threshold of the market solution,
𝑑𝑊/𝑑𝑥􀐎 is positive since 𝑢
􀏳(𝑥􀐎) − 𝑢
􀏴(𝑦􀐎) < 𝑐/𝑝􀐎 , and similarly, when 𝑥􀐍 is above the market
solution threshold, 𝑑𝑊/𝑑𝑥􀐍 is negative. A quick inspection shows that the first order conditions
for the social planner are equivalent to the threshold equilibrium conditions, so we have (𝑥∗􀐎 =
𝑥􀐎 and 𝑥
∗
􀐍 = 𝑥􀐍, i.e., the social optimum coincides with the market solution. Hence, the search
equilibrium is efficient in the sense that it maximizes total welfare.
A.2. Numerical Implementation
This section contains details regarding our implementation of the numerical results. The datawas
generated using code written in C++; performance and accuracy considerations ruled out the use
of Matlab orMathematica, whose built-in optimization routines performed poorly for our setting.
To avoid rewriting widely used mathematical operations, we used two third-party open-source
libraries: GSL for numerical integration and NLopt for minimization. Both libraries have been
extensively tested for correctness, sowe canbe confident of our results even for smallmagnitudes.
The implementation is quite straightforward: for sets of parameters (𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍), we define utility
functions, whose forms are given in the main text, and an error function, 𝜀(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) as
𝜀(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) = 𝜀􀐎(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) + 𝜀􀐍(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) (A.1)
where
𝜀􀐎(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
|𝑠􀐎(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) − 𝑐􀐎| for 𝑡􀐎 > 0
0 otherwise
(A.2)
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and
𝜀􀐍(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
|𝑠􀐍(𝑡􀐎 , 𝑡􀐍) − 𝑐􀐍| for 𝑡􀐍 < 1
0 otherwise
(A.3)
The error function is minimized via the SBPLX algorithm, and the numerical minimization proce-
dure is terminated when 𝜀 < 10􀍸􀍶.
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B.1. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.4. If the marginal participant searches, then lowering search costs increases
participation without changing the behaviors of anybody already on the platform, so revenues
must increase.
The non-trivial case is when the marginal participant does not search, so that a decrease in
search costs also decreases participation. When total participation does not change, a positive
revenue effect from reduced search costs is easy to show because, from the point of view of the
seller, low valuation buyers are replaced with higher valuation buyers, with no net change in the
measure of buyers; as a result, revenuemust increase. When there is a binding reservation utility,
however, the effects are more subtle: the lowest valuation buyers search out, and are replaced
by an equal measure of higher valuation buyers who search in; at the same time, however, the
increased competitiveness of the platform drives out more buyers in the middle. Hence, sellers
have more higher valuation buyers, but face a net decrease in the measure of buyers.
Since platform is symmetric, revenue in 𝐴 and 𝐵 markets are equal, hence it suffices to show
that revenue in market 𝐴 increases as search costs decrease. In particular, we will show that
𝑑𝑅􀐍/𝑑𝑐
∗ < 0when 0 < 𝜃􀐎 < 𝜃􀐡 < 1/2
1. We already have expressions for 𝑑𝜃􀐎/𝑑𝑐
∗ and 𝑑𝜃􀐡/𝑑𝑐
∗,
so if we express revenue as a function of 𝜃􀐎 and 𝜃􀐡 we can apply the chain rule and get an expres-
sion directly.
First, consider the effects of changes in threshold values on the revenue. Let
𝛽 ≡ 𝑢􀐍(1) + ∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑢􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
1 Note that if nobody is searching, and𝜃􀐎 = 0, thendecreasing search costs has no effect onbehavior or participation.
If everybody is participating, and 𝜃􀐡 = 1/2, then there is no net exit as search costs decrease. We restrict our
attention to the case where both equilibrium conditions are binding. The analysis also applies to cases where
𝜃􀐎 = 0 and/or 𝜃􀐡 = 1/2, as long as the equilibrium constraints are binding in the direction of change of 𝑐
∗.
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so that 𝑅 = 1 − 𝛽, and 𝑑𝑅/𝑑𝑗 = −𝑑𝛽/𝑑𝑗 for any variable 𝑗. Recall that
𝑢􀐍(𝜃) =∫
􀑈
􀍭
𝐺􀐍(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣
𝐺􀐍(𝜃) =𝑒
􀍸􀑇􀔅(􀑈)
𝜂􀐍(𝜃) =∫
􀍮
􀑈
𝑓􀐍(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡
𝑓􀐍(𝜃) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 for 𝜃 < 𝜃􀐎 or 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐡, 1 − 𝜃􀐡)
2𝜇 for 𝜃 > 𝜃􀐍 = 1 − 𝜃􀐎
𝜇 otherwise
which gives a utility function
𝑢􀐍(𝜃) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
𝜃𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐎) for 𝜃 ∈ [0, 𝜃􀐎]
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐎) +
􀍮
􀑌
(𝐺􀐍(𝜃) − 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐎)) for 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐎 , 𝜃􀐡]
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐡) + (𝜃 − 𝜃􀐡)𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐡) for 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐡, 𝜃􀐢]
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐢) +
􀍮
􀑌
(𝐺􀐍(𝜃) − 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐢)) for 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐢 , 𝜃􀐍]
𝑢􀐍(𝜃􀐍) +
􀍮
􀍯􀑌
(𝐺􀐍(𝜃) − 𝐺􀐍(𝜃􀐍)) for 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃􀐍, 1]
It is straightforward to see that
𝜂􀐍(𝜃􀐎) =𝜇2𝜃􀐡
𝜂􀐍(𝜃􀐡) =𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡) = 𝜂􀐍(𝜃􀐢)
𝜂􀐍(𝜃􀐍) =𝜇2𝜃􀐎
so
𝑢􀐍(1) = 𝜃􀐎𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) + (1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) +
1
𝜇
[
1
2
(1 + 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆)) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)]
Alsonote that the expressions for utility in all regionswhere𝑓􀐍(𝜃) > 0, i.e., buyers of that typepar-
ticipate, can be expressed as the sumof a constant term and term that depends on type, where the
type-dependent term is alwaysof the form𝐺􀐍(𝜃)/𝑓􀐍(𝜃); consequently the integral∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑢􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
can be written as
𝐾 + ∫
􀑈􀔙
􀑈􀔆
𝐺􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃 + ∫
􀑈􀔅
􀑈􀔚
𝐺􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃 + ∫
􀍮
􀑈􀔅
𝐺􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃
where𝐾 is the sumof each constant termmultiplied by themeasure of buyerswho have that term
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in their utility. Fully written out, we have
∫
􀍮
􀍭
𝑢􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃 =𝜃􀐎𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐡)] + (1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡)]
+
1
2𝜇
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐎)] −
1
𝜇
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐡)]
+
1
𝜇
[
1
2
(1 + 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆)) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)]
where the final term is the integral of the type-dependent terms in 𝐺􀐍(𝜃)𝑓􀐍(𝜃), and the square-
bracketed terms in all the preceding terms represent the measure of buyers with the associated
constant term in their utilities. Adding in 𝑢􀐍(1) gives
𝛽 =
1
𝜇
+ 𝜃􀐎𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐡) + 1]
+(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡) + 1]
+
1
2𝜇
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐎) + 2]
−
1
𝜇
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) [𝜇(2𝜃􀐡) + 2]
The partial derivatives of this are
𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐎) = −[𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆)(𝜇2𝜃􀐎 + 1) − 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡 + 1)
+ [𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)] [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡)] 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]
𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐡) = −[2 (𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)(𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡) + 1) − 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡 + 1))
+ [𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)] [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡)] 𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)
− (𝜇2𝜃􀐎)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙]
The comparative statics showed that
⎛
⎜
⎝
􀐐􀑈􀔆
􀐐􀐏∗
􀐐􀑈􀔙
􀐐􀐏∗
⎞
⎟
⎠
∝
⎛
⎜
⎝
𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐡)
−𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐎)
⎞
⎟
⎠
That is, the left-hand side vector is proportional to the right-hand side. Taking the derivative of 𝛽
with respect to 𝑐∗ using the chain rule gives
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝑐∗
= 𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐎)𝑑(𝜃􀐎 , 𝑐
∗) + 𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐡)𝑑(𝜃􀐡, 𝑐
∗) ∝ 𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐎)𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐡) − 𝑝𝑑(𝛽, 𝜃􀐡)𝑝𝑑(𝐹􀍮, 𝜃􀐎)
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The right hand side expands to
[
􀐤􀑦
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔆)(𝜇2𝜃􀐎 + 1) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡 + 1)+
􀐤􀑧
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
[𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)] [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡)] 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]×
× [
􀐥􀑦
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
2 (𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)) +
􀐥􀑧
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) +𝜇(2𝜃􀐎)𝑒
􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)]
− [
􀐤􀚅􀑦
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
2 (𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)(𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡) + 1) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡 + 1)) +
􀐤􀚅􀑧
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
[𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)] [𝜇(𝜃􀐎 + 𝜃􀐡)] 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) −(𝜇2𝜃􀐎)(𝜇2𝜃􀐡)𝑒
􀍸􀑌􀍯􀑈􀔙]×
× [
􀐥􀚅􀑦
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜
𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙) − 𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀍯􀑈􀔙) +
􀐥􀚅􀑧
⏜⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏞⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⎴⏜1
2
𝜇(1 − 2𝜃􀐡)𝑒􀍸􀑌(􀑈􀔆􀍷􀑈􀔙)]
To sign this, first note that
𝑑(, 𝑥)𝑒􀍸􀐤(𝑥 + 1) = −𝑥𝑒􀍸􀐤 < 0 for 𝑥 > 0
so the terms labeled 𝑥􀍮 and 𝑥
􀚄
􀍮 are greater than zero, and 𝑥􀍮 > (1/2)𝑥
􀚄
􀍮. This implies that all
the terms in large square brackets are greater than zero; consequently the sum of all products
involving the unlabeled terms is greater than zero. 𝑥􀍯𝑦􀍯 = 𝑥
􀚄
􀍯𝑦
􀚄
􀍯, 𝑥􀍮𝑦􀍮 > 𝑥
􀚄
􀍮𝑦
􀚄
􀍮, and 𝑥􀍯𝑦􀍮 > 𝑥
􀚄
􀍯𝑦
􀚄
􀍮, so
the entire expression, which is proportional to 𝑑𝛽/𝑑𝑐∗, is greater than zero. Finally,
𝑑(𝑅, 𝑐∗) = −𝑑(𝛽, 𝑐∗) < 0
as desired.
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